Eleutheria: John W. Rawlings School of Eleutheria: John W. Rawlings School of
Divinity Academic Journal Divinity Academic Journal
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 7
December 2023
An Appeal to Mystery Without "Punting": Revisiting Molinism’s An Appeal to Mystery Without "Punting": Revisiting Molinism’s
Biblical Problem in Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans Biblical Problem in Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans
11:33–36 11:33–36
Jeffrey S. Kennedy
Liberty University
, jskennedy@liberty.edu
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
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in Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans 11:33–36."
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An Appeal to Mystery Without "Punting": Revisiting Molinism’s Biblical Problem in An Appeal to Mystery Without "Punting": Revisiting Molinism’s Biblical Problem in
Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans 11:33–36 Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans 11:33–36
Abstract Abstract
Molinists maintain that middle knowledge is the best candidate for settling the historical debate on God’s
sovereignty and man’s free will. The philosophical sophistication of the view can be alluring, and the
efforts of Molinists to rationally defend it against criticisms have been impressive. But does Molinism still
have a biblical problem? Proponents argue that the doctrine is compatible with the Bible's teaching on
God's knowledge of counterfactuals, though admittedly, it is not explicitly taught in Scripture. But this
claim is more problematic than advocates for the theory have alleged. The present study maintains that in
the absence of a more complete biblical revelation regarding God’s knowledge logically prior to his eternal
decree, philosophers of religion should exercise greater caution than is presently being advocated. It is
argued that Paul supplies the reader with a necessary constraint to philosophical speculation regarding
the deliberations of the divine mind (Rom 11:33–36), and it is John Calvin, not Luis de Molina, who best
represents Paul’s appeal to mystery in this respect. Far from being an intellectual "punt" to mystery, this is
an occasion to join Paul in awestruck wonder in the face of the unknowable.
Jeff Scott Kennedy, Ph.D. Bible Exposition (Rawlings School of Divinity, Liberty University / 2022)
Keywords Keywords
Molinism, Middle Knowledge, Natural Knowledge, Free Knowlddge, Luis de Molina, Counterfactuals,
Subjunctive Conditionals, Foreknowledge, Predestination, Election, Omniscience, Compatibilism,
Libertarian Freedom, Calvin
Cover Page Footnote Cover Page Footnote
Jeff Scott Kennedy, Ph.D. Bible Exposition (Rawlings School of Divinity, Liberty University / 2022)
This article is available in Eleutheria: John W. Rawlings School of Divinity Academic Journal:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/eleu/vol7/iss2/7
Page 91
Revisiting Molinism
Kennedy
“An Appeal to Mystery without ‘Punting’: Revisiting Molinism’s Biblical
Problem in Light of Ephesians 1:4–11 and Romans 11:33–36”
Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable
are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! “For who has known the mind of
the Lord, or who has been his counselor?”
“Or who has given a gift to him that he
might be repaid?” For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him
be glory forever. Amen. (Rom 11:33–36, English Standard Version)
Theologians who decline to speculate on indeterminate matters in biblical
texts are sometimes criticized by philosophers of religion as “punting to mystery.”
A theological punt can be defined as an appeal to the unknowability of certain
ambiguous or paradoxical issues in Scripture so as to avoid the difficult task of
philosophical reflection.
1
William Lane Craig observes that all too often, an “easy
appeal to mystery has become a substitute for the labor of hard thinking.”
2
Instead,
he insists, Christians should first exhaust their intellectual resources before
resorting to mystery as a convenient recourse to ignorance.
3
This admonition
against lazy or incurious thinking is admirable and, in many cases, necessary.
However, some biblical texts may appeal to mystery and even encourage the reader
to embrace ambiguities in God. Paul’s ode to God’s omniscience in Romans 11:33–
36 is just such a text. Paul’s case for God’s sovereign freedom in election for
salvation (Rom 8:28–11:32) crescendos into a hymn that acknowledges the
unfathomable depths of God’s knowledge and wisdom while marveling at his
inscrutable and unsearchable judgments (Rom 11:33–34).
This study investigates the hymn’s apparent constraining principle as it
relates to the philosophical concept of middle knowledge, also referred to as
“Molinism.” Molinism theorizes that logically prior to God’s decision to predestine
and create the world, God possessed knowledge of all counterfactuals or future
contingent truths. On this view, God knows what free creatures would do if created
_____________________________
1
Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A
Biblical, Historical, Theological and Philosophical Analysis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020),
50. Often, the appeal to mystery is described as merely “punting” or deferring to it in the absence of
a more complex philosophical explanation. See also Tom McCall and Keith D. Stanglin, “SM
Baugh and the meaning of Foreknowledge: Another Look,” TJ 26, no.1 (2005): 19–31; For a
reformed use of the term, see Oliver D. Crisp, God, Creation, and Salvation: Studies in Reformed
Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 34.
2
William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge
and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2000), 15, 153. Craig is careful to note that
mystery has a place, but only as a last resort, after the philosopher has employed the assets of reason
and rationality.
3
Ibid.
Volume 7 Issue 2
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in any set of freedom-permitting circumstances. Consequently, God can predestine
and decree the actions of these free creatures according to his will to bring many
freely to salvation. This speculative theory concerns God’s knowledge of supposed
counterfactuals of creaturely choices in order to resolve the debate between
Thomistic high sovereignty (predestination) and human free will (libertarian
choice). The present study maintains that in the absence of a more complete biblical
revelation regarding God’s knowledge logically prior to his eternal decree,
philosophers of religion should exercise greater caution than is presently being
advocated. It is argued that Paul supplies the reader with a necessary constraint to
philosophical speculation regarding the deliberations of the divine mind (Rom
11:33–36), and it is John Calvin, not Molina, who best represents Paul’s appeal to
mystery in this respect. This would mean that the supposed choice between
engaging in the rigors of philosophical study or defaulting to a lazy intellectual
punt to mystery is a false dilemma in this particular case. Another interpretive live
option remains—Paul intended his Roman readers to embrace the unknowability of
this issue as a stimulus for greater worship.
The Usefulness and the Challenge of Philosophical Theology
This paper stipulates that the modern theologian is indebted to the rich
heritage of Christian philosophical writings.
4
Considering the pretensions of the so-
called enlightenment (1685–1815) and the subsequent eviction of God and
_____________________________
4
The anti-philosophical traditions of some patristics (Tertullian, Tatian, Irenaeus, et al.)
and certain Reformers (Luther) should not be pressed too much. The issue is not whether they
practiced philosophical theology but to what degree. One need only read Luther’s debate with
Erasmus to see that the thrust of his argument was that embracing “free will” would put Erasmus in
conflict with the Anti-Pelagian Constraint (APC), not merely with Paul. See Philip Melanchthon,
Loci Communes 1555: Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine, trans. Clyde L. Manschreck, intro. Hans
Engelland (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), vii–xvi. Despite his official stance of revulsion for
“Aristotelian” reasoning, calling it the heathen’s “philosophical god,” Luther tolerated and
enthusiastically endorsed his colleague and successor, Philip Melanchthon. An accomplished
philosopher and humanist, Melanchthon offered rational arguments for God’s existence, appealing
to reason in his moral philosophy. He published his Loci Communes with Luther’s apparent consent.
See also Aku Visala, “Erasmus Versus Luther: A Contemporary Analysis of the Debate on Free
Will,” NJSTh 62, no.3 (2020): 311–35. Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers,
Volume I: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); John
Beversluis, “Reforming the ‘Reformed” Objection to Natural Theology,” Faith and Philosophy 12,
no. 2 (1995): 189–206; For an explication of Calvin’s view, see Paul Helm, “John Calvin, the
‘Sensus Divinitatis,’ and the Noetic Effects of Sin,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 43, no. 2 (1998): 87–107; For an explanation of Calvin’s reception and rejection of certain
philosophical ideas, see Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). See
also Calvin’s commentary on Acts 17:18–27, where he notes the limited usefulness of philosophical
reasoning, Calvin, Commentary Upon the Acts of the Apostles, vol. 2, trans. Henry Beveridge
(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2010), 152.
Page 93
Revisiting Molinism
Kennedy
religious thought from all branches of the humanities, it is therefore encouraging to
see a resurgence of the philosophy of religion today. Philosophical theology can be
a valuable weapon against “every lofty opinion raised against the knowledge of
God” (2 Cor 10:5). Using God-given reason can help to enlighten the believer’s
understanding on matters to which the Bible inconclusively speaks.
5
This study also acknowledges that Molinism has become an increasingly
attractive option because it appears to embrace both a high view of sovereign
election and human freedom grounded in a theory of God’s omniscience.
6
This
raises the question of whether every uncertainty in Scripture necessitates a
philosophical resolution. Surely some problems are amenable to rational discourse,
but perhaps some are not and were intended to be left undisclosed. This issue
matters because Molinism is being used to reinterpret the entirety of the loci
communes, or key aspects of the Christian faith.
Molinism’s Origins
Before critiquing it, the reader must first understand its origins and core
concepts. The theory of Molinism gets its name from the Spanish Jesuit priest Luis
de Molina (1535–1600).
7
Following the example of Desiderius Erasmus before
him, Molina worked for reform within the Roman Catholic Church, resulting in
vicious opposition from the Dominican order.
