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197

“HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?”

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, RELIGION,

AND POVERTY POLICY THROUGH THE

LENS OF KENDRICK LAMAR’S MUSIC

GREGORY S. PARKS

AND DEREK S. HICKS

ABSTRACT

The election of Donald Trump to President of the United States casts

in stark relief the ideals of a portion of his base—white evangelical voters—

and his policies as they impact the working class and the poor. The Christian

ethos has long been typified by concern for “the least of these,”

at least in

theory. Paradoxically, white evangelical voters lined up, and continue to do

so, behind a man with little regard for the working class or the poor. In fact,

his policies reflect such. This article highlights that paradox: the notion that

(1) Christians are supposed to care about the poor and downtrodden; (2)

political conservatives often score higher on metrics of religious attitudes

than liberals; (3) in practice, political conservatives often embrace

KENDRICK LAMAR, How Much a Dollar Cost, on TO PIMP A BUTTERFLY (Aftermath

Entertainment 2015).

Associate Dean of Research, Public Engagement, & Faculty Development and Professor of Law

at Wake Forest University School of Law. A draft of this article was initially presented at Brooklyn

Law School for the 2017 Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty & The Northeast

People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. The authors thank the attendees for the comments

and feedback. Thank you, also, to Kristin Delbridge, Eli Marger, Alexia Martin for their research

assistance. Of note, the authors found the lyric Genius website for “How Much a Dollar Cost”

helpful in considering how to interpret the song. See Kendrick Lamar - How Much a Dollar Cost

Lyrics, GENIUS, https://genius.com/kendrick-lamar-how-much-a-dollar-cost-lyrics (last visited

Dec. 27, 2018).

Associate Professor of Religion and Culture at Wake Forest University’s School of Divinity

and founding Director of the Center for Research, Engagement and Collaboration in African

American Life (RECAAL) at Wake Forest University.

Matthew 25:34-40 (King James).

198 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

nonegalitarian attitudes towards the working class and the poor; and as such,

(4) political conservatives, even Christians, endorse policies that are

harmful to the working class and the poor. The authors analyze this paradox

through the lens of rapper Kendrick Lamar’s song, “How Much a Dollar

Cost?”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 198

II. MUSIC AND POLITICS ................................................................... 202

III. LINE BY LINE ANALYSIS OF KENDRICK LAMAR’S “HOW

MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” ...................................................... 213

A. VERSE I AND HOOK ................................................................. 213

B. VERSE II ................................................................................... 218

C. VERSE III AND OUTRO ............................................................. 228

IV. THE ELECTION OF DONALD TRUMP ....................................... 237

A. PRESIDENT TRUMP: MAN OF THE PEOPLE IF THE PEOPLE

WERE THE ONE PERCENT ...................................................... 237

B. THE TRUMP VOTER .................................................................. 245

C. TRUMP AND WHITE EVANGELICALS ....................................... 250

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 258

I. INTRODUCTION

Kendrick Lamar Duckworth was born on June 17, 1987 in Compton,

California.

His parents moved from Chicago in 1984—his father one of

seven children, his mother one of thirteen.

His father was a member of the

Chicago street gang Gangster Disciples and wanted to escape, but he still

found himself on the streets in Compton while his wife worked in fast food.

Growing up, Lamar was a “quiet, observant kid who made good grades.”

His youth was marked by realizations that not every community had the

Kendrick Lamar Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/kendrick-

lamar-21349281 (last updated Jan. 16, 2019).

Jessica Hopper, Kendrick Lamar: Not Your Average Everyday Rap Savior, SPIN (Oct. 9, 2012),

http://www.spin.com/2012/10/kendrick-lamar-not-your-average-everyday-rap-savior/.

Id.

Rebecca Haithcoat, Born and Raised in Compton, Kendrick Lamar Hides a Poet’s Soul Behind

“Pussy & Patron”, L.A. WEEKLY (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:30 AM),

http://www.laweekly.com/music/born-and-raised-in-compton-kendrick-lamar-hides-a-poets-

soul-behind-pussy-and-patron-2168759.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 199

same tumultuous existence as Compton.

His father encouraged him to

make something of his life.

Lamar then began to see that the youth in

Compton were going to jail and dying with disturbing regularity, a

recognition of reality that he called “a gift from God.”

Lamar’s dream of becoming a rapper began upon seeing Dr. Dre and

Tupac shoot the music video for “California Love” around the corner from

his house.

When he was thirteen, Lamar began writing rhymes and, after

seeing 50 Cent’s mixtape success, he realized that he could begin sharing

his music.

By the time he was sixteen, Lamar’s mixtape, Youngest Head

N**** in Charge, under the pseudonym K-Dot, had made it to Anthony

“Top Dawg” Tiffith of record label Top Dawg Entertainment.

After

freestyling for an hour with Top Dawg, his talent was recognized, and he

has been with Top Dawg ever since.

Lamar’s success began to unfold in

2010 when he released Overly Dedicated, which peaked at number 72 on

the Billboard Top Hip-Hop Albums chart.

Dr. Dre then recruited Lamar

to collaborate on the Dre and Snoop Dogg “eternally-delayed” Detox

album.

In July 2011, Lamar released his first full-length album, Section.80,

which included the single “HiiiPoWeR,” a song produced by fellow rapper

J.Cole.

It received critical acclaim.

In 2012, shortly after releasing hit

single “Cartoons and Cereal,”

Lamar was signed to Interscope Records

Hopper, supra note 4.

Id.

Haithcoat, supra note 6; Nadine Graham, Kendrick Lamar: The West Coast Got Somethin’ to

Say, HIPHOPDX (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://hiphopdx.com/interviews/id.1641/title.kendrick-

lamar-the-west-coast-got-somethin-to-say.

Haithcoat, supra note 6.

See Kendrick Lamar Chart History: Top R&B/Hip-Hop Albums, BILLBOARD (last visited Nov.

15, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/music/kendrick-lamar/chart-history/r-b-hip-hop-albums.

Graham, supra note 12.

Steven Horowitz, Kendrick Lamar Speaks on the Meaning Behind “HiiiPoWeR,” Working with

J. Cole, HIPHOPDX (July 1, 2011, 10:36 AM),

https://hiphopdx.com/news/id.15795/title.kendrick-lamar-speaks-on-the-meaning-behind-

hiiipower-working-with-j-cole; A. Jacobs, Hip Hop Album Sales: The Week Ending 7/3/2011,

HIPHOPDX (July 6, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://hiphopdx.com/news/id.15846/title.hip-hop-album-

sales-the-week-ending-7-3-2011.

Ogden Payne, How Kendrick Lamar’s ‘Section.80’ Catapulted Him into Hip-Hop Royalty,

FORBES (July 2, 2016, 7:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ogdenpayne/2016/07/02/how-

kendrick-lamars-section-80-catapulted-him-into-hip-hop-royalty/#6154f8715b4d.

Cartoons and Cereal - Single, ITUNES (Feb. 6, 2012),

https://itunes.apple.com/us/album/cartoon-cereal-single/671739552.

200 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

and Aftermath Entertainment.

It was announced that those two companies,

along with Top Dawg, would be releasing Lamar’s next album,

good kid,

m.A.A.d city, which debuted in October 2012.

Featuring hit singles such

as “Swimming Pools” and “Poetic Justice,” the album was met with

widespread acclaim and was certified as platinum nine months after its

release.

Lamar made waves in 2013 when he recorded a verse on Big

Sean’s track, “Control,” in which he disparaged numerous rival rappers and

proclaimed himself “The King of New York” (in addition to having been

previously proclaimed the “New King of the West Coast”),

which led to

much discussion.

This controversy, however, helped to expand Lamar’s

followers and listening base.

In late 2014, Lamar released tracks for his third studio album,

including the song “i,”

a song for which Lamar would win a Grammy for

Best Rap Song in early 2015.

In March 2015, one week before its official

release date, To Pimp a Butterfly was leaked.

The album was met with

widespread critical acclaim, including being called the “Great American

Hip-Hop Album” and “a lush volcanic riverbed of harmonic cunning and

complexity [that] [o]nly a lyricist of Lamar’s skills, scope, poetics and

Nadeska Alexis, Kendrick Lamar, Black Hippy Ink Deals with Interscope and Aftermath, MTV

(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.mtv.com/news/2497306/kendrick-lamar-signs-with-interscope-

aftermath/.

Id.

Latifah Muhammad, Kendrick Lamar’s good kid, m.A.A.d. city Goes Platinum, BET (Aug. 22,

2013), https://www.bet.com/news/music/2013/08/22/kendick-lamar-s-good-kid-maad-city-goes-

platinum.html.

Id.

Andres Tardio, Kendrick Lamar on Being “King of West Coast Rap,” Explains Positive

Perspective, HIPHOPDX (Dec. 7, 2012, 8:39 AM),

https://hiphopdx.com/news/id.22134/title.kendrick-lamar-on-being-king-of-west-coast-rap-

explains-positive-perspective.

William Gruger, Kendrick Lamar’s ‘Control’ Feature Yields Huge Twitter Followers Jump,

BILLBOARD (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5672483/kendrick-lamars-

control-feature-yields-huge-twitter-followers-jump.

Id.

Nathan Slavik, Kendrick Lamar’s ‘To Pimp a Butterfly’ Album Official Tracklist: Exclsuive,

DJBOOTH (Mar. 12, 2015), https://djbooth.net/features/2015-03-12-official-tracklist-kendrick-

lamar-to-pimp-a-butterfly-album.

Erika Ramirez, Taylor Swift Cries Tears of Joy Over Kendrick Lamar’s Grammy Wins,

BILLBOARD (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/events/grammys-

2015/6465578/taylor-swift-kendrick-lamar-grammy-wins.

Andrew Flanagan, Explained: Kendrick Lamar’s Chaotic (and Planned) Surprise Release of

‘To Pimp a Butterfly’, BILLBOARD (Mar. 6, 2015),

https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6502263/explained-kendrick-lamar-to-pimp-a-

butterfly-surprise-planned-release.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 201

polemics would dare hop aboard.”

To Pimp a Butterfly was named Best

Album of 2015 by the Rolling Stone,

a magazine which has featured

Lamar on its cover.

In fact, in 2015, President Barack Obama’s favorite

song that year was none other than a song off of Lamar’s To Pimp a

Butterfly album: “How Much a Dollar Cost.”

As Lamar described the

song:

It’s a true story . . . These are moments in my life deeper

than just handing somebody a dollar. These are actually

moments of integrity, actually being able to talk to

somebody. Me talking to [this homeless man] was simply

a thank you from God. And I felt God speaking through

him to get at me.

In this article, we draw upon Lamar’s lyrics to make sense of how

political and religious ideologies influence attitudes toward the poor and, in

turn, poverty policy.

In short, we contend that political conservatives score

higher on measures of religiosity than political liberals.

As such, one

might suspect that conservatives also have stronger egalitarian attitudes

towards the poor than liberals. However, we found just the opposite. We

found that conservatives endorse and put forth harsher public policy vis-à-

vis the poor.

Accordingly, in Part II, we provide some historical context

to understanding how hip-hop music has been used to understand social

conditions in the United States. Then, in Part III, we employ the Intro, Verse

1, Verse 2, Verse 3, and the Outro of Kendrick Lamar’s “How Much a

Dan Weiss, Review: Kendrick Lamar Returns with the Great American Hip-Hop Album, “To

Pimp a Butterfly”, SPIN (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.spin.com/2015/03/kendrick-lamar-to-pimp-

a-butterfly/; Greg Tate, To Pimp a Butterfly, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 19, 2015, 1:15 PM),

http://www.rollingstone.com/music/albumreviews/kendrick-lamar-to-pimp-a-butterfly-

20150319.

50 Best Albums of 2015, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 1, 2015, 3:52 PM),

https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-lists/50-best-albums-of-2015-146153/.

The Trials of Kendrick Lamar: Inside the New Issue, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 11, 2015, 2:28

PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/the-trials-of-kendrick-lamar-inside-the-

new-issue-107516/.

Ryan Reed, Obamas Pick Kendrick Lamar, ‘Uptown Funk’ for Favorite 2015 Songs, ROLLING

STONE (Dec. 9, 2015, 5:29 PM) http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/obamas-pick-kendrick-

lamar-uptown-funk-for-favorite-2015-songs-20151209.

Id.

In 2012, Caleb Mason employed a similar methodology in his analysis of the Fourth

Amendment as framed in Jay-Z’s song “99 Problems.” See Caleb Mason, Jay-Z’s 99 Problems,

Verse 2: A Close Reading with Fourth Amendment Guidance for Cops and Perps, 56 ST. LOUIS

U. L. J. 567 (2012) (analyzing the second verse of Jay-Z’s 99 Problems as a proxy for how

accurately pop culture interprets criminal justice).

