NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
21
According to radio communications that the Hanscom AFB-FD dispatch recorded,
Hanscom AFB-FD personnel learned of the accident via an Alert 3 notification (which indicates
an accident on or near the airport) from the BED ATCT at 2140:23. At 2141:49, Rescue 3, a
light-duty vehicle, left the fire station and, about 3 seconds later, reported smoke in the air and
visible fire near the end of runway 11. Upon arriving at the accident scene, Rescue 3 personnel
encountered “heavy smoke and fire” coming from the crashed airplane and conducted a primary
search of the area up to the edge of the ravine for victims.
At 2142:56, Crash 10, a firefighting vehicle with a capacity of 1,000 gallons of water,
130 gallons of foam, and 500 lbs of dry chemical, left the fire station en route to the crash site. In
addition, three other firefighting vehicles (Crash 9, Engine 4, and Engine 6) proceeded from the
fire station to the crash site. Crash 10 and Crash 9 drove on scene together about 50 ft apart.
Crash 9 personnel stated that they applied agent to spot fires on the grass area about 100 ft in
front of the main fire and then applied foam to the main fire until it was knocked down enough
so that fire crews could get closer to the scene.
By 2145:07, about 5 minutes after the Alert 3 notification, both Crash 10 and Crash 9
(Hanscom AFB-FD’s largest firefighting vehicle with a capacity of 3,300 gallons of water,
500 gallons of foam, and 500 lbs of dry chemical) were fighting the fire. Firefighters on scene
characterized the airplane as engulfed in flames on both sides of the ravine.
About 2207, Crash 9 ran out of foam and shut down, and, about 2210 (30 minutes after
the Alert 3 notification), Crash 10 reported running out of water “again.” Shortly thereafter,
Engine 4 was sent to the fire hydrant about 1,200 ft away to lay a hose to pump water back to the
accident site. Both Engine 4 and Engine 6 had bypassed this hydrant on the way to the crash site.
By 2224, Crash 9 had been resupplied with water and foam, and firefighting operations resumed.
Hand lines were deployed to fight the ground fire in the grass area that the airplane had
passed through, to fight the fire in the brush around the airplane, and to apply additional foam to
the airplane. Rescue 3 personnel indicated that they searched close to the airplane on the runway
side of the ravine; however, they were unable to cross the ravine due to fire on the airplane and
in the river. About 2213, the Hanscom AFB-FD incident commander requested personnel at the
scene to move away from the edge of the ravine because of explosions in the water.
The Hanscom AFB, Lexington, and Lincoln fire departments made numerous attempts to
put personnel and equipment on the nonairport or east side of the ravine. About 2229, Engine 6
personnel indicated that they would be “going on the outside thru Hartwell [gate] to see if they
can get on the backside of this aircraft,” but Engine 6 personnel did not reach the other side of
the ravine. (The Hartwell gate is the main gate to Hanscom AFB; it is not an airport perimeter
gate and does not provide access to the east side of the ravine. Airport perimeter gate 26, which
is shown in figure 8, does provide access to the east side of the ravine.) About 2244, Engine 4’s
fire officer informed the incident commander that there was no way to gain entry to the cockpit
from the airport side of the ravine because it was “too steep [and there was] debris in the way.”
National Fire Protection Association document 402, “Guide for Aircraft Rescues and Fire-Fighting
Operations,” states that, “if upon arrival at an aircraft accident the operator of the first-arriving ARFF vehicle
encounters a small fire, the best tactic would be to extinguish it rapidly.”