8
Kirk MacGregor states, “It should
_____________________________
5
Philip J. Fisk, “The Unaccommodated Bavinck and Hodge: Prolegomena with Natural
Certainty,” TJ 30, no. 1 (2009): 107–27. Despite the tradition of caution or even suspicion regarding
philosophical reasoning within some Reformed circles, a cursory reading of Reformed dogmatic
texts such as Bavinck, Berkhof, Vos, Hodge, et al. reveals that they are all permeated with
philosophical-theological insights for which biblical revelation is only suggestive or evocative.
Hodge’s criticisms of Bavinck’s Kampen school of thought is itself reliant on the positivist, law-like
principles of exegetical science characterizing the Princetonian method (philosophy). However, the
tendency to interpolate a philosophical perspective goes back at least to Calvin himself, exemplified
by his sensus divinitatis view, which is, philosophically, a substantialist (rather than a vocationalist)
perspective on human image-bearing. See Paul Sands, “The Imago Dei as Vocation,” EvQ 82, no.1
(2010): 28–41.
6
Since Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense in the 1970’s, many have gone on to apply the
theory to many areas of theology. See William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle
Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy:
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 6, no. 2 (1989): 172–87; Craig, “‘Lest Anyone
Shall Fall’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Perseverance and Apostolic Warnings,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (1991b): 65–74; Craig, “‘Men Moved by the
Holy Spirit Spoke from God’ 2 Pet 1:21: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Biblical Inspiration,”
Philosophia Christi 1, no. 1 (1999): 45–82.
7
Louis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans. Alfred J.
Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), vii.
8
Kirk MacGregor, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle
Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 11.
Volume 7 Issue 2
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be emphasized that little in Molina’s thought is specifically Roman Catholic in its
orientation.”
9
It took Molina thirty years to write his magnum opus, the Concordia,
and he had to delay its publication for one year because of the stir it caused among
classical Thomists who emphasized God’s predestination and sovereignty. He
finally published the Concordia along with an appendix answering anticipated
objections to his theory (1588), the addition of which could not assuage his
detractors. Afterward, he became the target of withering attacks from the
Dominicans, who eventually referred him to the Spanish Inquisition.
10
His ideas
were so contentious that Rome had to step in to quash the controversy. Ultimately,
they shelved the Concordia issuing Molina three censures from the Congregatio.
Molina went to his grave believing his life’s work would be lost in history and that
he would be posthumously anathematized.
11
A closer examination of his ideas
reveals why his theory was so controversial.
Molina’s Controversial Idea
Theologians of Molina’s day all agreed that God has natural knowledge or
innate knowledge. God holds knowledge of all metaphysically necessary truths,
including such things as the laws of logic and whatever is true concerning his own
nature. Molina states the position well, “Through his natural knowledge, God
comprehends himself, and in himself, he comprehends all the things that exist
eminently.”
12
Not to be mistaken for a sequential progression in God’s knowledge,
God holds natural knowledge logically or explanatorily prior to his decree of the
actual world.
13
An analogy would be the relationship between axioms and
_____________________________
9
MacGregor, Luis de Molina 12.
10
Ibid., 158. It seems clear that Molina’s detractors took immediate offense at his
suggestion that previous theologians, such as Augustine and Aquinas, had not devoted sufficient
thought to the problem of free will and predestination. He claimed that an understanding of middle
knowledge would have saved the church hundreds of years of debates beginning with Augustine and
Pelagius. This was perceived by the Congregatio to be an implicit admission of its novelty and,
thus, contrivance.
11
Ibid., 238–41. MacGregor notes that the Congregatio met on 169 separate occasions and
never found Molina guilty of Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism and was deemed not to be heretical.
On August 28, 1607, Pope Paul V declared Molinism to be permissible to all who desired to study
it.
12
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 119.
13
For more on the differences between the theory of God as atemporal or omnitemporal,
see William Lane Craig, “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” Philosophia Christi 2, no.1 (2000):
29–33. Craig holds that God is timeless sans creation but exists temporally after creation. For an
alternative Reformed view, see Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time, 2nd ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). For a contra position, see R.T. Mullins, The End of the
Timeless God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 150; “The Divine Timemaker,” Philosophia
Christi 22, no. 2 (2020): 211–37.
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Revisiting Molinism
Kennedy
equations. Arguably, many equations are grounded in certain foundational axioms.
Though the axioms are logically prior to equations, they are not temporally or
sequentially prior, as the two exist simultaneously. In the same way, as a result of
God holding natural knowledge logically prior to the creative decree, God naturally
knows what he could do, and therefore he knows all possible worlds that could
exist before decreeing any particular world. Medieval theologians believed that this
was the first logical moment in God’s knowledge.
Likewise, nearly everyone agreed that God holds free knowledge, which
was thought to be the second logical moment. God does not create the world out of
necessity; he creates it because he freely chooses it. As a consequence of his
sovereign decree, God holds knowledge of all truths about the actual world,
including past, present, and future facts. This knowledge is logically posterior to his
free decree and was widely thought to include all counterfactuals or future
contingent truths (hypotheticals). William L. Craig observes:
Catholic theologians of the Dominican order … maintained that in
decreeing that a particular world exist, God also decreed which
counterfactual statements are true. Logically prior to the divine decree, there
are no counterfactual truths to be known. All God knows at that logical
moment are the necessary truths, including all the various possibilities.
14
Molina and the Jesuit Molinists generally accepted these traditional Thomistic
categories but theorized that God also possessed middle knowledge (Lat. scientia
media).
15
They proposed placing God’s counterfactual knowledge (knowledge of
hypotheticals) between his natural and free knowledge. This would mean that
logically prior to his sovereign decree (creation), God’s knowledge of these future
contingents is independent of his will.
16
By ordaining free creatures in certain
circumstances where he knew what they would freely do, as MacGregor notes, God
can “bring about his ultimate purposes through free creaturely decisions.”
17
The
Molinists suggested thinking of God’s omniscience in terms of three logical
moments rather than the standard view of two moments.
18
_____________________________
14
William Lane Craig, “God Directs All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence,
eds. Stanley N. Gundry, Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 82.
15
Alvin C. Plantinga, “Which Worlds Could God have Created?” Journal of Philosophy
70, no. 17 (1973): 539–52.
16
Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82.
17
Ibid., 82.
18
John D. Laing, “On Parsing the Knowledge and Will of God, or Calvinism and Middle
Knowledge in Conversation,” Calvinism and Middle Knowledge: A Conversation (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick, 2019), 187; cf. Craig, ‘No Other Name,’ 174. Craig affirms that since God is timeless
sans creation. Thus, whatever God knows he has always known eternally, and there is no “temporal
succession” in God’s thinking or knowledge. Nonetheless, Craig states, “There does exist a sort of
Volume 7 Issue 2
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• First moment (natural knowledge): God knows all metaphysically
necessary truths and therefore knows what he could do and what worlds or
states of affairs he could realize.
• Second moment (middle knowledge): God knows what would happen; he
knows the range of feasible worlds that would allow for human free
choices.
19
And he knows the choices free creatures would make if he were
to realize any state of affairs.
• God’s free choice to decree the actual world: In a sovereign act, he freely
chooses to bring a feasible world into existence and make it actual.
• Third moment (free knowledge): God knows what will happen in the
world he has freely chosen; he knows all that will unfold in the actual
world, both determined things and undetermined things.
20
Molina thought this view would solve the ongoing debate on human free will and
the double-predestinating will of God.
Molinism’s Compatibility with Scripture
Proponents of Molinism have attempted to justify this view biblically,
theologically, and philosophically.
21
The logical coherence of Molinism has been
adequately defended, and the philosophical arguments need not be engaged here.
22
_____________________________
logical succession in God’s knowledge in that His knowledge of certain propositions is
conditionally or explanatorily prior to His knowledge of certain other propositions.”
19
MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 11.
20
Petr Dvorak, “Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents and Necessity,” in A
Companion to Luis de Molina, eds. Alexander Aichele and Mathias Kaufmann (Leiden: Brill, 2013),
55–56. Dvorak affirms that divine foreknowledge is essential to God’s providence of the world and
that all late scholastic movements had shared desiderata: (1) God as the first cause must be the
causal impetus for any logically contingent state of affairs, either as a necessary or sufficient cause.
(2) God knows the truth of any logically contingent statement, including human free decisions or the
results of these. (3) Humans, therefore, have freedom of choice such that their actions are sufficient
for moral responsibility. (4) God is in no way the direct cause or source of evil. On Molina’s view,
Thomism easily explains God’s foreknowledge because of causal determinism (1 and 2) but cannot
explain free choices and, thus, human responsibility (3 and 4). Molina explicitly denied that God is
the sufficient cause, determining human volition. True free choices, he thought, must be out of
God’s direct control either as the necessary, sufficient, or efficient cause.
21
Craig, “God Directs the World,” 83. Cf. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 237–78.
22
Thomas P. Flint, “The Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” in Molinism: The
Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); William Lane
Craig, “Hasker On Divine Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 67, no. 2 (1992): 89–110; William Lane Craig, “Middle
Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,” Faith and Philosophy 18, no. 3 (2001):
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Revisiting Molinism
Kennedy
Instead, this study focuses on the biblical basis and warrant for the view. Molinists
often assert that they have thoroughly addressed all objections and advocate for
moving forward with the application of middle knowledge across various
theological domains.
23
However, this paper serves as a call to pause and revisit the
question of whether additional biblical justification is necessary. It seems that any
solid biblical case must do more than merely justify Molinism’s compatibility with
Scripture.
24
The view must instead provide sufficient biblical grounds for a strong
affirmation of it. Some have tried to put this doctrine in the same category of the
Trinity or God’s perfections, which require an extrapolation about God from
revealed biblical truths.