See infra pp. 226.

See infra pp. 229–32.

202 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

Dollar Cost,” respectively, to analyze our thesis. Throughout Part IV, we

cast our findings from Part III on our current political moment—i.e., the

paradox of many white evangelical voters’ and white working-class voters’

support for President Donald Trump. This support comes despite his

persona and policies being anathema to their respective values and interests.

In Part IV, Section A, we explore how President Trump’s policies adversely

impact the working class and the poor. In Part IV, Section B, we explore

the factors that drove Trump voters. And in Part IV, Section C, we further

explore the paradox of Christians’, specifically white evangelicals’,

overwhelming support for Trump.

II. MUSIC AND POLITICS

Music may put into context the seemingly paradoxical relationship

between white evangelical voters and Trump. If politics is the blood that

feeds our societies with the energy to evolve, then music is an essential

ingredient to political transformation. We listen to music not only to be

entertained, but to also understand ourselves individually and collectively.

It is specifically because music is so entertaining that it allows such great

potency as a vehicle for political expression.

Music’s potential to influence society’s political evolution has long

been recognized by thinkers. For example, Socrates warned that “the modes

of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental

political and social conventions.”

As such, soul and rap music became

ways to express various forms of black consciousness.

“And the debates

about rap, as about jazz earlier in the [twentieth] [c]entury, reflect the

special double character, the essential tension in black music.”

In the late 1970s, rap music emerged as a street-styled folk poetry and

became a way for young blacks to speak their minds.

Even more, it is

rooted in African American youths’ expression of political and social

protest, as voiced by urban African American youth.

As music writer

COURTNEY BROWN, POLITICS IN MUSIC: MUSIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION FROM

BEETHOVEN TO HIP-HOP 1–10 (Farsight Press 2008) (discussing a brief history between social

scientists and their belief that music directly influences politics, as well as the primary ways in

which music can express political content).

Richard Brody, Breaking Muse, NEW YORKER, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-

brody/breaking-muse (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).

RON EYERMAN & ANDREW JAMISON, MUSIC AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 104 (Jeffrey C.

Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1998).

Id. at 104–105.

Id. at 105.

Id. at 103–105.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 203

Dorian Lynskey explains:

The July 1977 blackout brought [New York City]’s agonies

bubbling into the streets. At that point, only the violence

and deprivation was visible to the watching world, but a

growing clique of South Bronx residents was building

something new, a form of music which would capture the

ears of the world. That was hip-hop’s DHM [Deep Hidden

Meaning]: We’re still here. You gave us nothing, and we

made something.

The blackout of 1977, in a strange twist of events, actually proved to

give a huge boost to hip-hop.

Kids would knock over hi-fi stores to get

their hands on their first turntables, and thus was the birth of a new

generation of DJs.

Courtney Brown explains:

[T]he political turmoil of the 1970s involving the Black

Panther Party became one (of many) focuses of hip-hop

awareness. For example, Afeni Shakur, the mother of the

late rapper Tupac Shakur, was a member of the Black

Panther Party, and some have argued that her politics had

an influence on that of her son. . . . Some early political

influences on hip-hop politics can also be traced to

Malcolm X as well as other even more radical African-

American political leaders.

New York City experienced a 10.7% unemployment rate in the

summer of 1982.

The South Bronx was hit the hardest, and despite

improvements to the borough since 1977, the rest of the country still thought

of the South Bronx as “the ghetto” of America.

Movies like Paul

Newman’s Fort Apache, The Bronx—with the tagline “15 minutes from

Manhattan there’s a place where even the cops fear to tread”—did little to

alter this perception, especially given that many of the stereotypes were not

entirely inaccurate.

Along with that summer’s extreme plight came an

exciting era in the genre of hip-hop.

The songs heard on the radio, though,

were a much different flavor than the party beats mixed for the dance floors

DORIAN LYNSKEY, 33 REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE: A HISTORY OF PROTEST SONGS, FROM

BILLIE HOLIDAY TO GREEN DAY 336 (2012) (emphasis in original).

Id.

BROWN, supra note 37, at 187 (internal citations omitted).

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 329.

Id. at 329–30 (emphasis in original).

Id. at 330.

Id.

204 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

in nightclubs: “a halting, wounded rhythm . . . a slow and steady litany of

grievances” with a sound that was “local,” “introspective,” and

“paranoid.”

The Furious Five,

except for Melle Mel, echoed the thoughts

of the majority of artists at the time who were confused by this new trend.

With the dooms of reality just outside their window, many artists struggled

to understand why an audience would want to hear about it in their songs.

In their minds, dance music’s function was an escape from reality.

One person who was quick to get behind this new movement in music

was Sylvia Robinson.

She and her husband, Joe, created Sugar Hill

Records in a time when local DJs were the next big thing.

After being

turned down in their attempt to sign Grandmaster Flash, a well-known DJ,

Sugar Hill Records decided to take matters into their own hands and formed

their own rap group, the Sugarhill Gang.

The group unexpectedly enjoyed

great success with their first record, selling eight million copies.

However,

the record’s ultimate success was a nonsensical track called “Rapper’s

Delight.”

For over fifteen minutes, “the trio meanders through dance floor

chants, randy boasts, daft smiles, outlandish fantasies of wealth, and

extended analogy about chicken dinner, and an amorous encounter with

Lois Lane”

—all of which gives the impression that the song was

freestyled on the spot.

The song very simply raised the bar for all hip-hop

singles to come.

After rejecting Robinson’s offer to sign with Sugar Hill, Grandmaster

Flash continued to hone his craft in the city’s streets.

In the very early days

Id.

The Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five were a South Bronx hip-hop group formed in the

1970s, who introduced revolutionary rapping and turntable techniques to the genre. Members

included Joseph Saddler (“Grandmaster Flash”); Melvin Glover (“Mele Mel”); Nathaniel Glover

Jr. (“The Kidd Creole”); Eddie Morris (“Scorpio aka Mr. Ness”); Keith Wiggins (“Keef

Cowboy”); and Guy Williams (“Rahiem”). Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, ROCK &

ROLL HALL OF FAME, https://www.rockhall.com/inductees/grandmaster-flash-and-furious-five

(last visited Jan. 2, 2019).

LYNSKEY, supra note 42, at 331.

Id.

Id. at 332.

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 205

of his career, Flash had the creative genius to attempt playing sixteen

records in two minutes by blending each song into a continuous beat.

When the young DJ first took this new craft to the stage, however, he was

not met with cheers; instead, he said: “[i]t turned out to be a seminar. They

were just standing and staring. I think I cried for a week after that.”

The

experiment led Flash to realize that MCs were going to be integral to his

newfound art form.

When “Rapper’s Delight” was released and the glass

ceiling above hip-hop artists was shattered, Flash quickly rethought his

decision to reject Robinson’s offer, and soon the Furious Five accepted a

record deal with the label.

Edwin “Duke Bootee” Fletcher, the house percussionist for Sugar Hill,

unintentionally came up with the rhythm and then the lyrics for a song that

would eventually be titled “The Message.”

The song was raw, mentioning

glass being broken in the streets and other common occurrences that

accompanied living in South Bronx.

It was a reality in a song. Robinson

was obsessed with the new single and was more than excited for the newly

signed Furious Five to record it.

However, the group was not a fan of the

song.

Flash even admitted his reluctance, saying:

Like you [sic] listening to music, let’s say throughout the

week you’re nine-to-five, you had a hard week’s work,

you’re tired, you want to go out and party. Why would a

person want to hear this? . . . The risk factor was so high,

either it was going to be a big thing or it was gonna miss.

Despite the group’s reluctance, Robinson did not let up and continued

to pressure the artists into recording the song.

She was convinced that the

public was craving political commentary in their music, and she was right.

While the short trend of “message rap” failed to sell at the time,

hip-hop

with a message did. “With hindsight, ‘The Message’ was inevitable. It was

the record that critics, especially white ones, had been waiting for, placing

Id.

Id. at 332–33.

Id. at 333.

Id.

Id. at 333–34.

Id.

Id at 334.

Id.

Id. at 334–35.

Id. at 335.

Id.

206 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

hip-hop in the socially conscious bloodline of Stevie Wonder, Curtis

Mayfield, and Gil Scott-Heron.”

Nothing about “The Message” was obscure:

In a few stark, eloquent verses, Edwin Fletcher sketched

out the city that the hip-hop kids came home to when the

clubs and the block parties were over . . . Here are roach-

infested tenements and failing schools, predatory junkies

and pitiful bag ladies, hookers and killers, inflation,

unemployment, and strikes; things fall apart . . . It ends with

Mel’s “Superrappin’” verse, chronicling the life and death

of a kid who sees that the only people making decent

money on his block are “the number book takers, thugs,

pimps, pushers.” So he drops out of school, “turns stick-up

kid,” gets sent to jail, and ends up swinging from a noose

in his cell.

What was so revolutionary about “The Message” was its narrator.

From singers of soul to the eventual gangsta rappers, songs were sung with

an outside-looking-in perspective.

“The Message” though, was narrated

by a man who lived on those streets and suffered that life every day.

The

record was the first of its kind but definitely not the last, as it proved to be

a guiding light to future introspective and more personal records.

The

single’s “priority is not how to make the black nation rise but how to save

one man from falling.”

Just as Robinson expected, the song blew up, and

one could argue that hip-hop was never the same after “The Message” was

delivered:

“in 2002 it became the only top record in the inaugural intake

of the Library of Congress’ National Recording Registry, dedicated to

recordings that are ‘culturally, historically, or aesthetically important,

and/or inform or reflect life in the United States.’”

Despite their

hesitations, the Furious Five are credited with pioneering hip-hop’s

positioning as a conductor of social commentary and a leader of change.

Id. at 330–31.

Id. at 336.

Id.

Id. at 337.

Id.

Id. at 339.

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 207

While countless allusions to “The Message” are noted in songs of

every genre, what is less known is the impact the record had on Poland

during its political unrest. “The Polish hip-hoppers are mostly males who

are as angry with their situation in life as many inner city African Americans

are with theirs, even though the issues for each culture are different.”

The

vast spectrum of problems plaguing these polar-opposite youths is a perfect

example of how the anger expressed in these songs can transcend race,

region, and even circumstance.

Rap music similarly emerged in Cuba at

the end of the twentieth century, with the country’s government even

funding its own rap festivals.

Rap and hip-hop have not limited their commentary to just political

and social injustices but have also opened up the conversation about drug

use. While many artists are guilty of glorifying the drug life, Grandmaster

Flash and the Furious Five took a different approach in their song “White

Lines (Don’t Do It).”

The song is about cocaine abuse and, as the title

transparently states, the artists discourage using the deadly drug.

“[I]t is

interesting to note that this song presaged Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’

campaign against drug use which she initiated in 1985 in a speech which

she gave in Oakland, California at an elementary school.”

The worlds of music and social activism intersected again with many

artists contesting the trial and incarceration of former Black Panther and

prominent radio journalist, Mumia Abu-Jamal. Abu-Jamal was sentenced

to death for the killing a Philadelphia police officer in 1981.

Musical

groups such as Rage Against the Machine, however, believed Abdul-Jamal

was not given a fair trial.

The bands’ continued support culminated in a

benefit concert, from which the proceeds were donated to Abu-Jamal’s

BROWN, supra note 37, at 191.

Id. (comparing Polish hip-hoppers to inner city African Americans based on similarities such

as perpetual poverty, lack of opportunity, and government housing that combines to create “a

culture that lives and breathed discontent.”).

Id.

Id. at 191–92.

Id.

Id. at 192.

Gil Kaufman, Best of ’99: Thousands Demand Refunds for Rage Mumia Benefit Show, MTV

(Jan. 27, 1999), http://www.mtv.com/news/511747/best-of-99-thousands-demand-refunds-for-

rage-mumia-benefit-show/.

Id.

208 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

defense fund.

The increasing levels of artist outcry also contributed to the

overturning of Abu-Jamal’s death sentence in 2001.

While the mid-1980s are often remembered as a period of “growing

consumer culture, financial greed, and social self-interest,” the world of

music “became gripped by an omnipresent sense of humanitarianism.”

fact, “by the mid-1980s, hip-hop had crossed racial lines entirely as it began

its rapid spread into mainstream American culture.”

The Beastie Boys

were one of the first breakout bands in this new category of music.

Why

hip-hop has continued to so profoundly influence white suburban youth has

long been debated, but songs like “(You Gotta) Fight for Your Right (to

Party!)”

100

offer some explanation. This particular track perfectly embodies

the Beastie Boys—“silly, funny, obnoxious even, but very self-aware and

adroitly satirical.”