25
But unlike those doctrines, which are the inescapable
result of a robust texts-to-theory exegesis, Molinism cannot hold that same
distinction as it is firstly a philosophical framework that is brought to various texts
in Scripture.
26
Old Testament Examples of God’s Counterfactual Knowledge
Nevertheless, there are some passages in both the Old Testament (OT) and
the New Testament (NT) that seem to strongly suggest that God at least knows
contingent choices or subjunctive hypotheticals. Craig maintains that “The
Scriptures abound with examples of such counterfactual conditionals concerning
creaturely choices and actions.”
27
For instance, Moses warns that if the Israelites
_____________________________
337–52; Craig, “Robert Adams’s New Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 54, no. 4 (1994): 857–61.
23
Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: 1998), 186.
24
Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 83–84. Craig states, “Unfortunately, this fact does not
settle the matter of whether God has middle knowledge. For the scriptural passages show only that
God possesses knowledge of counterfactual propositions.” Hence the appeal to philosophy. But,
Molinists maintain, this would also apply to other doctrines, such as aseity, divine timelessness vs.
omnitemporality, divine simplicity, strong impassability, strong immutability, etc., which are
routinely assumed by many Reformed and Catholic theologians.
25
Braxton Hunter and Timothy A. Stratton, “Yes, Molinism is Biblical,” August 22, 2022,
YouTube interview, 6:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LmukhG4f8DU. On several
occasions Stratton has compared Molinism with the doctrine of the Trinity. Others have attempted
to actually apply Molinism to the alleged problem of the incarnation, a subject within Trinitarian
theology. See Thomas P. Flint, “The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist
Suggestions,” Religious Studies, 37, no. 3 (2001): 307. For a response, see William Lane Craig,
“Flint’s Radical Molinist Christology Not Radical Enough,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the
Society of Christian Philosophers, 23, no. 1, (2006): 55–64; R. T. Mullins, “Flint's ‘Molinism and
the Incarnation’ is Too Radical,” Journal of Analytic Theology 3, (2015): 109–23.
26
See Molina’s Concordia, 116 for his “proofs” regarding foreknowledge. See Disputation
49. In his exposition of Rom 8:29, he just assumes that God’s knowledge must be natural, middle,
and free. This perspective is then brought to Rom 8:29 having already assumed that logical
moments in God’s knowledge are a fact without any critical self-reflection on the matter.
27
Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 83.
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were to make a covenant with the Canaanites upon entering the land, God would
destroy them as a people (Deuteronomy 7:1–5). Israel can choose its consequences.
Likewise, according to Nehemiah, their ancestors’ disobedience led to judgment
because they would not obey God (Nehemiah 9:29–30), suggesting different
choices would have resulted in different results. Similarly, Jonah’s story
demonstrates God’s awareness of alternate outcomes, as God’s offer of salvation to
Nineveh leads to repentance, averting an otherwise sure judgment, “When God saw
what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God relented of the disaster
that he had said he would do to them, and he did not do it” (Jonah 3:10).
28
Molinists
note that the expectation of moral compliance through repentance presupposes
moral aptitude. These individuals could choose either way, and sometimes they
chose obedience, and at other times, they chose the consequences of disobedience.
Perhaps the most well-known example in the OT is David’s interaction with
the residents of Keilah, a citadel city in the lowlands of Judah. According to 1
Samuel 23, David takes refuge in the city after saving it from the Philistines (1 Sam
23:1–5). Upon discovering Saul’s plot to march on Keilah to capture and kill him
(1 Sam 23:6–8), David inquires of the priestly Ephod, “Will the men of Keilah
surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?” And the LORD responds, “They
will surrender you” (23:12). But then they fail to take David. The whole
predicament is avoided because David makes a different choice and leaves the
town. In this example, God doesn’t just know what will happen; he knows what
would have happened had David stayed in Keilah.
New Testament Examples of God’s Counterfactual Knowledge
There are also several apparent instances of God’s hypothetical knowledge
of creaturely choices in the New Testament (NT). Molina’s principal example in
the Concordia was of Jesus pronouncing woes upon Chorazin, Bethsaida, and
Capernaum. Christ denounces them for their apathy and lack of repentance despite
witnessing his mighty works, suggesting that if ancient Tyre and Sidon had seen
the same miracles, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes
(Matthew 11:21). Jesus knows what the residents of Tyre and Sidon would have
done had they witnessed his Galilean ministry. In another story, Jesus admonishes
the Pharisees for condemning the guiltless disciples who threshed grain in their
hands because they were hungry on the Sabbath. Jesus taught that if the Pharisees
had grasped the importance of mercy over mere ritual, then they would not have
condemned the guiltless disciples (Matthew 12:7). If these religious leaders had
understood the importance of human life and that the Sabbath was made to serve
man not man to serve the Sabbath, then they would have not chosen to prematurely
_____________________________
28
Emphasis mine.
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Revisiting Molinism
Kennedy
judge the famished disciples. Finally, in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, he explains
that the rulers of this age would surely not have crucified the Lord of glory had
they comprehended the full implications of Christ’s victory leading to their demise
(1 Corinthians 2:8). The above examples seem compelling: God doesn’t only know
what a person will do as a matter of simple foreknowledge, he knows what a person
would do if circumstances had been different.
Molinism, Thomism, or Calvinism
These biblical examples notwithstanding, it still remains to be seen what
theory best accounts for these apparent counterfactuals in Scripture. Perhaps no
theory is needed. Does God comprehend contingent truths as part of his infallible
prevolitional knowledge (middle knowledge)? Or does God know these
hypotheticals as a consequence of his creational decree of a world of his choosing
(Thomism)? A third and apparently simpler interpretive option remains. Instead of
speculating about God’s state of mind, the Bible presents God’s predestination and
election of the believer as an eternal plan, and God’s knowledge of hypothetical
truths is in accordance with his eternal knowledge of that plan and his will
(Calvinism).
29
In other words, the issue of logical moments in God’s knowledge
remains intentionally mysterious and thus elusive. This option is admittedly
conservative. On this view, foreknowledge is neither prevolitional knowledge of
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom nor is it merely God’s simple propositional
foreknowledge, or prescience of the world after creation, nor some combination of
both.
30
Instead, God foreknows his people because he wills to choose them and to
bestow his covenant love upon them while also knowing which future conditionals
are true about them.
31
Beyond these mere claims, the biblical authors remain silent.
Scripture’s silence on the matter (mystery) was John Calvin’s view.
_____________________________
29
Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 377–78. While
Calvin and the Westminster Confession tended to speak of God’s eternal decree, Erickson instead
adopts the language of his eternal “plan,” mainly due to his exegesis of Ephesians 1:4–11.
30
Origen, The Fathers of the Church: Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,
Books 1–5 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2001), 65–66. Origen curiously
asserted something like a middle knowledge view in saying that God knows what people would do,
and then chooses them on this basis. But his view turns out to be more akin to Pelagianism.
31
Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans, eds. Robert W. Yarbrough and Joshua W. Jipp, 2
nd
ed.
BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2018), 444. Schreiner notes that the “background of the term should
be located in the OT, where for God ‘to know’ (ע ַדָי, yāda) refers to his covenant love, in which he
sets his affection on those whom he has chosen (cf. Gen. 18:19; Exod. 33:17; 1 Sam. 2:12; Ps.
18:43; Prov. 9:10; Jer. 1:5; Hosea 13:5; Amos 3:2).”
31
Romans 11:2 reflects this usage, as the
opposite of God “rejecting” (ἀπώσατο) Israel was to “foreknow” (προέγνω) them. This strongly
implies more than mere prescience or cognitional foreknowledge.
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God’s Will: Molina Versus Calvin
A brief comparison between Molina and Calvin seems necessary. The two
models will then be applied to Paul according to Ephesians 1:4ff. and Romans
11:33–36 to see who aligns best with the apostle’s clear teaching.
Molina’s View of God’s Will and Election
Molina thought that having knowledge of counterfactuals only by virtue of
his free decision to create a world would deprive God (and free creatures) of any
real choice.
32
Craig explains Molina’s view:
He [God] does not possess knowledge at this second moment of such
counterfactuals concerning decisions of his own will. Molina believed that
such knowledge would rob God of His freedom, presumably because which
counterfactuals are true or false does not depend on God’s will. Molina
supported exempting decisions of God’s own will from divine middle
knowledge on the basis of his doctrine of supercomprehension.
33
If God does not know counterfactuals to be true in any possible or feasible world,
then free creatures would be dispossessed of their free will.
34
Molina thought,
“[God] comprehended this [all things that were going to freely or contingently
happen] not only prior to anything’s existing in time but even prior … to any
_____________________________
32
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 166. In his sixth argument, he maintains that
“foreknowledge of future things destroys freedom of choice” and here he refers to the Thomistic
view of God’s foreknowledge of all things decreed.
33
Craig, Divine Foreknowledge, 238. Emphasis mine.
34
For an engaging defense of libertarian freedom, see Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine
Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, 5. Stratton essentially defines libertarian freedom (free will) as
“the categorical ability to choose among a range of alternative options, each of which is consistent
or compatible with one’s nature.” While external factors may influence an individual’s choice (e.g.,
place of birth, family history, genetics, etc.) ultimately choices must, by definition be uncoerced or
undetermined, otherwise responsibility for those decisions remains impossible. The typical
Reformed response is to point to the myriad of metaphors and passages in Scripture which appear to
teach that human beings are spiritually blind, dead, and enslaved. The mind is “darkened” such that
one’s “thinking has become futile” (Rom 1:21–22), we are “dead in our sins” (Rom 6:1; Eph 2:1–
11), “were slaves” of sin, having now died to its enslavement (Rom 6:6, 18, 20), now raised and
made “alive from the dead” (6:13), and have been set free for freedom (Gal 5:1; cf. John 8:36). It
seems one should make a distinction then, between the innate capacity for libertarian freedom and
the ability to operationalize that freedom given one’s corruption in sin.