101

The group raps about protesting ordinary acts, such as

going to school, but also manages to offer a strong (if clichéd)

representation of teenage angst and rebellion.

102

Additionally, the song was

subject to controversy because fans did not understand the humor behind

protesting the necessity of these everyday acts,

103

yet it helped advance

musical creativity by forcing fans to separate the artist from the art.

“Gangsta rap” entered the scene during the “post-classical period” of

hip-hop, following 1993.

104

This genre is still viewed as one of the most

verbally violent forms of rap music today.

105

It tends to vulgarize sex, drugs,

and violence in such offensive tones and terms that it is no wonder the art

form has alienated many listeners and caused uproars on the political

scene.

106

Cornell West tried to explain the genre by saying, “the roots of the

Afro-American spiritual-blues impulse are based on the supposition that

Rockers Celebrate Death Row Decision, NME (Dec. 20, 2001, 12:21 PM),

https://www.nme.com/news/music/rage-against-the-machine-92-1382077.

See id.

HARDEEP PHULL, STORY BEHIND THE PROTEST SONG: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 50 SONGS

THAT CHANGED THE 20TH CENTURY 199 (2008).

BROWN, supra note 37, at 187.

PHULL, supra note 97, at 205.

100

BEASTIE BOYS, (You Gotta) Fight for Your Right (to Party!), on LICENSED TO ILL (Def Jam

& Columbia Records 1986).

101

Id. at 207.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 209.

104

BROWN, supra note 37, at 188.

105

See, e.g., Clay Calvert et al., Rap Music and the True Threats Quagmire: When Does One

Man’s Lyric Become Another's Crime?, 38 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 17–19 (2014) (comparing the

“violent lyrics” of gangsta rap to other rap subgenres).

106

BROWN, supra note 37, at 188–89.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 209

somebody—God, Mom or neighbors—cares. Some expressions of black

rap music challenge this supposition.”

107

The band Public Enemy was formed with the goal of creating a “hybrid

of Run-D.M.C. and the Clash” and with the intention of making a political

statement with every lyric they sang.

108

In 1987, Public Enemy released

their debut album, Yo! Bum Rush the Show.

109

“On the album cover, the

group members cluster under the harsh glare of a single bulb like menacing

basement conspirators, poised for a revolution rather than a party. At the

foot of the image runs a repeated ticker-tape message: ‘THE

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBLE.’”

110

While their presentation may

have succeeded in conveying their political angst, the group still had a long

way to go before their music matched this quality.

111

A year later though,

Public Enemy released Nation of Millions, and the reaction was

tremendous.

112

The music cut between speeches by Malcolm X and Khalid

Abdul Muhammad; there were “air-raid sirens, jagged bursts of turntable

scratching, cries, and grunts.”

113

“These elements didn’t merge so much as

collide,” and it was a sound begging to be heard.

114

Public Enemy gained

enough notoriety even to be watched by the government, with the FBI

“creat[ing] a study of rap music and its possible effects on national security

in which Public Enemy was referenced by name.”

115

As the creative nature erupting from the East Coast boiled over, a

movement all of its own began to form on the West Coast.

116

“If Public

Enemy [was] the Clash, seeking to build something new from the ruins of

the older order, then Niggaz With Attitude (“N.W.A.”)

117

were the Sex

Pistols, bent on dancing amid the debris.”

118

Hip-hop was almost

exclusively dominated by East Coast artists, especially those from New

York City, until the late 1980s.

119

“West Coast artists had long been

dismissed as inferior imitators who lacked the talent or credibility to

107

Id. at 188.

108

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 432.

109

Id. at 433.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 434.

114

Id.

115

PHULL, supra note 97, at 218.

116

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 434.

117

The group’s name is sometimes spelled as “Niggaz Wit Attitudes.”

118

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 435.

119

PHULL, supra note 97, at 211.

210 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

compete, but one group that single-handedly bucked that trend was a five-

piece crew from Compton called N.W.A. (Niggaz With Attitude).”

120

The

racial makeup of the Los Angeles area shifted greatly from the 1960s to

1970s, but the soon predominantly black area was hit hard by the subsequent

decline of the manufacturing industry.

121

Lynskey described it the following

way:

Compton was one of several black working-class suburbs

plagued by a crumbling economy, failing infrastructure,

and soaring crime rates. After the crumbling of the Panthers

in the early 1970s, the power vacuum in South Central Los

Angeles was filled by a potent new criminal gang known

as the Crips, who inspired a wave of rival gangs, some of

whom coalesced under the banner of the Bloods. More like

networks than single gangs, the Crips wore blue for

identification, the Bloods favored red, and the two groups

set about carving up turf throughout black Los Angeles. By

the start of the 1980s, with recession ensuring that the only

black business booming was crack cocaine, the city was

home to 155 gangs with 30,000 members.

122

Towards the end of the decade, law enforcement attempted to curb the

increasing gang activity by instituting Operation Hammer in 1987.

123

This

endeavor saw police arresting large numbers of black and Hispanic males

on small charges, which only assisted in creating an aura of victimization

and police brutality.

124

This was the environment that birthed Tracey “Ice-

T” Marrow, and that inspired O’Shea “Ice Cube” Jackson, Eric “Easy-E”

Wright, Andre “Dr. Dre” Young, and Antoine “DJ Yella” Carraby, to begin

making music as N.W.A.

125

The success of the single “Boyz-N-the Hood”

with its brutal honesty put N.W.A. in the position to release their 1989

album, Straight Outta Compton.

126

One of its tracks, “Fuck tha Police,” is

arguably the song of the record.

127

The protest song is a direct assault on

120

Id.

121

Id. at 210.

122

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 435.

123

PHULL, supra note 97, at 210 (describing Operation Hammer as “a measure designed to curb

this urban blight by arresting large numbers of black and Hispanic youths with only minimal

evidence to connect them to gang activity,”).

124

Id.

125

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 435.

126

Id.

127

Maeve McDermott, N.W.A.’s ‘Straight Outta Compton’ Turns 30—and is just as Essential

Today, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2018, 2:44 PM),

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 211

LAPD chief Daryl Gates and his oppressive tactics towards blacks,

especially young black men.

128

“As protest, Straight Outta Compton is

blithely uninterested in causes or solutions, only in the reality of ‘street

knowledge.’”

129

On the East Coast, while Public Enemy encouraged their listeners to

learn black history and to become socially and civically active, “N.W.A

asked only that they make the best of what was available.”

130

“N.W.A said

and did things that they knew would strike an attitude with the demographic

that they weren’t necessarily a part of[.] . . . They had a sensibility that really

hit street cats but they were not those cats.”

131

Following the release of

“Fuck tha Police,” N.W.A. began losing support and even sparked letters

from the FBI reprimanding the group.

132

“N.W.A also drew flak from

socially conscious hip-hop DJs who believed the group was confirming

every possible negative stereotype about young black men. Hip-hop’s

liberal defenders saw it as the music of the oppressed, but in the violent,

misogynistic, homophobic work of N.W.A, the oppressed became the

oppressors . . .”

133

In 1988, following the success of their album, It Takes a Nation of

Millions to Hold Us Back, the members of Public Enemy sat down with film

director Spike Lee to discuss the soundtrack to his upcoming movie, Do the

Right Thing.

134

The film director needed “an anthem to scream out against

the hypocrisies and wrongdoings of the system.”

135

Public Enemy member

Carlton “Chuck D” Ridenhour found his inspiration for the feature song in

the 1975 Isley Brother’s hit “Fight the Power.”

136

Lynskey explains:

[The movie] was a referendum on the civil rights

movement. After [a] climactic riot [scene], the movie

ended with two competing quotations regarding the

validity of violence as a means of dissent, one from Dr.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2018/08/07/nwa-straight-outta-compton-turns-30-

and-remains-masterpiece/917888002/.

128

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 435–36.

129

Id. at 436.

130

Id.

131

Id. (quoting Carlton “Chuck D” Ridenhour, one of the members of Public Enemy).

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id. at 429.

135

Id. (quoting Chuck D).

136

Id. at 430.

212 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

King, one from Malcolm X. Each viewer got to decide

which one better suited the times.”

137

Any appeal that Public Enemy had gained at this point though had

surely been seized by the toxic commentary given by group member

Richard “Professor Griff” Griffin when he gave an undeniably anti-Semitic

interview with The Washington Times on May 9, 1989.

138

But as Chuck

explained, to a certain extent Griff was expected to be extreme, saying

“[f]lavor is what America would like to see in a black man—sad to say, but

true—whereas Griff is very much what America would not like to see.”

139

Chuck, at first, did not condemn his friend for his anti-Semitic comments.

140

He received a lot of flak for this but believed that a person should be able

to speak his mind, even if what he was thinking was toxic.

141

However, with

time and boycotts, eventually Public Enemy and Professor Griff parted

ways.

142

In 1992, Ice-T released his song “Cop Killer” with his group Body

Count.

143

This song was characterized by its angry and revenge-fueled

dialogue.

144

Additionally, “Cop Killer” boasts a chorus that is worryingly

devoid of remorse for the homicidal revenge taken against police or for their

grieving families.

145

A boycott was almost immediately called on Time

Warner for producing the record, and Ice-T’s work was compared to slavery

and Nazism.

146

Despite his repeated explanations that the song was a fantasy

and not an actual plan to assault law enforcement, Ice-T eventually removed

“Cop Killer” from the album.

147

In its place, the controversial artist released

a new song, appropriately titled “Freedom of Speech.”

148

The incident was

the result of the public forgetting that these artists were successful because

of their controversy. What started as a statement of protest against police

brutality ended up becoming Ice-T’s battle against censorship with the

137

Id. at 437.

138

Id. at 430.

139

Id. at 439.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

PHULL, supra note 97, at 200.

144

Id. at 220.

145

Id. at 221.

146

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 445.

147

PHULL, supra note 97, at 221–22.

148

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 445.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 213

rapper even commenting, “‘Freedom of Speech’ is a great concept, it sounds

good, but it has never applied and will never apply.”

149

Lynskey contends that “‘Fight the Power’ planted political hip-hop in

the mainstream of U.S. culture for three eventful years. After ‘Cop Killer,’

that time had passed, never to come again.”

150

However, over the years,

rappers have provided some of society’s most incisive social

commentary.

151

Included in that bunch is Kendrick Lamar.

152

Of particular

note is his song, “How Much a Dollar Cost,” off his album To Pimp a

Butterfly.

III. LINE-BY-LINE ANALYSIS OF KENDRICK LAMAR’S “HOW

MUCH A DOLLAR COST”

A. VERSE I AND HOOK

1. How much a dollar really cost?

2. The question is detrimental, paralyzin’ my thoughts

3. Parasites in my stomach keep me with a gut feeling, y’all

4. Gotta see how I’m chillin’ once I park this luxury car

5. Hopping out feeling big as Mutombo

6. “20 on pump 6,” dirty Marcellus called me Dumbo

7. 20 years ago, can’t forget

8. Now I can lend all my ear or two

9. How to stack these residuals tenfold

10. The liberal concept of what men’ll do

11. “20 on 6,” he didn’t hear me

12. Indigenous African only spoke Zulu

13. My American tongue was slurry

14. Walked out the gas station

15. A homeless man with a semi-tan complexion

16. Asked me for ten rand, stressin’ about dry land

17. Deep water, powder blue skies that crack open

18. A piece of crack that he wanted, I knew he was smokin’

19. He begged and pleaded

20. Asked me to feed him twice, I didn’t believe it

149

PHULL, supra note 97, at 223.

150

LYNSKEY, supra note 43, at 446.

151

See supra Part II.

152

See Sagal Mohammed, 10 Times Kendrick Lamar Got Political with His Songs, GLAMOUR

(Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.glamourmagazine.co.uk/article/kendrick-lamar-humble.

214 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

21. Told him, “Beat it”

22. Contributin’ money just for his pipe, I couldn’t see it

23. He said, “My son, temptation is one thing that I’ve

defeated

24. Listen to me, I want a single bill from you

25. Nothin’ less, nothin’ more”

26. I told him “I ain’t have it” and closed my door

27. Tell me how much a dollar cost

28. It’s more to feed your mind

29. Water, sun and love, the one you love

30. All you need, the air you breathe

153

[Lines 1–3]: Lamar seems to ponder the true “cost” of money—not

simply what it buys but also the “loss or penalty incurred especially in

gaining [it].”

154

When Lamar speaks of “parasites,” he could be speaking

metaphorically of one of two things or both. On one hand, a parasite is “an

organism that lives on or in an organism of another species . . . from the

body of which it obtains nutriment.”

155

On the other, it is also “a person who

receives support, advantage, or the like, from another or others without

giving any useful or proper return.”

156

With regard to the former, Lamar

could be implying that a failure of some sort is eating away at him. With

regard to the latter, he could be foreshadowing that someone who wants

something from him and seems to have little to offer is gnawing away at

him.

[Lines 4–5]: Lamar articulates that when he steps out of his luxury

vehicle, his ego is as tall as former NBA star, center Dikembe Mutombo.

157

In essence, he connects consumerism to confidence, if not narcissism.

Studied in relation to many human behaviors, including interpersonal

communication and relationships, the trait of narcissism is an individual’s

desire for grandiosity in combination with the need for admiration.

158

Those

153

KENDRICK LAMAR, supra note 1; Kendrick Lamar - How Much a Dollar Cost Lyrics, GENIUS,

https://genius.com/kendrick-lamar-how-much-a-dollar-cost-lyrics (last visited Dec. 27, 2018)

[hereinafter How Much a Dollar Cost Lyrics].

154

See Cost, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/cost (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).

155

Parasite, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/parasite (last visited Nov. 15,

2017).

156

Id.

157

See Bloomberg News, Tall Tales in the N.B.A. Don’t Fool Players, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,

2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/15/sports/basketball/tall-tales-in-nba-dont-fool-

players.html (stating that Mutombo is 7’2” tall).

158

Emanuel de Bellis et al., The Influence of Trait and State Narcissism on the Uniqueness of

Mass-Customized Products, 92 J. RETAILING 162, 164 (2016).

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 215

who exhibit narcissism have a propensity for self-enhancement, dominance,

and lack of empathy.

159

Narcissists also value exhibitionism and respond to

criticism with defense, upholding a sense of entitlement and

exploitativeness.

160

In this century, the fixation on self-esteem is increased

by the media and has a significant effect on youth in particular, raised to

focus only on their own needs.

161

Additionally, scholars are now focused on the combination of non-

pathological narcissism, or an unjustified conceit that motivates self-

enhancement, and how corporations use this trait to their advantage.

162

For

example, there was a significant increase in levels of narcissism in college

students from 1979 to 2006.

163

Additionally, men tend to display more

narcissistic tendencies than women,

164

and its prevalence is linked to

Western culture, with an emphasis on individualism over collectivism.

165

With the increase in narcissism in this era, researchers are interested in what

role consumption plays in this trend.

166

Brands can be incorporated as a part

of identity formation, which is significant when this identity is based on

self-esteem and enhancement.

167

Some studies have identified the

importance of a new culture of mass-customization, where individuals can

differentiate themselves from others by designing unique products to show

their identity.

168

One study noted that material objects are used not only for

this expression but also to support an otherwise fragile identity where

humans can define themselves by their possessions.

169

Brands provide

security for otherwise insecure individuals through the recognition they

159

Id.

160

Brent McFerran et al., Evidence for Two Facets of Pride in Consumption: Findings from

Luxury Brands, 24 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 455, 466 (2014) (citing Robert Raskin & Howard

Terry, A Principal-Components Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and Further

Evidence of its Construct Validity, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 890, 892 (1988)).

161

Aliette Lambert & John Desmond, Loyal Now, but Not Forever! A Study of Narcissism and

Male Consumer-Brand Relationships, 30 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 690, 690–91 (2014).

162

de Bellis et al., supra note 158, at 163.

163

Lambert & Desmond, supra note 161, at 691.

164

Id. (citing Joshua D. Foster et al., Individual Differences in Narcissism: Inflated Self-Views

Across the Lifespan and Around the World, 37 J. RES. PERSONALITY 469 (2003)).

165

Id. (citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE

RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (Free Press 1999); OLIVER JAMES, AFFLUENZA: HOW TO

BE SUCCESSFUL AND STAY SANE (Vermillion 2007)).

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

de Bellis et al., supra note 158, at 162.

169

Lambert & Desmond, supra note 161, at 703–704.

216 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

create.

170

This concept has been referred to as “terminal materialism,” where

consumers acquire goods solely for the status it displays.

171

In these early lines Lamar weaves in a self-critique against narcissism

that offers a framework for our examination of public policy for the poor.

This self-critique creates a path toward a position of benevolence toward

the poor that might be drawn from larger themes of the song.

[Lines 6–13]: After parking, Lamar asks the attendant to put gas in his

car. Possibly alluding to being teased about his ears when young,

172

the

irony of the song is that now Lamar uses his ears to make money. Indeed,

he seems to extol the virtues of “economic liberalism”: an economic system

created by virtue of economic decisions being made by individuals, rather

than by collective institutions or organizations.

173

It is important to note that

the song emerges from Lamar’s actual experiences in South Africa.

174

[Lines 14–22]: As Lamar exited the petrol station, a man of apparently

mixed origin begged him for the equivalent of one U.S. dollar. Lamar

assumed that the money was for drugs—stereotyping a poor person as being

synonymous with a drug user. Accordingly, when the man continued to beg

for food, Lamar dismissed the beggar. Stereotypes are generalized

judgments about an individual based on membership in a particular social

group,

175

such as the lower economic class.

176

Researchers have sought to

uncover how the poor are viewed, how people respond to the poor and their

situations, and what causes people to hold certain beliefs about poor

people.

177

For example, the poor tend to be viewed as less intellectually

competent than the rich.

178

170

Id.

171

Id. at 703.

172

See StillaBlackHippy, Kendrick Lamar Dumb It Down, YOUTUBE (Dec. 30, 2011),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q59G6cYTmfE; Kendrick Lamar – Dumb It Down Lyrics,

GENIUS, https://genius.com/Kendrick-lamar-dumb-it-down-lyrics (“[A]ll I got is bad credit, big

ears and big head.”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).

173

See IAN ADAMS, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY TODAY 25–26 (2d ed. 2001).

174

KillaKam, South Africa’s Influence on Kendrick Lamar’s ‘To Pimp A Butterfly,’ OKAYAFRICA

(Feb. 11, 2016, 3:31 PM), http://www.okayafrica.com/audio/kendrick-lamar-south-africa-to-

pimp-a-butterfly/.

175

Taniesha A. Woods et al., The Development of Stereotypes About the Rich and Poor: Age,

Race, and Family Income Differences in Beliefs, 34 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 437, 437 (2005).

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 442.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 217

Researchers have investigated the impact of the perceived wealth or

poverty of an individual on strangers’ judgments of their character.

179

The

results revealed that, as expected, poor strangers received significantly

lower overall ratings than did neutral or wealthy strangers.

180

Wealthy

strangers were perceived as more intelligent, healthy, likely to be

successful, and able.

181

However, despite receiving overall lower scores, the

poor were rated higher than the other two groups in working hard, trying

hard, being generous, and handling money wisely.

182

Furthermore,

participants did not assume that poor targets used drugs or alcohol more

than the other groups.

183

Nonetheless, there remains the perception that the

poor are stereotyped as being greater abusers of alcohol and drugs than the

wealthy under the theory of a “culture of poverty.”

184

Indeed, people develop attitudes, biases, and stereotypes about the

poor for a variety of reasons. Groups that are judged as responsible for their

own need for financial aid, and those that are less likable, are considered

less deserving of aid than groups judged as less responsible for their need

for aid and more likable.

185

Additionally, some researchers have studied the

theory that a person’s actions are inherently inclined to bring morally fair

life outcomes to that person—i.e., belief in a just world.

186

Those who have

a strong belief in a just world judge individuals as less deserving of aid than

those with a weak belief in a just world.

187

Not surprisingly, in the context

of evaluative judgments of the poor, these views are harbored largely by

people, such as the middle class, who are separated from the poor out of the

desire to justify exclusion.

188

[Lines 23–27]: Lamar alludes to the beggar as one who, like Jesus in

Matthew 4:1–11, has been tempted in every way by Satan and overcome it.

Though tempted Jesus exhorts Satan not to “put the Lord your God to the

test” and, in the end, triumphantly banishes Satan “away” from him before

179

Dianne Skafte, The Effects of Perceived Wealth and Poverty on Adolescents’ Character

Judgments, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95 (2001).

180

Id. at 96–96.

181

Id. at 97.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Paul Gorski, The Myth of the “Culture of Poverty”, EDUC. LEADERSHIP 32, 33–34 (2008).

185

Lauren D. Appelbaum, Who Deserves Help? Students’ Opinions About the Deservingness of

Different Groups Living in Germany to Receive Aid, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 201, 219–21 (2002).

186

Id. at 206–207.

187

Id.

188

Bernice Lott, Cognitive and Behavioral Distancing from the Poor, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST

100, 104 (2002).

218 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

being attended to by angels.

189

Hinting at the identity of the homeless man,

Lamar reiterates the homeless man’s simple request—a dollar—and

Lamar’s repeated denial of the request. He ends by begging the question,

the same way he opened the song: what is true “cost” of money—not simply

what it buys but also the “loss or penalty incurred especially in [hoarding

it].”

190

[Lines 28–30]: The hook seems to be sung from the perspective of

God. “How much a dollar really cost,” is given a positive angle—“the

amount . . . paid or charged for something.”

191

Here, the failure to give to

“the least of these,”

192

results in a penalty; however, the affirmative giving

appears to result in a reward—food for the mind and soul (e.g., air, water,

sun, love, and loved ones).

B. VERSE II

31. He’s starin’ at me in disbelief

32. My temper is buildin’, he’s starin’ at me, I grab my key

33. He’s starin’ at me, I started the car, then I tried to leave

34. And somethin’ told me to keep it in park until I could

see

35. The reason why he was mad at a stranger

36. Like I was supposed to save him

37. Like I’m the reason he’s homeless and askin’ me for a

favor

38. He’s starin’ at me, his eyes followed me with no laser

39. He’s starin’ at me, I notice that his stare is contagious

40. Cause now I’m starin’ back at him, feelin’ some type

of disrespect

41. If I could throw a bat at him, it’d be aimin’ at his neck

42. I never understood someone beggin’ for goods

43. Askin’ for handouts, takin’ it if they could

44. And this particular person just had it down pat

45. Starin’ at me for the longest until he finally asked

46. “Have you ever opened up Exodus 14?

47. A humble man is all that we ever need”

48. Tell me how much a dollar cost

193

189

Matthew 4:1-11 (New International Version).

190

See KENDRICK LAMAR, supra note 1; How Much a Dollar Cost Lyrics, supra note 153.

191

Id.

192

Matthew 25:34-40 (King James).

193

KENDRICK LAMAR, supra note 1; How Much a Dollar Cost Lyrics, supra note 153.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 219

[Lines 31–41]: Lamar recounts his perception that the homeless man

was incredulous that Lamar would not give him a dollar. However, it is clear

that Lamar grows increasingly frustrated and angry with the homeless man.

In fact, while the homeless man’s staring may have caused Lamar’s

frustration, his perceived lower status may have exacerbated it. The

relationship between perceptions of status and hostility and/or aggression

has been well studied and documented. First studied by Anthony N. Doob

and Alan E. Gross in 1968, researchers examined the relationship between

perceived status of a “frustrator” (person causing the frustration) and

aggressive behavior or tendencies among drivers.

194

Their study suggests

that “the status of the frustrating agent is inversely related to the amount of

aggression displayed by the frustrated individual.”

195

Further, the

researchers found that low-status automobiles elicited more honking than

high status automobiles.

196

Building off of Doob and Gross’s findings, humanities and social

sciences professor Andreas Diekmann and colleagues employed an

observational approach to the study of aggressive behaviors among

drivers.

197

Specifically, they explored the effect of a frustrated person’s

social status on the tendency to react aggressively, rather than the

frustrator’s social status.

198

They varied the status of the frustrated

individual’s car, hypothesizing that drivers of high-status cars would exhibit

more aggressive behavior than drivers of low-status cars.

199

Indeed,

Diekmann and colleagues found that the social status of a frustrator inhibits

aggressive responses by frustrated individuals, thereby appearing as if

“higher social status not only inhibits others’ aggressive tendencies but also

intensifies one’s own.”

200

[Lines 42–44]: While Lamar never speaks of political ideology, his

attitude in this moment of the song and stereotyping of the beggar seem

consistent with conservative ideology, given the social and scientific

literature on the topic.

194

Anthony N. Doob & Alan E. Gross, Status of Frustrator as an Inhibitor of Horn-Honking

Responses, 76 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 213–14 (1968).

195

Lawrence J. Chase & Norbert H. Mills, Status of Frustrator as a Facilitator of Aggression: A

Brief Note, 84 J. PSYCHOL. 225, 225 (1973).

196

Id.

197

Andreas Diekmann et al., Social Status and Aggression: A Field Study Analyzed by Survival

Analysis, 136 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 761, 761 (1996).

198

Id.

199

Id. at 761–62.