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created thing’s existing in the duration of eternity.”
35
Here, Molina makes a
distinction between things existing with their real existence (in the duration of
time) and things preexisting with what he calls objective existence within God’s
knowledge (in the duration of eternity).
36
The implication is that natural and middle
knowledge are prevolitional and, therefore not decisive nor determinative in God’s
eternal will or plan.
The key to Molina’s view appears to be his understanding of
foreknowledge. He observed that Paul and Peter agree that God “foreknew”
(proginōskō, προγινώσκω) the predestined (Rom 8:29–30; 1 Pet 1:1–2). Aquinas
thought this foreknowledge was mere prescience, and Augustine collapsed the idea
of foreordination into foreknowledge. Calvin later embraced Augustine’s view but
found ample biblical support for conflating foreknowledge and foreordination.
Molina rejected both of these positions. He rejected the Augustinian view because
he believed that such unilateral determination would eliminate the creature’s
libertarian freedom.
37
He observed numerous instances in Scripture where moral
choices and moral commands presume that those so commanded have both moral
discernment and moral fitness. Additionally, he rejected the Thomistic view as
reductionistic to natural knowledge. Molina interpreted Romans 9:11–13 as
definitive in this respect. God’s election of Jacob over Esau was not based on
human will or desire or anything they had done (Rom 9:11–13). He believed that
God’s choice of circumstances still requires unconditional election.
38
Thus,
predestination cannot be motivated by God’s knowledge of what an individual will
do or would do.
39
MacGregor explains, “For Molina, therefore, the cause and
ground of any person’s predestination to salvation (election) or to condemnation
(reprobation) is God’s sovereign will.”
40
Molina took the aforementioned passages
_____________________________
35
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 116. See Alfred Freddoso fn 8, See also Molina,
Foreknowledge, 127. Commenting on Jerome’s view of Eph 1:4ff., Molina insists that things that do
not yet exist “are not hidden from God, but rather are known clearly by him just as if they existed.”
36
Ibid., 127.
37
Ibid., 185.
38
Ibid., 141.
39
Kirk MacGregor, “Luis de Molina’s Doctrine of Predestination,” A Paper Delivered at
the 67th Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society on 17 November 2015, 2 (2015): 1–
8.
40
MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 26. He cites Molina: “The total effect of
predestination…depends only on the free will of God” to which, MacGregor comments, “Any
Calvinist would give a hearty ‘Amen’ to Molina’s reasoning from Romans 9:15–18.” cf. Molina, On
Divine Foreknowledge, 219. Molina criticizes Luther for his Augustinian view of meticulous
predestination, even of sinners and their choices while also criticizing a simple compatibilist view of
predestination with permission. He writes that these thinkers “take refuge in the permission of sins
and claim that this alone, without any previous middle knowledge, is the reason God’s knowledge
regarding future sins is certain.” See Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 218–19. Disputation 53.9–
10.
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(Rom 8:29, 1 Pet 1:12) to mean that God’s election, while in accordance with his
prior counterfactual knowledge, is neither dependent on nor determined by any
actual or counterfactual creaturely choices. While God may predestine a world in
which he knows which counterfactuals are true, he does not choose a feasible world
because those counterfactuals are true.
41
Molina argued that traditional medieval interpretations of Romans 8:29–30
and 1 Peter 1:1–2 mistakenly applied the wrong species of God’s knowledge (free
knowledge) to the apostolic texts. To him, it was clear that the apostles, in their use
of the term προγινώσκω failed to differentiate between the three types of divine
knowledge (natural, middle, or free knowledge), leaving the precise referent of
these verses ambiguous. He deduced that the proper referent to προγινώσκω must
be prevolitional, leaving natural or middle knowledge as the only choices of the
three.
42
He further deduced that if the apostles had meant “natural knowledge” by
προγινώσκω, then this would warrant the view of universalism, which the Bible
explicitly teaches against. So logically, the only option left as the proper referent of
προγινώσκω was middle knowledge. MacGregor affirms that “For Molina himself,
at this logical point in God’s complete and unlimited deliberation, God is faced
with an infinite range of feasible worlds.”
43
Molina insisted, “It has to be explained
how future contingents are known by God and how the foreknowledge he has of
them coheres with their contingency.”
44
He marshaled multiple philosophical and
circumstantial biblical texts in support of his view, attempting to apply the
hermeneutical principle of the analogy of Scripture.
45
The problem with Molina’s approach should be apparent. If, by Molina’s
own admission, Paul and Peter did not convey the nuances between natural, middle,
and free knowledge in their use of προγινώσκω, then this is a tacit admission that
those authors did not intend to communicate such ideas. MacGregor notes that
“Molina believed that the way to reconcile these three sets of texts was not
exegetical but philosophical.”
46
To arrive at his peculiar interpretation of
προγινώσκω in Paul’s or Peter’s texts one must first apply the philosophical
_____________________________
41
Ibid., 150. See also page 30, fn 23. An important distinction must be noted here between
epistemic Molinism and soteriological Molinism. In practical terms, Molina’s view of predestination
and salvation of the elect was very close to Calvin’s. Molina and Calvin differed from each other
but also significantly from Arminius who thought that after looking down the corridor of history,
God merely predestines those he foreknows will freely believe in Christ. But, as Craig has pointed
out, Arminius’ view really is not predestination at all as there is not much for it do other than to
decree what God already knows.
42
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 168; MacGregor, “Luis de Molina’s Doctrine of
Predestination,” 4.
43
Ibid., 6. Emphasis mine.
44
Ibid., 98.
45
Ibid., 98, 141.
46
MacGregor, “Luis de Molina’s Doctrine of Predestination,” 1.
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framework of alleged logical moments in God’s knowledge. This preconceived
idea is then imported into the passages in question in order to resolve what appears
to be an apparent contradiction.
47
Furthermore, he mostly ignores the Jewish and
OT context of Paul and Peter. If the background referent to προγινώσκω is the
Hebrew word “to know” yāda (ע ַדָי) then it surely refers to the bestowal of God’s
covenant love and affection set on his elect people (cf. Gen 18:19; Exod 33:17; 1
Sam 2:12; Ps 18:43; Prov 9:10; Jer 1:5; Hosea 13:5; Amos 3:2).
48
Schreiner notes
that the parallel terms “consecrate” and “appoint” in Jer 1:5 are synonymous with
God’s foreknowledge of Jeremiah’s calling.
49
When Paul says that God has not
rejected the nation he “foreknew,” this implies more than mere prior knowledge
(Rom 11:2). By Molina’s own admission, exegesis of these texts leads to a heuristic
dead end hence the need to engage rational arguments. Consequently, Molina’s
view is not the inevitable result of the exegesis of those “foreknowledge” texts in
light of Paul’s and Peter’s ancestral background. Yet a further, more insuperable
problem remains.
Beyond exegesis, one wonders what there is for counterfactual knowledge
to do. “Nothing!” Molinists would say. While knowledge may serve as a causal
precondition for action, knowledge itself lacks inherent causal properties. If one
had definite prior knowledge that the Twin Towers would fall on 9/11, for example,
having that foreknowledge would not cause the buildings to fall. The point is well
taken. But then, why bother postulating that God has this species of knowledge if
nothing is contingent on it or if he makes no decisions in light of it? Again, Molina
claimed that Paul’s wording “according to foreknowledge” does not necessitate that
he means “owing/due to his foreknowledge” but refers only to taking that
knowledge into consideration. By his own admission, God does not decree the
world based on counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
Yet another problem remains with respect to God’s alleged desire and inner
judgment. If God’s free decree is grounded by his alleged prevolitional desires in a
supposed “unlimited deliberation” informed by middle knowledge, then how can it
be said that God’s will is not already in motion? Both desire (want) and
deliberation (judgment) imply a will that is already at work in the formulation of a
plan of action even before that plan is actualized. Craig reflects this very dilemma
when he states:
According to Molina, this decision is the result of a complete and unlimited
deliberation by means of which God considers and weighs every possible
_____________________________
47
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 116ff; particularly on page 168 in Disputation 52
where Molina insists that “It is necessary for us to distinguish three types of knowledge in God.”
This “necessary” rational framework must therefore be brought to circumstantial texts.
48
Schreiner, Romans, 443.
49
Ibid.
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circumstance and its ramifications and decides to settle on the particular
world He desires. Hence, logically prior, if not chronologically prior, to
God’s creation of the world is the divine deliberation concerning which
world to actualize.
50
It is difficult to see where one should locate this purported desire and unlimited
deliberation concerning which world to instantiate. Since desire implies a want and
deliberation implies adjudicating between desired options, how can it be said that
God desires and considers his options unless his will is already engaged? This
would suggest that God’s knowledge of counterfactuals is not prevolitional as the
Molinist claims. And if that is the case, then there is no need to postulate middle
knowledge. To summarize Molina’s view and its implications:
• Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are independent of God’s will and,
therefore, not within God’s control. God’s knowledge of counterfactuals is
not grounded in the actual world but in his “supercomprehension” of all
necessary truths including all possible worlds.
• God holds middle knowledge logically prior to his eternal will, and his
divine desire and unlimited deliberation regarding possible worlds are
logically prior to the eternal decree.
• God’s will to elect is eternal but only in relation to temporal realities (like
the world), not atemporal or logical realities, such as God’s alleged natural
or middle knowledge.
• Molina insisted that God’s foreknowledge must not be confused with mere
prescience or prior knowledge of the actual world, nor should
foreordination be collapsed into foreknowledge. Peter and Paul must have
had God’s middle knowledge in mind when they taught that God foreknows
the predestined.
• God knows counterfacts about possible worlds before there are any facts
about the actual world. God can choose to create a person in one set of
circumstances where they would choose the good over evil, or in another set
of circumstances where the same person would choose evil over the good,
or God can choose not to create them at all. This, for Molina, presupposes
that God must know of their possible and contingent choices logically prior
to decreeing them into existence.
• God’s election of individuals is indirect but definite. He chooses individuals
by choosing a world or circumstances out of the ensemble of possible
worlds and then by predestinating individuals to inhabit the particular
circumstances of their lives.
_____________________________
50
Craig, “No Other Name,” 178.
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• Human beings can resist God’s will or embrace God’s offer of salvation
because they have “libertarian freedom,” or libertarian self-determination
(what Molina simply called “free will”).
It should be noted, however, that once God predestines an actual world, those
alleged free creatures do exactly what God knew they would have done and now
foreknows what they will do because they are instantiated in the preordained actual
world.
Calvin’s View of God’s Will and Election
By contrast, Calvin seems to reject or ignore both Thomistic and Molinistic
categories of knowledge in favor of a more plainspoken doctrine of the eternal
decree. The comparison and contrast of their views thus necessarily leaves behind
epistemic middle knowledge (God’s knowledge state prior to creation) and centers
on soteriological Molinism, as Calvin’s concern was the latter (soteriology) and not
at all the former (epistemology).
51
Several quotes from Calvin should suffice to
capture his view and the eternality of God’s decreeing will:
“The will of God is the chief and principal cause of all things.”
52
“By predestination, we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he
determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every
man.”
53
“God the ruler and governor of all things, who in accordance with his
wisdom has from the farthest limit of eternity decreed what he was going to
do.”
54
“The foundation and first cause, both of our calling and of all the benefits
which we receive from God, is here [Eph 1:4] declared to be his eternal
election. If the reason is asked, why God has called us to enjoy the gospel,
why he daily bestows upon us so many blessings, why he opens to us the
gate of heaven—the answer will be constantly found in this principle,
_____________________________
51
Which Molina himself was quick to do. In popular debates Molinists often protest the
Calvinist’s use of Ephesians 1:4–11 or other soteriological passages in an attempt to redirect the
conversation back to epistemic middle knowledge. But this just is to privilege the philosophical
epistemology over biblical soteriology. In a biblical discussion on the issue, one can only examine
the texts that speak to God’s knowledge, will, and choice. And the overwhelming contexts in
Scripture are soteriological.
52
John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, 177.
53
Calvin, Institutes, 206.
54
Ibid., 28. See 1.16.8.
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that he hath chosen us before the foundation of the world. The very time
when the election took place proves it to be free; for what could we have
deserved, or what merit did we possess, before the world was made?”
55
“Had not God, through his own election, rescued us from perishing, there
was nothing to be foreseen.”
56
This approach is strikingly conservative and straightforward by comparison.
57
But
Calvin is also careful to note that God’s eternal decree is not a decree of necessity
(and thus fatalistic) but of his free choice.
Did Calvin Prefer Causal Determinism Over an Appeal to Mystery?
The claim at the outset by some philosophers of religion has been that if one
chooses to reject speculative philosophy on God’s knowledge and predestination
(Molinism), then only two choices remain: (1) The interpreter can embrace a
causally determined world in which human decision-making is illusory or a farce
(allegedly Calvinism). (2) Or, in the absence of a good philosophical explanation,
one can “punt to mystery” defaulting to intellectual indifference on the issue.
58
But
this is a false option, both as it applies to Calvin and those who agree with his
interpretation of Paul. A survey of Calvin reveals that his view of predestination
and human choice is in no way allergic to the notion of an appeal to mystery, either
in terms of God’s reasons for foreordination or the interplay between the
foreordained and their choices. He defines “mystery” as that which is
“incomprehensible until the time of its revelation.”
59
He describes the relationship
between God’s sovereign choice and human decisions as a “high mystery” (9:14),
an “incomparable mystery” (9:16), an “inexplicable mystery” (9:22), an
“incomprehensible mystery” (11:25), and a “great mystery” so profound that
mankind’s deepest reasoning cannot breach it nor penetrate it (11:33).
60
Calvin
concludes:
Thus, the more he [Paul] elevates the height of the divine mystery, the more
he deters us from the curiosity of investigating it. Let us then learn to make
no searchings respecting the Lord, except as far as he has revealed himself
_____________________________
55
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians
(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2010), 197–98.
56
Ibid., 198.
57
Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.
58
Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, 50.
59
Calvin, Romans, 435.
60
Ibid., 359. On Paul’s example of the hardening of Pharoah’s heart (9:17), Calvin states
that the reasons for hardening Pharoah must remain hidden in the private undisclosed counsel of
God’s mind.
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Kennedy
in the Scriptures; for otherwise we shall enter a labyrinth, from which the
retreat is not easy. It must, however, be noticed that he speaks not here of
all God’s mysteries but of those which are hid with God himself and ought
to be only admired and adored by us.
61
The inner workings of God’s mind are unknowable. Calvin appealed to a doctrine
of mystery with respect to God’s omniscience and foreordination. To summarize
his view in contrast to Molina’s:
• Whereas Molina believed that God’s knowledge of creaturely choices was
not dependent on God’s will, Calvin taught that nothing is independent of or
outside the control of God’s sovereign and eternal decree. For “In him we
live and move and have our being” and that includes human choices.
• Contrasted to Molina’s view of an eternal will only relative to temporal
realities, Calvin taught God’s will to elect is an eternal decree beyond which
the believer can say nothing. Since neither Paul nor Peter reveals how this
works in the mind of God by logical moments in his knowledge, all theories
should refrain from prying into the divine mind.
• Therefore, God’s foreknowledge of future contingent truths is grounded in
God’s sovereign and eternal decree to relationally and covenantally know
the elect in particular. This, Calvin insisted, is the cultural referent for
προγινώσκω, “foreknowledge.”
• Contrary to Molina’s idea of God electing individuals by choosing a
“feasible world” or “circumstances,” Calvin taught that God’s election is
discreet and personal. He has predestined his people, the individuals who
comprise the group. It is on them that his affection is set and his favor
conferred from eternity past.
• Consequently, human beings cannot resist God’s sovereign decree, his will,
and his purpose. While God is the remote cause of all their choices, the
individual is the proximate cause of their sinful decisions, meaning they
remain responsible and accountable to God for their choices.
Now it remains to be seen which view appears more consistent with Paul’s
claims in his letters to the Ephesians and the Romans and which view is the more
extravagant.
62
_____________________________
61
Ibid., 445.
62
See John D. Laing, “The Compatibility of Calvinism and Middle Knowledge,” JETS 47,
no. 3 (2004): 455–67.
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Ephesians 1:4–11: Does God Elect a “World” or “People”?
Paul erupts with praise in his letter to the Ephesians (1:4–11) because “he
[God] chose us (ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς) in him before the foundation of the world (πρὸ
καταβολῆς κόσμου)” (Eph 1:4).
63
Paul does not here say that he chose a possible
world or a feasible world, but “he chose us in Christ” before the creation of this
actual world. Later to the Galatians, Paul will personalize that: “Christ loved me
and gave himself for me” (Gal 2:20).
A quick survey of the passage draws attention to Paul’s emphasis on God’s
plan, pleasure, and will with respect to the elect. God has predestined us (Gk.
προορίσας ἡμᾶς) for “adoption as sons” (Eph 1:5). This predestination is
“according to the good pleasure (εὐδοκίαν) of his will (τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ)”
(1:5b) and is “to the praise of his glorious grace (δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ)” (1:6).
This, Paul explains, is a gift that has been “lavished upon us with all wisdom and
insight, making known to us the mystery of his will (τοῦ θελήματος), according to
his good pleasure/purpose (εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ), which he set forth in him as a prior
plan (προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ) for the fullness of time…” (1:8–10). In Christ believers
have obtained an inheritance, “having been predestined (ἐκληρώθημεν
προορισθέντες) according to the purpose (πρόθεσιν) of him who works all things
(πάντα) according to the counsel of his will (βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ)”
(1:11).
64
_____________________________
63
All Greek citations from Michael W. Holmes, The Greek New Testament: SBL Edition
(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press SBL, 2011–2013) unless otherwise noted. The phrase πρὸ
καταβολῆς κόσμου is used several times in the NT and also in Second Temple Jewish literature to
mean “before creation” or “before the universe began.” Jesus used the phrase this way (Matt 13:35;
25:34; cf. Luke 11:50). His claim that the Father loved him “before the foundation of the world” is
most often taken as evidence of his preincarnate and eternal existence (John 17:24), foreknowledge
in this context also communicates the Father’s love for the Son. Peter clearly states that Christ was
known by the Father “before the foundation of the world” (1 Pet 1:20); Paul’s preference for the
phrase πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων “predestined before the ages” likely has the same essential force. Revelation
13:9 states that “everyone whose name was written from the foundation of the world.” Beale states,
“It is a metaphor for saints whose salvation has been determined: their names have been entered into
the census book of the eternal new Jerusalem before history began, which is explicitly affirmed in
21:27…13:8 and 17:8, which express the notion of predetermination with ‘from the foundation of
the world.’ That saints were written in the book before history began is implied by the fact that the
beast worshipers are said not to have been so written.” G. K. Beale, The Book of Revelation: A
Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 701–02. For use in the
Second Temple Jewish literature, see As. Mos. 1:14; Jos. Asen. 8.9; Midr. Ps. 74:1; 93:3; Gen. Rab.