200

Id. at 767–68.

220 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

As outlined by many psychologists, an individual’s cognitive

responses are a product of inherent positive or negative inherent beliefs

about a particular group.

201

“Attribution theory” developed as a result of this

investigation and identifies the connection between thinking, feeling, and

action.

202

Responses to an environment prompt a cognitive reaction to these

situations, which then leads to a reaction contingent upon the positive or

negative emotions that were provoked.

203

Attribution theory states that

individuals accredit actions to either dispositional or situational causes.

204

Humans tend to underestimate situational factors in others and overestimate

dispositional causes, a theory referred to as “fundamental attribution

error.”

205

Individuals will view those around them as independent actors

responsible for their actions;

206

therefore, individualistic causes are more

commonly endorsed than situational assumptions.

207

For example, an

instance of this error occurs in identifying reasons for a person’s poverty:

dispositional attributions would be race, gender, personality, or lack of

effort.

208

In contrast, situational causes would include social structure,

discrimination, or a poor education system.

209

From this research,

psychologists have determined that certain ideological groups tend to rely

on dispositional attributions more frequently than others.

210

This

supposition implies that when debating social issues, the provision of help

depends upon the responsibility and deservedness of the person receiving

assistance, an idea guided by the attribution theory.

211

Groups advocating

dispositional causes tend to withhold help, while those who attribute others’

201

Michael J. Tagler & Catherine Cozzarelli, Feelings Toward the Poor and Beliefs About the

Causes of Poverty: The Role of Affective-Cognitive Consistency in Help-Giving, 147 J. PSYCHOL.

517, 518 (2013).

202

Gail Sahar Zucker & Bernard Weiner, Conservatism and Perceptions of Poverty: An

Attributional Analysis, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 927–28 (1993).

203

Id.

204

Id. at 926–27.

205

Rez Shirazi & Anders Biel, Internal-External Causal Attributions and Perceived Government

Responsibility for Need Provision, 36 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 96, 96–97 (2005)

206

Id. at 97.

207

Tagler & Cozzarelli, supra note 201, at 518.

208

Shirazi & Biel, supra note 205, at 97.

209

Id.

210

Bernard Weiner et al., An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to Poverty: The Political

Ideology of the Giver and the Perceived Morality of the Receiver, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 199–200 (2011).

211

Id. at 199.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 221

actions to situational reasons tend to express the desire to provide

rehabilitation.

212

In light of attribution theory, Gustav Ichesier, a pioner in attribution

research, stated: “The complete tragic blindness of the privileged

concerning the life-situation of the underprivileged is the result of . . . not

seeing the invisible factors in the situations of others.”

213

This statement

insinuates an inability of certain groups to see the environmental factors

leading to unsolvable circumstances, like poverty. Ascribing such a theory

to Kendrick Lamar should be acknowledged as somewhat paradoxical. As

an artist who was raised in Compton, his lyricism exposes the listener to his

struggles as being part of a community of degraded or ignored young black

males, pushing against attribution theory. In speaking from the experiences

of the historically debased, Lamar elsewhere connects with feelings

“reserved for strangely indicted people.”

214

This shared condition of

existence reckons with the reality of many in the African American

community being taught, as James Baldwin puts it, “to despise themselves

from the moment their eyes open on the world.”

215

As Lamar embodies the

privileged in this song, looking upon the beggar with little grace, he does so

while embodying his struggles with being viewed similarly by others. Like

the beggar in need, Lamar’s body becomes “a source of discursive

investigation” regarding its worthiness within a larger framework of the

African American experience in the United States.

216

This irony

notwithstanding, Lamar’s character in this song— presumably socially

distant from the daily trials of this panhandler—articulates a conservative

political ideology that values individual striving and and capitalistic ideals.

From this idea, considerable research developed supposing that

political affiliation and ideology affects the perception of social reality.

217

Ideology underscores values and beliefs that can determine causation of

complex events and how to approach these issues.

218

The political left tends

to recognize situational causes for poverty, including the failure of society

212

G. Scott Morgan et al., When Values and Attributions Collide: Liberals’ and Conservatives’

Values Motivate Attributions for Alleged Misdeeds, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.

1241, 1242 (2010).

213

Shirazi & Biel, supra note 205, at 96.

214

DEREK S. HICKS, RECLAIMING SPIRIT IN THE BLACK FAITH TRADITION 35 (2012).

215

Id. (quoting JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 39 (1963)).

216

HICKS, supra note 214, at 35.

217

Janak Pandey et al., Right-Left Political Ideologies and Attribution of the Causes of Poverty,

12 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 327, 327 (1982).

218

Zucker & Weiner, supra note 202, at 926.

222 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

to provide schooling, high taxes, low wages, and lack of opportunity.

219

Political conservatives are more likely to use individual attributes to explain

poverty, including alcohol and drug abuse, lack of effort or skill, and

sickness.

220

This phenomenon is referred to as the “ideo-attribution effect”:

identifying conservatives as more likely to attribute poverty to dispositional

reasons, and identifying liberals as more likely to recognize situational

causes for social problems.

221

These identifications are further specified by

division into “one of three attributional profiles”: blaming, caring, or

ambivalent.

222

Conservatives tend to blame the poor by emphasizing a high

internal focus and personal control rather than caring, which would imply

the low personal control of an individual living in poverty.

223

To further indicate that attitudes towards poverty are contingent upon

the values of a political group, researchers tested whether it is possible for

the ideo-attribution effect to be reversed if the values in the situation do not

reflect conservative beliefs but instead motivate conservatives to consider

situational explanations.

224

One study investigated factors that shape each

group’s attributions and why these values lead differing ideologies to reach

separate conclusions about social issues.

225

Conservatives have strong

individualistic values, such as belief in self-discipline, so they place more

emphasis on dispositional attributions.

226

Attempting to see a reversal of

these situational and dispositional norms, researchers presented participants

with a survey measuring reactions towards U.S. Marines accused of

wrongfully killing Iraqi citizens.

227

The hypothesis suggested that because

conservatives emphasize patriotic values, they would attribute the deaths to

situational factors.

228

The results upheld this reversal of the ideo-attribution

effect, revealing strong situational attributions in conservatives and finding

that this group perceived national security beliefs as more relevant in this

situation, thereby allowing them to consider external causes.

229

A follow-up

219

Weiner et al., supra note 210, at 201.

220

Id.

221

Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 1241.

222

Danny Osborne & Bernard Weiner, A Latent Profile Analysis of Attributions for Poverty:

Identifying Response Patterns Underlying People’s Willingness to Help the Poor, 85

PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 149, 149 (2015).

223

Id.

224

Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 1242.

225

Id. at 1243.

226

Id. at 1242.

227

Id. at 1244.

228

Id.

229

Id at 1247.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 223

study was conducted examining the attributions of police officers who

wrongfully killed a wild cougar in Chicago,

230

revealing that increased

conservatism was consistently correlated with an increased perception that

security values were applicable in this situation.

231

These studies suggest

that conservatives’ tendency to attribute poverty to dispositional causes is a

result of the values they hold, such as beliefs in the just world hypothesis—

the idea that the environment will reward good and punish bad.

232

Other

values, such as belief in self-help and resistance towards increased

government involvement, lead to the consistency of conservatives relying

on dispositional attributions.

233

With the comprehension of these beliefs and

attributions, researchers can understand the difference between political

ideologies, and policy-makers can develop or reform programs that will be

accepted by individuals on differing sides of the political-ideological

spectrum.

Psychologists emphasize the importance of recognizing that

perceiving others as responsible for their own condition can prompt anger

towards those individuals, which in turn influences reactions towards the

poor.

234

The findings of these studies support the “thinking-feeling-acting

motivational sequence” that largely affects how groups, such as

conservatives, both perceive the poor and respond regarding assisting.

235

The belief that poverty is “a moral failure on the part of the poor” has

implications for the policies established to rehabilitate the poor, particularly

when there is a stigma against such legislation.

236

Because of their

placement on the attributional scale and the anger prompted by

individualistic causation, many conservatives regard welfare with the

stereotype that these programs aim to assist those who are personally

responsible for their circumstances.

237

This idea implies that political conservatism has a strong role in

welfare decisions in relation to both emotions and desires to provide

assistance. Because of their sympathy profile and the outlined situational

factors, liberals endorse the provision of help for the poor, citing that the

individual is not responsible and the government needs to assist in

230

Id. at 1248–50.

231

Id. at 1250.

232

See Zucker & Weiner, supra note 202, at 927.

233

See id.

234

Weiner et al., supra note 210, at 205–206.

235

Id. at 207.

236

Id. at 208.

237

Id. at 203, 208.

224 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

uncontrollable situations.

238

With the development of national surveys, it is

evident that the negative attitudes towards welfare recipients are growing;

however, some researchers have found that these negative reactions are

toward welfare programs, and not toward poverty in general.

239

Some

theorize that welfare elicits ideas of inefficient government, invoke racist

beliefs and promotes stereotypes of “lazy welfare queens.”

240

Alluding to

the attribution theory, social psychologist P.J. Henry and colleagues

observed whether assumed controllability of circumstances predicts how an

impoverished individual is treated by others.

241

These researchers

hypothesized that the contradictory reactions towards welfare and poverty

by political conservatives stems from the amount of controllability

associated with welfare and poverty.

242

After conducting a survey

measuring attitudes towards welfare and the poor as well as policies

regarding assistance programs, the researchers found that participants were

less likely to respond positively to people on welfare than they were to poor

people in general, and that they did not favor increased spending for welfare

programs.

243

A follow-up study assessing assumptions in attribution found

that participants described the poor as working, while those on welfare were

not actively seeking better circumstances.

244

People had less sympathy for

those on welfare and were more likely to resist government spending for

recipients they assumed were in control of their economic condition.

245

The

researchers also found that racial stereotypes about African Americans play

an important role in promoting the heightened negative reactions to welfare

programs as opposed to reactions towards the poor in general.

246

Accordingly, those who perceive causes for poverty to be internal will

withhold support from public assistance in rehabilitation.

247

Data from

238

Id. at 203.

239

E.g., P.J. Henry et al., Hate Welfare but Help the Poor: How the Attributional Content of

Stereotypes Explains the Paradox of Reactions to the Destitute in America, 34 J. APPLIED SOC.

PSYCHOL. 34, 35 (2004).

240

Id.

241

Id. at 37.

242

Id. at 38.

243

Id. at 39–40.

244

Id.

245

Id. at 50.

246

Id. at 52 (“One explanation for the difference in the reaction to welfare recipients versus the

poor is that the concept of welfare triggers racist thoughts about Blacks . . . the data suggest that

the effect of racism directed against African Americans on welfare attitudes was at least partially

mediated by attributions that welfare recipients are more in control of and more responsible for

their condition in life than are poor people.”).

247

Id. at 54–55.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 225

fourteen other cultures revealed this negative relationship between

dispositional attributions and the promotion of government spending,

especially in politically conservative men.

248

This cross-cultural method

asked participants to fill out a survey judging their attitudes towards social

justice, reported political ideology, and responsibility for the individual

citizen versus the government in providing certain needs.

249

The results

revealed that the more conservative group placed more importance on

individual responsibility, and less emphasis on government provision of

needs.

250

More specifically, left-leaning participants and women promoted

government responsibility significantly more than right-leaning participants

and men.

251

When observing the consequences of politically conservative views

towards poverty, it is important to comprehend the reasons driving their

tendency to use dispositional attributes regarding the poor. Different

political orientations imply varying values, and these standards motivate

desired attributional conclusions.

252

The political right remains resistant to

change in governmental policies, contributing to their dispositional

attitudes, in contrast to liberals tending to advocate for social change.

253

Additionally, conservatives give the government lower responsibility in

developing welfare programs because of the high internal causes they

promote,

254

as displayed by many researchers upholding conservative

dispositional tendencies. If more of an emphasis were placed on situational

attributes, such as financial failure, this group would be more likely to hold

the government responsible for providing relief.

255

Prioritizing self-

enhancement values, or views that individuals are capable of improving

their own situations, contributes to the dispositional attitudes conservatives

display towards the poor.

256

Liberals tend to uphold self-transcendence

ideas, with the mantra that every individual should work for the whole.

257

Attempting to uncover the reasoning behind the relationship between

political ideology and the attribution theory reveals the broader question of

248

Shirazi & Biel, supra note 205, at 96.

249

Id. at 103.

250

Id. at 104.

251

Id. at 111.

252

Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 1251.

253

Robert J. Pellegrini et al., Political Identification and Perceptions of Homelessness: Attributed

Causality and Attitudes on Public Policy, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPS. 1139, 1140 (1997).

254

See Shirazi & Biel, supra note 205, at 111.

255

Id. at 100.