1:5; For Patristics, see Justin Martyr (AD 100–165) and Irenaeus (AD 135–203) who largely
affirmed both the meticulous predestination of God and human freedom of choice; Augustine (AD
354–430) held two different views when comparing the early and late writings.
64
See Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians, WBC vol. 42 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 22–
23. Emphasis mine.
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Like a drumbeat, there are several explicit and repeated claims in this text,
some ideas aligning with and others contradicting Molina’s view:
1. Paul says that God has revealed the mystery (μυστήριον, 1:9) of his will
which is the previously unmanifested private counsel of God. This mystery
is the revelation of God in Christ.
65
2. God’s choice, and thus his knowledge of the believer, is in Christ before
creation began (1:4). Paul clearly sets God’s deliberation and desire for a
world in the category of his volition or will, not in the category of
prevolitional hypothetical knowledge (contra Molinism). This
predestination is said to be according to his “purpose,” “plan,” “good
pleasure” (desire), and the “counsel of his will” (his internal deliberation).
The reader learns that this is God’s “eternal purpose which he accomplished
in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Eph 3:11). Elsewhere, Paul insists that salvation
is according to God’s own “purpose and grace, which he gave us in Christ
Jesus before the ages began” (2 Tim 1:9). Paul imparted secret wisdom (the
gospel) hidden in God’s knowledge to the Corinthians “which God decreed
before the ages for our glory” (1 Cor 2:7). This is an eternal decree that is
grounded in the sovereign will of God to choose and to know believers.
God’s pleasure implies his desire (what he wants), and plan/purpose entails
his premeditative internal deliberation (adjudicating between desired
options).
3. Multiple times he appeals to God’s predestination of “us,” which includes
“we who are first” and “you also” (1:12), and presumably includes Paul as
an individual (cf. Gal 2:20; Acts 15:7; Rom 9:24a). Rather than choosing a
feasible world, God elects his beloved.
4. Paul says that God “works all things” according to the counsel of his eternal
will. This echoes Romans 8:28, in which God works “all things” together
for the good of the elect because he has foreknown them in eternity past,
and they are “called according to his purpose” (Rom 8:28b).
66
God’s
predestinating plan seems all-encompassing and leads inexorably to the
glorification of the elect whom he foreknew because he chose them before
the foundation of the world (Eph 1:4).
_____________________________
65
Cf. Mark 4:11; Matt 13:11; Luke 8:10. For Paul see Rom 11:25; 1 Cor 15:51; Col 1:26;
2:2; 1 Cor 2:1; 1 Cor 4:1. Paul ironically chides the Corinthians with the exaggerated example of
one who “knew all mysteries” (1 Cor 13:2), which sarcastically infers that God has in fact not
revealed all mysteries.
66
Lincoln, Ephesians, 23.
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5. Paul mentions nothing about God’s desire to “receive the freely given love
of free creatures,” as some Molinists have claimed.
67
Instead, God’s
purpose in election is so that all things may be “to the praise of his glory”
(Eph 1:14). In bestowing his covenant love on his people, those chosen
before creation now offer resounding praises for his offer of pure grace
(Eph 1:6). This echoes the concluding benediction of Romans 11:36, “For
from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be the glory
forever.”
In summary, Paul insists that God’s predestinating decree is a direct result of his
will (his sovereign choice), obviously making no reference to any logical moments
in God’s knowledge. It is admittedly difficult to see where middle knowledge fits
here unless one assumes that by “foreknowledge” Paul (Rom 8:29) and Peter (1 Pet
1:1–2) meant “prevolitional middle knowledge.”
68
This middle/foreknowledge
must be logically before God’s choice of the elect “before the foundation of the
world” (Eph 1:4). But this idea seems foreign to the Hebrew apostles’ thought-
world.
Summary of Ephesians 1:4–11
Two conclusions must be made. First, in the very text where one would
expect middle knowledge to be, it is conspicuous by its absence. Since middle
knowledge is a theory about God’s unlimited prevolitional deliberation concerning
possible worlds, and since Paul clearly puts God’s deliberative process in the
category of his volitional actions in election, this would seem problematic for the
theory of middle knowledge. Second, one cannot get middle knowledge out of the
Ephesian text unless it is first imported there. This can be achieved through two
distinct approaches: hermeneutically, employing the analogy of Scripture to
interpret related texts that perhaps align with the present one, or alternatively, via
eisegesis, which entails introducing foreign concepts from external contexts
unknown to the author and unrelated to the writer’s intended insights.
As Molina himself acknowledged, his interpretation of the Ephesian text
requires the incorporation of a foreign concept derived from Thomistic “logical
moments” within God’s knowledge, a concept nowhere present in the writings or
_____________________________
67
William Lane Craig, “Theistic Critiques of Atheism.” The Cambridge Companion to
Atheism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69–85. This claim is found nowhere in
Scripture, but it has proven to be an effective rejoinder to Atheist criticisms of God’s existence due
to the problem of evil and suffering in the world.
68
Lincoln, Ephesians, 23.
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the thought-world of Paul and Peter.
69
Paul apparently knew nothing of medieval
categories of God’s knowledge and makes no appeal to it as the basis for election.
Thus, Molinism is eisegetical. Calvin’s view, on the other hand, which is free of
speculation about the mental state of God prior to his eternal decree, seems to best
align with Paul. Calvin embraces God’s eternal will and decree as a boundary event
for human knowledge. He explains:
The subject of predestination, which is difficult enough already, is made
even more puzzling and dangerous by human curiosity. This [curiosity]
cannot be held back from forbidden areas, even floating up to the clouds in
a determination to discover all the secret things of God. When we see
decent men rushing into such presumption, we must point out how wrong it
is. First, when they delve into the question … they must remember that they
are probing the depths of divine wisdom, and if they dash ahead too boldly,
then instead of satisfying their curiosity, they will enter a maze with no exit!
It is not right that men should pry into things which the Lord has chosen to
conceal in himself … The secrets of his will, which he sees fit to make
plain, are revealed in his Word: everything necessary for our well-being is
there.
70
For Calvin, God’s revelation in Scripture was not given so that the philosopher of
religion could be endlessly exercised through speculation about God’s inner mental
life. Again, he states, “If anyone will seek to know more than what God has
revealed, he shall be overwhelmed with the immeasurable brightness of
inaccessible light.”
71
God’s revelation was intended to conform the Christian to the
image of his Son as the believer gazes in wonder, at times into the unknowable.
The Molinist, conversely, rejects that limitation either philosophically or
exegetically.
How Has God Imprisoned All That He Might Show Mercy to All?
The study now comes to Paul’s ode to God’s omniscience in Romans
11:33–36 to understand its bearing on Molinist claims. Paul concludes, “For God
has consigned all to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all” (Rom 11:32).
This summary statement encapsulates the theme of God’s sovereign election in
_____________________________
69
Molina, Concordia, 7.23. cf. MacGregor, “Luis de Molina’s Doctrine of Predestination,”
3–4.
70
Calvin, Institutes, 214.
71
John Calvin, Commentary on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans (Bellingham,
WA: Lexham Press, 2010), 447.
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Romans 9:1–11:32.
72
God works all things together for the good of his Spirit-filled
people (Rom 8:28) who are assured that nothing can separate them from the love of
God in Christ (8:31–39).
73
In light of this lofty promise, he then grapples with the
curious case of Israel, abundantly blessed with the covenants, prophets, and the
Messiah, yet they remain currently “cut off” and not saved (Romans 9:3, 10:1).
Paul explains that Israel’s partial hardening is part of God’s eschatological plan to
extend salvation to the Gentiles, ultimately leading to the inclusion of a remnant of
ethnic Jews into Christ (Romans 11). Israel is cut off from the vine with hardened
hearts due to their unbelief and God’s sovereign will. Paul elaborates on both
paradoxical claims across three sections.
First Section (Rom 9:1–29): God’s Plan for Israel Did not Fail
The reason that God’s plan cannot be considered a failure (9:6) is that God
had always intended to save a remnant from among the larger groups, “For not all
who are descended from Israel belong to Israel, and not all are children of Abraham
because they are his offspring” (9:6b–7a). Paul insists that “it is not the children of
the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are counted
as offspring” (9:8). He notes that many Jews are presently excluded from the
blessings of salvation due to God’s sovereign choice and their persistence in
unbelief.
74
In Paul’s theology, the sovereign election of God is compatible with
human choices and responsibility. He then proceeds to give several examples in
support of this:
Example 1: God’s sovereign choice of Isaac over Ishmael (9:6b–13;
presupposes God’s choice of Abraham over Nahor, cf. v. 7).
_____________________________
72
Schreiner, Romans, 612. Schreiner states, “Verse 32 sums up the discussion of chapter
11 and of 9–11 as a whole.”
73
Scholars have taken several approaches to Romans 9–11. See Mary Ann Getty, “Paul
and the Salvation of Israel: A Perspective on Romans 9–11,” CBQ 50, no. 3 (1988) 468; Bruce W.
Longenecker, “Different Answers to Different Issues: Israel, the Gentiles and Salvation History in
Romans 9–11,” JSNT 11, no. 36 (1989): 95; Moo suggests that the central thought is “Salvation is to
be found in Jesus alone, for both gentiles and Jews.” See Douglas J. Moo, Encountering the Book of
Romans: A Theological Survey, ed. Walter A. Elwell, EBS (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 130. Colin
Kruse and Tom Schreiner seem to have it just right. See Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, ed. D.
A. Carson, PNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012); Schreiner, Romans, 22–23.
74
Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 355.
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Example 2: The choice of Jacob over Esau (vv. 10–13). In order to drive
home his point, he cites a difficult passage from Malachi, “Jacob I loved but
Esau I hated” (v.13, cf. Mal 1:2–3).
75
Example 3: The choice of Moses over Pharaoh, showing mercy to Moses
but hardening Pharoah (9:14–18).
76
Example 4: The Potter’s freedom to make what he wants out of the lumps
of clay (9:19–21). He describes all this as not because of works or the desire
of man but because of “him who calls” (ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος, 9:11b).
Paul then anticipates two objections to his theology of God’s
sovereign election:
Objection 1: This makes God the author of sin. Doesn’t God’s choice to
show mercy to some and harden or reject others mean that there is
“unrighteousness (ἀδικία) in God” (9:14)? In other words, this would make God the
author of sin or, worse, a sinner himself.
77
Paul insists, “By no means!” and then
continues to press his point—God can show mercy to whomever he so chooses
because he does not owe anyone grace in the first place and can reject others for
reprobation for reasons known only to him (9:15–18). Thus, no one can gainsay his
free offer because “who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid” (11:35).
But if Paul is right about this, it would lead to an additional problem.
Objection 2: God is unjust. Paul projects a question into the mouths of his
imaginary interlocutors, “You will say, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can
resist his will?’” (9:19) In other words, human beings cannot be held responsible
for their actions if they cannot escape the inevitable. How is it just and good that he
judges people who cannot resist his predestinating will? Paul’s response, “But who
are you, O man, to answer back to God?” In other words, the question itself (much
_____________________________
75
It should be noted that the context of Malachi 1 is “Esau” as the archetype of his
descendants “Edom” who have historically opposed Israel in the land, going all the way back to
Moses’ day.
76
It is clear in the context of Pharoah’s story that God hardened his heart (Exod 10:1, 20,
27; 11:10; 14:8) through Pharoah’s own will to harden his own heart (Exod 8:15; 9:12; 9:34). That
is, Pharoah’s will to resist God is the very instrument through which God made him increasingly
recalcitrant so that his rejection of God (and Moses) would lead to greater glory and victory for
YHWH.
77
Guillaume Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of
Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018),
184–89. He notes that Calvin argued that God is the “remote” cause while the individual is the
“proximate” cause of sin. In earlier chapters of Excusing Sinners, Bignon establishes that in “this
world, instances of causal responsibility without moral responsibility were found in all sort of
situations,” and these include cases of “coercion, manipulation, mental illness, ignorance of the
relevant facts, all these conditions were seen to entail … that a person, though causally responsible
for his actions, is not morally responsible.” These examples illustrate how God can be the
predestinating cause and not be the direct cause of their choices.
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less the answer) is above everyone’s pay grade with the exception of God. Earth-
bound observers are simply not in a position to dispute God’s actions or will on this
matter. Such election may seem unreasonable or morally inexcusable to finite
creatures. But God is nevertheless justified because he is the decisive arbiter of
what is just and unjust. He alone is in a position to make these decisions and reveal
or not reveal his reasoning for it. Paul suggests that to contradict God’s wisdom on
this matter is to find oneself on a dangerous footing. The reader who echoes the
aforementioned objections (9:14, 19) is not here complaining to Calvin but will
find himself in conflict with Paul.
After answering these predictable objections, Paul then puts several
questions to them. What if God’s purpose in displaying his wrath was to
demonstrate his power to save his elect people (9:22a)? What if God patiently
tolerated the vessels made for his wrath whom he prepared for destruction before
creation (9:22b)? And what if God was willing to reveal the riches of his glory on
the objects of mercy (the former objects of his wrath now elect) that he prepared
beforehand (9:23a)? This series of interrogatives clarifies his previous examples of
elect individuals. If God chose to raise up an object of wrath whom he prepared
before creation, then that is his prerogative. If God chose to then show those same
vessels of wrath his kindness and grace, then that too is his business. He alone is in
a position to make those choices.
The reader should note the recurrent theme—the vessels made for
destruction/wrath and the objects of mercy were both prepared beforehand. The
objects of his mercy are, “Even us,” Paul says, “whom he has also called, not only
from among the Jews but from among the Gentiles” (9:24).
78
The selection of a
people from among these larger groups (Jew and Gentile) begins a narrowing of
God’s election to the remnant cited from several OT texts (Rom 9:25–26; (cf. Hos
2:23; 1:10; Isa 1:9; 10:22–23; 28:22).
79
The chapter begins with the election of the
nation of Israel (9:1–4), then digresses to the election of individual patriarchs and
Pharoah (9:6–18), then projects forward to the remnant at present within those
groups (9:19–29), and finally focuses on individuals among the Gentiles who
obtain righteousness “by faith” (9:30–10:10).
In summary, God’s plan with ethnic and national Israel did not fail because
their choice to reject the Messiah is part of that predestinating plan, and Paul
_____________________________
78
Holmes, Greek New Testament SBL, Ro 9:24. This is a direct translation of οὓς καὶ
ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν.
79
HALOT, s.v. תי ִר ֵא ש, 1380. The Hebrew word תי ִר ֵא ש literally means “residue” or
“remainder.” The Greek is λεῖμμα, which has the same force of meaning. In 2nd Temple literature,
this term is used in a multivalent way, referring to groups within larger groups, such as descendants
of certain tribes (Jub. 22.21) or referring to the individuals who comprise a group (Jub. 20.7; 21.25;
Liv. Pro. Hab. 12.4; 1 En. 83:8; 4 Ezra 12:34; 2 Bar. 40:2; Sib. Or. 5.384) or even individuals as the
group, e.g., “Noah the remnant” and by extension his sons (1 En. 106.18–19); Apoc. Zeph. IV.12;
also, as a metaphor of “fruit-bearing trees” among the “seed” of Noah Apoc. Adam 6.1.
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supplies the reader with no answer as to the interplay between God’s sovereign
action and human choices.
Second Section (9:30–10:21): Israelites are Called to Confess Jesus as Lord
In Chapter 10, Paul trains his focus on the individual. He contends that
unbelieving Israel rejects Christ and instead seeks righteousness through law-
keeping, remaining ignorant of God’s righteousness (Romans 10:1–3). The
individual must hear and choose to respond, “For with the heart one believes and is
justified, and with the mouth, one confesses and is saved. For the Scripture says,
‘Everyone who believes in him will not be put to shame’”
80
(10:10–11). God’s
election of Gentiles who confess Christ as Lord (Romans 10:8–10) was divinely
intended to provoke Israel to jealousy (Romans 10:19; 11:11), so that God would
be found by those who were not seeking him (Romans 10:20).
81
Paul concludes
that Israelites who reject the message that has been heard in the prophets and
heralded by their preachers (10:18–21) will be answerable for their disobedience
and willful defiance of the gospel.
Third Section (11:1–36): Israel is Not Completely Rejected
Yet, God has sovereignly hardened unbelieving Israel, chosen a remnant in
grace not on the basis of works (11:1–6), and grafted believing Gentiles into God’s
family (Rom 11:11–24). Only the “elect” find what they were looking for
(righteousness) while “the rest were hardened” by God (11:7) with a “spirit of
stupor” and “eyes that would not see” (11:8), and “darkened eyes unable to see or
understand” (11:10; cf. 1:19, 21, 28, 31).
82
The reader should note the connection
between the phrases, “eyes that would not see,” which has to do with their
unbelief—and eyes that “unable to see or understand,” stressing God’s role in their
recalcitrance. Like Pharoah’s example in 9:17, Israel’s own intractability is the very
means by which God has sovereignly hardened their consciences. While individual
ethnic Jews have not been rejected, the nation at large has been judged, even
though “their rejection means the reconciliation of the world” (11:15; cf. 11:1).
_____________________________
80
Emphasis mine.
81
Schreiner, Romans, 532. Regarding the debate on whether Paul here means “temporal
end” or “goal,” Schreiner states, “I conclude that an either-or is not necessary in Rom. 10:4, and
thus both “end” and “goal” are probably intended.”
82
John Calvin and John Owen, Commentary on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the
Romans (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2010), 416–17. Calvin seems to introduce the idea of
“permission” in God’s sovereign choice stating, “As the elect alone are delivered by God’s grace
from destruction, so all who are not elected must necessarily remain blinded. For what Paul means
with regard to the reprobate is,—that the beginning of their ruin and condemnation is from this—
that they are forsaken by God.” Emphasis mine.
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Though they have been “broken off” and “not spared,” despite their ethnic heritage
(11:19, 20; cf. 9:3), they may be grafted back into Christ “if they do not continue in
unbelief” (11:23). Paul repeatedly balances God’s sovereign actions with the need
for human responsibility without offering an explanation as to how those two
things work together.