256

Id. at 112.

257

Id.

226 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

whether attributions are tailored to fit a political ideology, or if this ideology

is shaped by beliefs about the causes of poverty.

258

A held value that tends to differ between conservatives and liberals is

strength of religiosity. In many studies, the relationship between religious

beliefs and prejudice have been unveiled, with the implications that strongly

religious conservatives may promote dispositional attributions because of

another factor of their ideology.

259

Examining extreme right-wing

authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism, researchers observed

whether these factors displayed a relationship between general religiosity

and racial prejudices.

260

Religious fundamentalism was defined as “a

closed-minded set of beliefs” relying on the “teachings about humanity and

[a] deity,” while right-wing authoritarianism displays “the degree to which

these values must be upheld.”

261

The researchers hypothesized that right-

wing aggression and religious fundamentalism would mediate the

relationship between general religiosity and racial prejudices, tested with an

online survey measuring religiosity, personality, and prejudice among

members of different ethnicities and religions.

262

The results displayed a

strong correlation observed between practiced, internalized religion and

racial prejudices that is “mediated by cognitively rigid ideologies.”

263

This

data is important in indicating that while it may not be religiosity itself

leading to strong prejudices against out-groups, these values are associated

with “authoritarian or fundamentalist beliefs held in conjunction with

religious beliefs.”

264

Conservatives holding religious values may be

prompted to have dispositional casual attitudes towards the poor as a result

of not only these beliefs, but also the standards of the political group with

which they identify.

While embodying the privileged in these lines, Lamar uses his

positionality to critique those of privilege vis-à-vis the poor. He

simultaneously reveals what he sees as the attributes God values in human

beings. Ultimately, this section probed Lamar’s tension with “askin’ for

handouts” (line 43) to present a deep consideration of political posturing

between conservatives and liberals and the ways both are embodied in

258

Id. at 113.

259

E.g., Megan K. Johnson et al., A Mediational Analysis of the Role of Right-Wing

Authoritarianism and Religious Fundamentalism in the Religiosity-Prejudice Link, 50

PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 851, 851 (2011).

260

Id.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 852.

263

Id. at 854.

264

Id. at 855.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 227

Lamar’s character in the song. This lyrical section articulates an internal

struggle within the main character about benevolence. Lamar internally

wrestles with whether it is more appropriate to see the beggar’s plight as an

individual issue of poverty or one tied to larger policy issues.

[Lines 45–48]: The beggar asks Lamar whether he was familiar with

the story of Moses parting the Red Sea, guiding the children of Israel to

safety.

265

Implicitly, the beggar notes that all that is needed is a humble man

like Moses,

266

suggesting that Lamar could be such a man. Here, the beggar,

a physical manifestation of God, poses the question “[h]ow much a dollar

really cost?,” raising the stakes and suggesting the power that one man can

have as an exemplar for his people.

A relationship between Lamar’s political ideology and religiosity

begins to emerge.

267

The religiosity expressed by Lamar here follows a

tactic he has employed in other songs: using an unsung figure to articulate

the religious values being promoted in the song. In this song, the listener

encounters the beggar. In the song “Sing About Me, I’m Dying Of Thirst”

from his previous album, good kid, m.A.A.d city, the unsung spiritual leader

is a grandmother-like figure who intervenes when several young men are

planning to retaliate for a friend’s death.

268

She asks them why they are so

angry and declares that they are “dying of thirst.”

269

Again, this unsung

figure, like the beggar, points the listener to issues of greater significance

than retaliation or receiving a single dollar. In both songs, religion is

addressing deeper matters of the heart and soul. They both get at what it

means to be human and what the collective call to impact others in one’s

community entails. Lamar weaves in what has been theorized as the

“liberative logos” of black religiosity.

270

This person functions as the

“restorative mouthpiece for a wounded community,” urging others to

265

See Exodus 14 (New International Version).

266

“Now Moses was a very humble man, more humble than anyone else on the face of the earth.”

Numbers 12:3 (New International Version). In fact, Moses displays his humility when God sends

him to lead the children of Israel out of Egypt: “But Moses said to God, ‘Who am I that I should

go to Pharaoh and bring the Israelites out of Egypt?” Exodus 3:11 (New International Version).

267

E.g., Paul J. Silvia et al., Blessed Are the Meek? Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, and the

HEXACO Structure of Religious Beliefs, Motives, and Values, 66 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES 19, 19–20 (2014). Religiosity is defined as “people’s interest in and involvement

with religion,” and is connected with political ideology dependent on a society’s religion and

political understanding. Id. at 19.

268

KENDRICK LAMAR, Sing About Me, I’m Dying of Thirst, on GOOD KID, M.A.A.D CITY

(Aftermath Entertainment 2012).

269

Id.

270

HICKS, supra note 214, at 104.

228 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

change their ways.

271

Emphasis is placed on the power of the words uttered.

While the circumstances are different, the liberating words from each

unsung figure function to bring the subjects closer to an encounter with the

divine to induce “better” behavior. This inducement is intended to

encourage the subjects to take required steps to help improve their own

social conditions. The theoretical narrative follows a line of religious

thought within marginalized communities. Lamar follows the lead of rap

artists like Goodie Mob (Soul Food, 1995) and OutKast (Aquemini, 1998),

whose lyrics and, in the case of Goodie Mob, religiosity, call upon

individuals in urban communities to be led by something greater than

themselves to address what ails the community.

272

In this sense, Lamar’s

political ideology and religiosity of the unsung savior emerges as a critical

arbiter of divine values of benevolence regarding the poor.

C. VERSE III AND OUTRO

49. Guilt trippin’ and feelin’ resentment

50. I never met a transient that demanded attention

51. They got me frustrated, indecisive and power trippin’

52. Sour emotions got me lookin’ at the universe different

53. I should distance myself, I should keep it relentless

54. My selfishness is what got me here, who the fuck I’m

kiddin’?

55. So I’mma tell you like I told the last bum

56. Crumbs and pennies, I need all of mines

57. And I recognize this type of panhandlin’ all the time

58. I got better judgment, I know when nigga’s hustlin’,

keep in mind

59. When I was strugglin’, I did compromise, now I

comprehend

60. I smell Grandpa’s old medicine, reekin’ from your skin

61. Moonshine and gin, nigga you’re babblin’, your words

ain’t flatterin’

62. I’m imaginin’ Denzel but lookin’ at O’Neal

63. Kazaam is sad thrills, your gimmick is mediocre

64. The jig is up, I seen you from a mile away losin’ focus

65. And I’m insensitive, and I lack empathy

271

Id.

272

See GOODIE MOB, SOUL FOOD (LaFace Records, 1995); OUTKAST, AQUEMINI (LaFace

Records 1998).

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 229

66. He looked at me and said, “Your potential is

bittersweet”

67. I looked at him and said, “Every nickel is mines to

keep”

68. He looked at me and said, “Know the truth, it’ll set you

free

69. You’re lookin’ at the Messiah, the son of Jehovah, the

higher power

70. The choir that spoke the word, the Holy Spirit

71. The nerve of Nazareth, and I’ll tell you just how much

a dollar cost

72. The price of having a spot in Heaven, embrace your

loss. I am God”

72. I washed my hands; I said my grace

73. What more do you want from me?

74. Tears of a clown, guess I’m not all what it’s all meant

to be

75. Shades of grey will never change if I condone

76. Turn this page, help me change to right my wrongs

273

[Lines 49–59; 66–67]: While Lamar begins to feel conflicted about

his stinginess, he continues to make excuses for why he has not given the

beggar the dollar. He recognizes that his selfishness has helped him become

wealthy. Ironically, when he struggled financially, he was more inclined to

give to the poor, suggesting that the accumulation of wealth has made him

increasingly greedy.

Psychology professor Paul L. Wachtel analyzed the correlation

between charity and political ideology.

274

His work highlights some

important facts about political ideology and charity, including political

discourse “dominated” by the idea that “[y]ou can’t throw money at

problems.”

275

Wachtel asks questions about the implications of letting such

an idea control social changes such as poverty, drug abuse, crime, and

homelessness.

276

Furthermore, Wachtel analyzes the opinions of individuals

towards taxes.

277

He points out that people’s own opinions about authority,

whether they are true or not, affect their feelings towards higher tax rates.

278

273

How Much a Dollar Cost Lyrics, supra note 153.

274

Paul L. Wachtel, Political Psychology and Economic Psychology, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 747, 747

(1991).

275

Id. at 748.

276

Id.

277

Id. at 748–49.

278

Id. at 749.

230 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

For example, when people believe tax rates will not go towards social issues

such as homelessness, they do not support higher taxes.

279

Along with the

ideas about taxes, Wachtel points out that “[i]t has been an article of faith

in our society that economic growth holds the key to improving the lot of

those in need,” whereas in reality, economic growth makes it significantly

harder for those at the bottom to remain “above water.”

280

He states that

people need to change their political ideology and recognize that the only

way to help the poverty in the United States is to change the relative

distribution of wealth rather than focus solely economic growth.

281

Economic growth leads to growth in funding for social programs because it

causes an overall increase in wealth.

282

On the other hand, it also causes

greater feelings of need, so many people do not notice the increase in wealth

and do not want to donate more to society.

283

Professors Steven T. Yen and Ernest M. Zampelli’s research explored

“charitable giving of time and money” in light of “political ideology,

religiosity, [and] political and social involvement.”

284

The authors found

that there is no evidence that political conservatives are more charitable than

liberals; however, they found that liberals volunteer more than

conservatives and that the impacts of political conservatism are exacerbated

by an increase in religion.

285

The authors discovered that when religion is

involved, monetary donations are more common among conservative

individuals, but liberals donate significantly more time.

286

They also found

that conservatives and liberals who participate in charitable activities

regularly behave similarly when it comes to charitable donations and

involvement.

287

The authors considered cash donations for religious and

non-religious purposes and donation of time.

288

They measured

participants’ political ideology on a scale of one (“very liberal”) to five

(“very conservative”) and also measured how religious participants were as

well as how religiously active they were (participation in congregational

279

Id.

280

Id. at 751.

281

Id. at 752.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

Steven T. Yen & Ernest M. Zampelli, What Drives Charitable Donations of Time and Money?

The Roles of Political Ideology, Religiosity, and Involvement, 50 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL

ECON. 58, 58 (2014).

285

Id. at 66.

286

Id. at 59.

287

Id.

288

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 231

activities outside worship services).

289

The results showed that “political

ideology has a negative and significant impact on the probability of

volunteering and on the (unconditional) mean number of times

volunteered”: a very conservative individual “is almost 18% less likely to

volunteer and is expected to volunteer almost three times less per year” than

liberal individuals.

290

Even so, “an individual who attends worship services

three times a week or more is 14% more likely to volunteer and is expected

to volunteer over four times more per year than an individual who never

attends.”

291

Overall, conservative individuals are less likely to volunteer

time,

292

and a conservative, religious individual is also less likely to give for

non-religious purposes.

293

Sociology professors Brandon Vaidyanathan, Jonathan P. Hill, and

Christian Smith note that “[e]mpirical evidence points to self-identified

political conservatives’ greater financial generosity when compared with

liberals”; conservatives typically donate more to charity because their

conservative political ideology inclines them to “take individual charitable

initiative.”

294

In contrast, liberal political ideology leans more towards

“higher taxation and redistribution,” which makes people less willing to

make individual charitable donations.

295

Like the studies previously

discussed,

296

the authors hypothesize that “[i]f political ideology influences

giving, it will largely be contingent on concrete institutional arrangements

for the cultivation of cultural habits that, largely unconsciously, sustain

generous dispositions.”

297

The authors found evidence that the less

confidence a person has in the government, the more likely they are to give

to religious and non-religious nonprofits.

298

Liberals gave less to charities

because they “believe that it is the government’s responsibility to care for

the poor.”

299

The paper also looked at recent studies that question the

289

Id. at 61.

290

Id. at 64

291

Id. at 65.

292

Id. at 66.

293

Id. at 67.

294

Brandon Vaidyanathan et al., Religion and Charitable Financial Giving to Religious Secular

Causes: Does Political Ideology Matter?, 50 J. SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 450, 450–51 (2011).

295

Id. at 451.

296

See supra pp. 144–47 (discussing how peoples’ perceptions of the causes of poverty influence

their attitudes on poverty policy).

297

Vaidyanathan et al., supra note 294, at 451.

298

Id.

299

Id. at 452.

232 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

relationship between ideology and behavior.

300

It criticized previous studies

for being “overly deterministic,”

301

and claimed that perhaps political

ideology only leads to charitable behavior when other factors are in play,

specifically religious congregations.