Paul summarizes that the Romans are now informed about this profound
“mystery” of Israel’s “partial hardening” (Rom 11:25). In other words, this is the
extent to which God has revealed this mystery. The Jews’ unbelief for the benefit
of the Gentile believer is because “God has consigned (συγκλείω, “imprisoned”)
83
all to disobedience so that he may have mercy on all” (Rom 11:32; cf. Gal 3:22).
84
This summary statement encapsulates his entire case for election by God’s grace
alone. He has imprisoned all that he might display his immeasurable and
undeserved grace to all. The magnitude of this revelation suddenly arrests Paul. He
concludes with a doxology to the omniscient God:
Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge (σοφίας καὶ
γνώσεως) of God! How unsearchable (ἀνεξεραύνητος)
85
are his judgments
(τὰ κρίματα)
86
and how inscrutable (ἀνεξιχνίαστος)
87
his ways (αἱ ὁδοὶ)!
88
“For who has known the mind of the Lord (νοῦν κυρίου),
89
or who has been
_____________________________
83
BDAG, s.v. συγκλείω, 952. The word means to “put under a compulsion” or to
“confine”—to be “locked in under the power of sin.” See Gal 3:22: “But the Scripture imprisoned
everything under sin, so that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who
believe.” In the LXX, see Exod 14:3; Josh 6:1; 1 Macc 5:5; 6:18.
84
Schreiner, Romans, 612.
85
BDAG, s.v. ἀνεξεραύνητος, 77. Meaning “unfathomable” or “indiscernible.”
86
Ibid., κρίμαατος, 567. This word means “content of a deliberative process, decision, a
decree.” The idea of “good judgment and knowledge” or “wisdom and knowledge” is most often
paired in the wisdom literature. See Prov 1:7; 2:6, 10; 8:12; 9:10; 14:6; 30:3; Ecc 1:16, 18; 2:21, 26;
7:12; 9:10, 11. In the prophets, the “Spirit of wisdom and knowledge” will rest on the Messiah (Isa
11:2; 33:6). God’s knowledge, wisdom, judgment, and his ways are all taken as corollaries here and
should not be pressed for much differentiation.
87
Ibid., ἀνεξιχνίαστος, 77. Meaning, “incomprehensible” or “fathomless.”
88
Schreiner, Romans, 617. He states, “God’s wisdom and ways are inaccessible to human
beings, apart from revelation.” See BDAG, s.v. ὁδός, 691. Here, this word could mean “a way of
life; conduct.” Or more probably, “a moral and spiritual viewpoint, way of acting,” It is the way in
its most comprehensive sense. BDAG places Rom 11:33 in the former, but it should be placed in the
latter as Paul seems to be stepping back and taking in the entirety of God’s redemptive plan.
89
See Isa 40:13, Paul cites as his evidence of his exultation. No one knows the mind of
God on these matters, apart from revelation and no one serves as God’s counselor on how he should
conduct himself or dispense his judgments in salvation history. See BDAG, s.v. νοῦς, 680. The word
can, in some instances, refer to the result of thinking, such as an opinion or a decree. But normally
refers to “the faculty of intellectual perception; mind, intellect, understanding; the faculty of
thinking.” This verse summarizes all the ideas in v. 33. No one could naturally know the mind of the
Lord, including his fathomless judgments or ways, the unsearchable depths of the riches of his
wisdom and knowledge.
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his counselor?”
“Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?”
For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory
forever. Amen. (Rom 11:33–36, ESV)
The hymn celebrates three things: What God has revealed (v. 33a; the mystery of
the gospel to the Jews and Gentiles); what God has not revealed (v. 33b–34a; his
judgments, his ways, and his mind); and God’s free grace (v. 35)—God owes no
one salvation, and so his choice is utterly unmerited.
What God Has Revealed
Only here and in Ephesians 3:8 does Paul use the phrase “fathomless
riches,” and in both places, the phrase is linked to God’s unmerited grace in the
gospel.
90
For Paul, “Christ is God’s hidden wisdom” (1 Cor 1:24, 30; 2:6–7), and
he is God’s mystery “hidden in the ages and generations but now revealed to his
saints” (Col 1:26). In Christ and his gospel are “hidden all the treasures of wisdom
and knowledge” (Col 2:2–3). God has revealed these treasures to believers so that
the church might proclaim the manifold wisdom of God to spiritual forces in
heavenly realms (Eph 3:10) in order to free Gentile nations from their enslavement
to tyrannical false gods. Paul is simply overcome with wonder and awe at the fact
that God’s mysteries, which were despairingly hidden from mankind in ages past,
have now been gloriously revealed in Christ to the Church. No one could have
fathomed so great a mystery apart from special revelation. But, Paul insists, we
have that revelation—it is the mystery revealed in Christ and his work.
What God Has Not Revealed
Concerning that which remains undisclosed, Paul tells the Romans that
God’s judgments and ways or deliberations are unfathomable and indiscernible and
that no one knows God’s mind (v. 34). He cites Isa 40:13 (LXX), “For who has
known the mind of the Lord?” and “who has been his counselor? Paul quotes this
text in only one other place—1 Corinthians 2:16, and there he applies it to
unbelievers, “For who has known the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?” But
Paul says, “We [believers] have the mind of Christ.” In context, the mind of Christ
must refer to the mysteries of God’s wisdom hidden in ages past now revealed in
“the word of the cross” (1 Cor 1:18) and by the Spirit who knows and now
discloses the mind of God (1 Cor 1:18–2:7). Without the revelation of the gospel in
the preaching of the cross and the Spirit’s work to enlighten the darkened mind, the
Corinthians could not possibly have discovered God’s salvation on their own.
_____________________________
90
Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 457.
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There are yet unfathomable mysteries hidden from both Christians and non-
Christians. This should bring believers to their knees in worship because God has
chosen to reveal the gospel, his eternal plan and purpose for Jews and Gentiles
while also hiding the inner workings of his mind. This, too, is cause for high praise.
It is exactly at this point that Molinist philosophers propose to reveal the
cipher key to understanding God’s mind on this matter. Through exceptionally
sophisticated reasoning, they graciously offer to pull back the curtain revealing the
deliverances of the divine mind in order to understand God’s ways and his
judgments, which Paul says are indiscernible, untraceable, and unknowable apart
from revelation (Rom 11:33b).
Conclusion
Based on passages such as Ephesians 1:4–11, Romans 9–11, and
Molinism’s persisting hermeneutical problem, the following must be concluded: (1)
The Bible does not explicitly teach middle knowledge. The usual passages
employed to support it neither forbid nor compel one to affirm a middle knowledge
view of hypothetical statements in Scripture.
91
(2) Molina’s insistence that the
phrase “according to foreknowledge” (προγινώσκω Rom 8:29) should be
understood as referring to prevolitional middle knowledge lacks support from the
immediate, literary, or cultural contexts of Paul. This medieval theory cannot be
easily smuggled into the apostle’s Jewish way of thinking. Conversely, Calvin’s
view of foreknowledge has ample support in Paul’s ancestral contexts where
προγινώσκω or its corresponding Hebrew terms refer to a choice or bestowal of
covenant love. God’s foreknowledge of the elect entails his choice of them. (3)
Calvin and Molina’s interpretations of Ephesians 1:4–11 are strikingly similar
regarding predestination, with at least one sharp distinction. Molina placed God’s
desire for a possible world and his unlimited deliberation between world options as
part of God’s prevolitional knowledge, logically prior to his eternal decree.
However, Paul (Eph 1:4ff.) places God’s desire/good pleasure and judgment
squarely in the category of the counsel of his will simultaneous to the eternal
decree. Moreover, as noted, he describes God’s ways and deliberations as
inscrutable and indiscernible apart from revelation (Rom 11:33–34). Calvin’s
exposition exemplifies the conservative claims of Paul. (4) Because Molina’s view
of προγινώσκω cannot be exegeted from Paul’s use of “foreknowledge” (Rom
8:29), it seems to fail to adequately explain Paul’s “imprisonment to sin” language
with regard to human choices (Rom 9–11). Molina’s proposal reaches beyond the
apostolic authors. Paul’s point is that all people are under the bondage of sin (Rom
3:9; 7:14), enslaved to sinful desires (Rom 6:17–20; 7:14), dead to sin (Rom 5:12;
_____________________________
91
Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 83–84.
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Eph 2:1–11) and that God has imprisoned all to disobedience in order to have
mercy on all (11:32; Gal 3:22–23). Paul tells the Romans that this was God’s plan
all along with no appeal to prevolitional knowledge and no accounting of human
will. (5) Paul refrains from entertaining yet another objection and is instead
awestruck and overwhelmed by the unsearchable knowledge and wisdom of God
(Romans 11:33–36). Far from being a “punt to mystery” in the absence of a more
sophisticated explanation of God’s sovereignty and man’s choice, Paul intends
believers to take this hymn as a constraint against making extravagant claims about
the inner workings of the mind of God.
And perhaps this is the “bur in the saddle” for those scholars in the biblical-
theological disciplines. Maybe the NT authors did not always think they were
leaving the church problems to solve but rather mysteries to inspire awe and
wonder before their unknowability. Molinism is undoubtedly a rich philosophical
idea that has attracted many today. As its popularity grows, it is likely to attract
more individuals due to its pretensions of sophistication. However, middle
knowledge has the distinction of being an intelligible theory that remains
unknowable and skeptical of speculation about something not revealed in Scripture.
Volume 7 Issue 2
December 2023
Page 120
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