302

The study found that “political

affiliation is not statistically significant net of religious factors when it

comes to giving money to charities that serve the poor and needy”; in other

words, “[i]f political liberals who go to church behave like conservatives

who go to church when it comes to their financial giving, then the

explanation for differences in charitable giving seems to be primarily about

the effects of going to church, rather than the influence of political

ideology.”

303

Another researcher, Lydia Bean, posed a basic question: “[w]hy is the

evangelical subculture linked to economic conservatism in the United States

but not in Canada?”

304

She mentioned that American churches view welfare

negatively because they are opposed to government programs, whereas

Canadian churches hold the opposite belief.

305

Her study in demonstrates

that “economic conservatism among American evangelicals is anchored by

religious constructions of national identity in ways that previous scholarship

attributed to theology alone,” concluding that scholars should broaden “the

trinity of belief, belonging, and behavior” to consider how religious groups

imagine broader cultural membership.

306

Bean’s research showed that differences in American and Canadian

beliefs were shaped by power struggles and institutional development, not

national values.

307

Her study about why evangelical subculture is linked to

economic conservatism in the United States but not Canada examined

differences in how churches talk about poverty.

308

She conducted a one-year

observation of two churches in the United States and two in Canada,

309

and

concluded that “religious visions of national identity were an important

300

Id.

301

Id.

302

Id. at 453.

303

Id. at 454.

304

Lydia Bean, Compassionate Conservatives? Evangelicals, Economic Conservatism, and

National Identity, 53 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 164, 165 (2014).

305

Id. at 166.

306

Id.

307

Id. at 167.

308

Id. at 170.

309

Id. at 166.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 233

mechanism that linked religious participation to civic engagement and

political attitudes.”

310

Overall,

Canadian evangelicals drew on the same tools of

accountable individualism as their American counterparts,

but drew on different narratives of national identity to

define their religious responsibilities towards the poor.

Accountable individualism did not motivate them to reject

structural solutions to inequality when used in reference to

different constructions of religious nationalism.

311

Economic conservatism in the United States among evangelicals

seemed anchored by religious constructions of national solidarity, which

“linked the growth of the welfare state to the loss of a Christian America.”

312

Lamar conveys a similar angst in these lyrics. His internal strife and critical

self-awareness considers the merits of contributing time versus simply

contributing financial resources to the plight of the poor. Should, as

conservatives in greater numbers show, his position be to take individual

initiative to hand money to the poor or should the tactic require something

different? Lamar’s character seems uncertain at this point, even as he

continues to shun the beggar.

[Lines 59–64]: Again, Lamar falls back on his stereotypes of the poor,

generally, and the beggar, specifically—that the money would be used for

alcohol.

313

Consequently, Lamar refuses to empathize with the beggar, thus

embracing the beggar’s current status. Embracing the status quo, vis-à-vis

the current social order is correlated with political ideology and religiosity.

System Justification Theory (“SJT”)—an adaptive psychological response

that is instigated to reduce sources of stress, threat, and anxiety—helps

explain this phenomenon.

314

The theory leads to the defense of the current

social, political, and economic order.

315

It helps explain the support for

religion, social institutions, and conservative ideologies.

316

While its

influence over an individual varies from person to person, it is common for

310

Id. at 171.

311

Id.

312

Id. at 180.

313

See supra note 184 and accompanying text (addressing the “culture of poverty,” which falls

back on the stereotype that the poor are greater abusers of drugs and alcohol than the wealthy).

314

Aaron C. Kay et al., Inequality, Discrimination, and the Power of the Status Quo: Direct

Evidence for a Motivation to See the Way Things Are as the Way They Should Be, 97 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 421, 422 (2009).

315

Id.

316

John T. Jost et al., Belief in a Just God (and a Just Society): A System Justification Perspective

on Religious Ideology, 34 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 56, 59 (2013) [hereinafter Jost et

al., Belief in a Just God].

234 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

all Americans.

317

SJT often manifests itself in poor individuals supporting

and defending the very institutions that are hurting them. While there are

multiple components to SJT, one component—system dependence—

explains that the more dependent an individual is on a system, the more they

will defend it.

318

If an individual views a system as important in influencing

the social and economic outcomes in life, then that person will be more

likely to justify the results of the system.

319

For example, if you remind

individuals of how dependent they are on the government, they will support

public policy and increased spending.

320

If one examines electoral politics, system justification is predictive of

political candidate selection, at least in the United States. For example, in

the 2008 presidential election, psychology professor John T. Jost and

colleagues measured whether individuals planned to vote for John McCain

or Barack Obama to show the link between personality and political

preferences.

321

In the study, Jost and colleagues asked participants questions

relating to their party affiliation, political orientation, political system

justification, right-wing authoritarianism, and the big five personality

dimensions.

322

A key difference between liberalism and conservatism was

317

See id. (proposing that SJT “may contribute, at least in part” to religious conviction and

politics).

318

Kay et al., supra note 314, at 422–23. The other components consist of inescapability and

system threat. Id. at 423. System inescapability argues that individuals are more likely to justify a

system if it is evidently very difficult to leave or change the social system. Id. This manifested

itself in women accepting that men were more suited for a job if it was described as the status quo,

and that status quo was illustrated as difficult to change. Id. at 431. The social order is depicted as

difficult to change, which leads to women and minorities accepting their position in it. Id. at 431–

32. This spurs the feedback loop of inequality in low-status individuals. Id. at 432. System threat

states that a perceived threat to a social system will increase the likelihood that people will defend

the system. Id. at 423. For instance, people support that wealthy politicians should maintain power

when the politician is threatened. Id. at 424–25. Curiously, the wealthy politician is not as strongly

supported if there is no threat to his or her power. Id. Further, people will engage in more

stereotyping to protect system-justifying beliefs. Id. at 423. When participants of a study were told

that women were highly underrepresented in business positions, the participants were more likely

to rate a female business student as less likeable and competent than participants who were told

women were well represented in business positions. Id. at 430. This illustrates that when

participants were informed there could be an incoming change in the business world, they reacted

defensively against it.

319

Id. at 432.

320

Id. at 426.

321

John T. Jost et al., Personality and Ideology as Determinants of Candidate Preferences and

“Obama Conversion” in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, 6 DU BOIS REV. 103, 103 (2009)

[hereinafter Jost et al., Personality and Ideology].

322

Id. The “Big Five” personality dimensions are “[o]penness, [c]onscientiousness,

[e]xtraversion, [a]greeableness, and [n]euroticism.” Id. at 114.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 235

system justification and how open liberals were to changing unequal aspects

of the status quo.

323

Jost and his colleagues examined SJT and its relationship to

religiosity.

324

Their study identified religion as a system justifying belief,

which functions to provide ideological justification for the existing social

order.

325

As a system of justifying belief, religion forms what sociologist

Peter Berger calls a “sacred canopy.”

326

In this sense, religion becomes a

human enterprise of world-building by which a sacred communal cosmos is

established.

327

As communities conform themselves to this sacred cosmos,

they form a protective canopy that protects the community from the winds

of doubt while making the task of justifying belief easier.

328

By way of

argument, religious texts help to uphold the current social order by

validating institutions and conceptions of God as benevolent.

329

People

embrace such system justifications to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, guilt,

anxiety, dissonance, frustration, and moral outrage.

330

These factors were

divided into three motives in the study.

331

The first motive is an “epistemic

motive[] to attain certainty, predictability, and control” over one’s life.

332

Religion creates an element of certainty that allows people to put their faith

in a benevolent God who will do well by them if they do well by others.

The second motive is “existential,” which helps “manage anxiety, fear, and

threat.”

333

Again, religion reduces anxiety by giving individuals a way to

live and attain prosperity in the after-life. This curbs fear of the unknown.

The third motive is “relational,” which provides affiliation and connection

with others through a shared sense of reality.

334

Religion builds

communities and support systems; it gives people confidence in their beliefs

by bringing together a group of individuals who share common and

consistent beliefs.

335

These motives help explain the embrace of religion, as

323

Id. at 103.

324

Jost et al., Belief in a Just God, supra note 316, at 59.

325

Id.

326

PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF

RELIGION 26–27 (New York: Anchor, 1990).

327

Id. at 26.

328

Id. at 26–27.

329

See Jost et al., Belief in a Just God, supra note 316, at 57 (discussing how justice being served

reinforces individuals’ belief in a benevolent God).

330

Id. at 59, 75.

331

Id. at 75.

332

Id. at 59.

333

Id.

334

Id.

335

Id. at 61.

236 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

it helps people cope with the harshness of the world without having to solve

any issues.

336

Religious individuals tend to support system justification,

which indicates “obedience to authority, conventionalism, and right-wing

orientation.”

337

This manifests itself in an “overt endorsement of ideologies

that serve to legitimize social, economic, and political arrangements.”

338

Thus, system justification helps explain why more religious people support

capitalism, fair market ideology, opposition to equality, and political

conservatism even though such ideas are not necessarily correlated with

religious faith.

339

In conclusion, System Justification Theory is a means for some

citizens to maintain faith in the system to which they belong. It is simpler

for people to assume the system is fair due to the faults of the marginalized

rather than incite change and banish inequality. The factors that play into

this mind set can come from political ideology and several other personality

factors. The above studies work to understand why people think this way

and how to change the poverty that occurs every day.

[Lines 65–71]: The beggar goes on to inform Lamar that, just as Jesus

informed in the Bible, “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set

you free.”

340

He then instructs Lamar about the sacrifice made for money at

the neglect of the poor and downtrodden: a place in heaven. These lines also

relate to the parable of the sheep and the goats in the Book of Matthew. The

parable is one of the Last Judgment and the division of the world’s people

into the blessed—the sheep who are welcomed by God to inherit the His

kingdom and eternal life—and the cursed—the sheep who are cast into the

eternal fire.

341

The division is based on the acts of kindness and mercy

performed by people to others. Jesus identifies such kindness as kindness

towards him. Even more, the beggar reveals himself as God, highlighting

for Lamar that the cost of the dollar was how Lamar had treated him when

it was unbeknownst to Lamar that the beggar was God—i.e., entrance to

heaven. As Matthew 25:34–40 instructs:

“Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you

who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the

kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world.

For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was

336

Id. at 73.

337

Id. at 69.

338

Id. at 61.

339

Id. at 76–77.

340

John 8:32 (NIV).

341

Matthew 25:31–46 (NIV).

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 237

thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a

stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you

clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in

prison and you came to visit me.’

“Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we

see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you

something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and

invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did

we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’

“The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did

for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine,

you did for me.’

342

[Lines 72–76]: Lamar notes that he has demonstrated his faith;

however, it may not be sufficient to get him into heaven given his greed. He

is contrite and asks God what more he must do other than prayer and

recognizing his sins. He accepts his flaws and begs God to help him change.

Taking this lyrical analysis together, we find that the beggar ultimately

makes the most critical pronouncement: he is God. This lyrical analysis

therefore concludes above with the biblical passage that most directly

articulates Lamar’s aim in the song. The tension Lamar’s character

embodies carries the weight of both sides of the political spectrum in

relationship to the poor. Lamar’s final reckoning offers little in the form of

reconciliation as it relates to his final position on the matter. The beggar had

schooled him with a divine lesson of public policy toward the poor. We are

left to pick up the pieces of a complex internal struggle that illumines the

challenge of concluding with a neatly fitting political ideology regarding

the poor. Yet, Lamar moves the listener to be attentive to a question that

individuals of faith will at some point face: how do we account for the poor

among us?

IV. THE ELECTION OF DONALD TRUMP

A. PRESIDENT TRUMP: MAN OF THE PEOPLE IF THE PEOPLE WERE THE

ONE PERCENT

While a great degree of President Trump’s success can be attributed to

the votes of the white poor and working class, his policies do not reflect

their needs and priorities. Trump’s stance on the federal budget, taxes,

healthcare, immigration, education, and the federal prison system all

342

Matthew 25:34-40 (King James).

238 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

diverge from these constituents’ primary concerns. Despite extensive

campaign promises to address the needs of the poor and working class,

343

the Trump administration has repeatedly been criticized for failing to

prioritize programs designed to help low-income Americans.

344

This

disparity between voter support and representative policy has sparked

recent inquiries into how Trump gained such popularity among these voters

while touting policies that would potentially cause them harm.

345

The Presidential budget released by the White House is a numerical

reflection of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.

346

Specifically, his budget cuts

funding to the Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy

Departments, as well as the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, the Department of Education, and the Environmental

Protection Agency.

347

Additionally, the National Endowment for the Arts,

the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public

Broadcasting, and the Institute of Museum and Library Services would be

eliminated.

348

Finally, major cuts would be made on funding towards

“anything that smacks of internationalism, or of a benign and cooperative

American presence in the world.”

349

This budget plan significantly threatens

the white poor and working class. Throughout his campaign, Trump vowed

to help inner cities; however, his proposed budget would eliminate

programs that have aided these communities and would particularly hurt

343

See Karla Walter & Alex Rowell, Trump Has Already Broken All of the Promises He Made to

Workers During the State of the Union, TALK POVERTY (Jan. 31, 2018),

https://talkpoverty.org/2018/01/31/trump-already-broken-promises-made-workers-state-union/

(mentioning that when Trump was a candidate, he promised to turn the Republican party into a

“worker’s party”).

344

See Steven Mufson & Tracy Jan, If You’re a Poor Person In America, Trump’s Budget is Not

for You, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/16/if-youre-a-poor-person-in-

america-trumps-budget-is-not-for-you/?utm_term=.c8d4a6f81e6b (revealing Trump’s budget,

which would abolish programs for low-income Americans).

345

See Thomas Frank, Millions of Americans Support Donald Trump. Here’s Why, GUARDIAN

(Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/07/donald-trump-why-

americans-support (addressing the various motivations of Trump’s supporters).

346

John Cassidy, Donald Trump’s Voldemort Budget, NEW YORKER (Mar. 16, 2017),

https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trumps-voldemort-budget (citing OFFICE

OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA FIRST: A BUDGET BLUEPRINT

TO MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (2017)).

347

Id.

348

Id.

349

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 239

Americans with the lowest incomes.

350

The budget would dismantle

programs such as Medicaid and Social Security, benefiting the wealthy at

the expense of the poor.

351

It would cut anti-poverty programs by $1.7

trillion over the next ten years, cut Medicaid by $800 billion, and implement

work requirements to limit spending and eligibility on government-funded

programs.

352

These work requirements would allow states to deny health

assistance for lack of employment, and would negatively affect the current

Medicaid program.

353

The budget is assured to increase the number of

uninsured Americans and hurt low-income families, particularly those who

rely on government support.

354

Trump’s 2017 tax plan provides clear advantages for those in the top

one percent of income earners and neglects the poor.

355

The first component

of the plan is the reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%.

356

Theoretically, this would simplify the tax code, encourage more investment,

and discourage multinational corporations from concentrating on revenues

earned abroad.

357

However, there is mixed evidence from countries outside

the United States that such reform substantially stimulates economic

growth.

358

The second component would cut taxes on small businesses by

allowing them to reduce their pass-through income tax to 20%.

359

The goal

of this would be to even the playing field between small businesses and

large corporations.

360

However, altering pass-through laws would open the

door for large corporations to save millions in taxes, as well as for

350

Alana Semuels, How Trump’s Budget Would Impact Cities’ Poorest Residents, ATLANTIC

(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/trump-budget-

hud/519870/.

351

Derek Thompson, Things Are About to Get Much Worse for Poor Americans, ATLANTIC (Nov.

9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/things-are-about-to-get-much-

worse-for-poor-americans/507143/ [hereinafter Thompson, Things Are About to Get Much Worse

for Poor Americans].

352

Id.

353

Id.

354

Id.

355

Derek Thompson, A Comprehensive Guide to Donald Trump’s Tax Proposal, ATLANTIC (Apr.

26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/a-comprehensive-guide-to-

donald-trumps-tax-proposal/524451/ [hereinafter Thompson, A Comprehensive Guide to Donald

Trump’s Tax Proposal].

356

TAX FOUND., PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 2

(2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171220113959/TaxFoundation-SR241-TCJA-3.pdf.

357

Thompson, A Comprehensive Guide to Donald Trump’s Tax Proposal, supra note 355.

358

Id.

359

TAX FOUND., supra note 356, at 8.

360

Thompson, A Comprehensive Guide to Donald Trump’s Tax Proposal, supra note 355.

240 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

professionals to shelter their income through pass-through entities.

361

Finally, the third component cuts taxes on individual incomes and simplifies

the tax code but would still reserve most of its benefits for the rich.

362

One

year after its passage, the tax plan has delivered over $1 trillion of stock

buybacks to corporate America, while wages have collectively risen by just

2 cents an hour.

363

The Trump administration’s tax proposal from April 2017 also failed

to follow through on campaign promises to provide economic relief to the

working class.

364

Some critiqued the proposal as a “gift to plutocrats.”

365

This assessment was based on the fact that the tax cuts would

disproportionately benefit the extremely wealthy as opposed to the working

or middle classes that Trump promised to assist.

366

Cutting the corporate tax

rate, as Trump proposed, has not been proven to create the economic and

wage growth that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin insisted; in fact,

economic reports from the United Kingdom indicate that lowering the

corporate tax rate did not lead to GDP or wage growth, but raising the

corporate tax rate did.

367

Thus, although the white poor and working class

voted for President Trump to regain economic stability and cultural

prominence, they instead are more likely to fall victim to policies that

directly harm the poor and provide substantial benefits to the rich.

The promise to repeal the Affordable Care Act, also known as

“Obamacare,” was a major tenet of Trump’s campaign and a primary

motivator for white working class voters to elect him. According to Trump’s

plan, the three chief features of the Affordable Care Act—the expansion of

Medicaid to all low-income people, the individual mandate, and the

subsidy-backed private insurance marketplace—would be among the first

to be eliminated.

368

The irony is that many of those who most vehemently

oppose Obamacare currently benefit from its provisions. Research shows

361

Id.

362

Id.; TAX FOUND., supra note 356, at 2–3.

363

Emily Stewart, What the Republican Tax Bill Did—and Didn’t—Do, One Year Later, VOX

(Dec. 22, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/18/18146253/tax-

cuts-and-jobs-act-stock-market-economy.

364

John Cassidy, Trump’s Tax Plan Looks Like a Plutocrat’s Dream, NEW YORKER (June 18,

2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/trumps-tax-plan-looks-like-a-plutocrats-

dream.

365

Id.

366

Id.

367

Id.

368

Vann R. Newkirk II, Simply Reading Obamacare Will Hurt the White Working Class,

ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trump-

healthcare-plan-working-class-whites/508325/.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 241

that most whites without a college degree have coverage under the

Affordable Care Act.

369

Many of these individuals who supported Trump in

his victory would lose their coverage under the replacement health-care

plan.

370

White people living in the Rust Belt and in rural areas—

Republicans who earn under $50,000 per year—have been facing a health

crisis in recent years and desperately need proper health coverage.

371

Women would also be impacted by cuts to Obamacare, particularly those

struggling to afford birth control.

372

Former Secretary of Health and Human

Services Tom Price had opposed coverage for birth control without a copay,

arguing that requiring birth control coverage infringes upon religious

liberties.

373

Among the major concerns over Price’s proposals were whether

contraceptives would be covered at hospitals under health insurance plans

and whether women would be able to afford them.

374

Moreover, in addition

to diverting funds from the poor, Trump’s replacement for Obamacare

benefits the rich.

375

Price’s proposed plan would have not only eliminated

the provisions of Obamacare, but also would have scaled back the

expansion of Medicaid, much of which has benefitted the white working

class.

376

While insurers would have still been legally obligated to offer

coverage to sick people, they would have been free to “charge much higher

premiums to anybody who hadn’t maintained continuous coverage - a

loophole that could potentially affect millions.”

377

After the House passed

the American Health Care Act, Derek Thompson referred to it as “reverse-

Robin Hood legislation,” because it took federal funds intended to cover

lower and middle class families and redirected it back to the wealthiest one

percent in the form of a large tax cut.

378

369

Ronald Brownstein, Trump’s Cuts to SNAP and Social Security Would Hit the Rust Belt Hard,

ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/trump-budget-

snap-social-security/527799/.

370

Id.

371

Newkirk, supra note 368.

372

Olga Khazan, Tom Price: ‘Not One’ Woman Struggled to Afford Birth Control, ATLANTIC

(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/11/tom-price-not-one-woman-

cant-afford-birth-control/509003/.

373

Id.

374

Id.

375

John Cassidy, The First Victims of Repealing Obamacare Will be the Sick and the Poor, NEW

YORKER (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-first-victims-of-

repealing-obamacare-will-be-the-sick-and-the-poor.

376

Id.

377

Id.

378

Derek Thompson, The GOP Health-Care Bill Is the Ultimate Reverse Robin Hood, ATLANTIC

(May 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/ahca-reverse-robin-

242 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

Blue-collar workers would have been even more affected by the

proposed budget, as they benefit significantly from income-support

programs Trump attempts to undermine. For example, in all of Trump’s key

states, blue-collar white workers were far more dependent on programs such

as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) than were

households headed by minorities without college degrees, or any race with

college degrees.

379

Research also shows that children of low-income

mothers with access to prenatal coverage under Medicaid have lower

obesity rates, higher incomes in adulthood, higher high school graduation

rates, and are less likely to receive welfare payments.

380

Another study

found that without the help of SNAP, 65% of the receiving mothers would

fall below the poverty line.

381

As such, cutting funds intended for working

parents will increase the number of children raised in poverty.

382

Regarding United States immigration policy, in 2017, the Trump

administration considered a measure that would have denied “admission

[into the United States] to any alien who is likely to become a public

charge,” meaning anyone that may need benefits such as food stamps,

housing assistance or Medicaid.

383

This would have been a continuation of

past policies that have led to discrimination. Hidetaka Hirota, a visiting

assistant professor at the City College of New York, argues that such

restrictive laws target poor immigrants.

384

The clause “likely to become a

public charge” is highly open to interpretation, which provides officers a

great deal of authority to determine the meaning of the word “likely.”

385

a result, many officers who deny entry to poor immigrants can disguise

hood/525546/ [hereinafter Thompson, The GOP Health-Care Bill Is the Ultimate Reverse Robin

Hood].

379

Id.

380

KARINA WAGNERMAN ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST., MEDICAID IS A

SMART INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN 3–6 (2017), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2017/03/MedicaidSmartInvestment.pdf.

381

Derek Thompson, Trump’s Budget Is a Cruel Con, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2017) [hereinafter

Thompson, Trump’s Budget Cut Is a Cruel Con],

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/trump-budget-proposal-con/527667/

(citing Ron Haskins, Reflecting on SNAP: Purposes, Spending, and Potential Savings,

BROOKINGS (May 8, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/reflecting-on-snap-purposes-

spending-and-potential-savings/).

382

Thompson, Trump’s Budget Cut Is a Cruel Con, supra note 381.

383

Emma Green, First, They Excluded the Irish, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-poor-immigrants-public-

charge/515397/ [hereinafter Green, First, They Excluded the Irish].

384

Id.

385

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 243

racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices with technically neutral language.

386

This policy “assumes that congressional immigration policy is beyond

judicial review for constitutionality.”

387

Though this doctrine is less

powerful today, it still grants law enforcement a great deal of authority over

the entry of immigrants.

The president’s 2017 budget also would have hindered America’s

education programs by cutting funds for the Education Department by $9.2

billion.

388

The plan would have removed $2.4 billion in grants for teacher

training and $1.2 billion for after-school and summer programs for

children.

389

These cuts would have affected students and educators

nationwide, particularly impacting low-income students.

390

Along with

eliminating need-based aid to approximately 1.6 million low-income

undergraduates each year, this plan would have dramatically reduced funds

for Federal Work-Study.

391

It also would have targeted AmeriCorps, a

program upon which 80,000 members and numerous schools and

communities rely.

392

AmeriCorps responded by attempting to persuade

Congress that the relatively reasonable investment—just 0.03% of the

federal budget—is worthwhile.

393

These cuts to educational programs

would have directly affected many working-class voters who supported

Trump throughout the election.

394

Under Trump, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions established

policies that led to greater financial reprecussions for impoverished criminal

defendants.

395

During the Obama administration, a letter was sent to local

courts which “advis[ed] them to be wary of imposing stiff fees and penalties

386

Id.

387

Id.

388

See Alia Wong, Trump’s Education Budget Takes Aim at the Working Class, ATLANTIC (May

23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/05/trumps-education-budget-

takes-aim-at-the-working-class/527718/; see also Cassidy, supra note 375.

389

Wong, supra note 388; Cassidy, supra note 375.

390

Wong, supra note 388.

391

Id.

392

Eric Gorski & Cassi Feldman, How President Trump’s Federal Budget Would Hinder Poor

Students, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/how-president-trumps-federal-budget-

could-hinder-poor-students/518274/.

393

Id.

394

Wong, supra note 388.

395

Josh Delk, Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Letter to Local Courts on Fines and Fees for Poor

Defendants, HILL (Dec. 21, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/366127-sessions-

rescinds-obama-era-letter-to-local-courts-on-fines-and-fees.

244 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

on poor defendants.”

396

While the Obama administration claimed that its

letter prohibited courts from using defendants of any financial situation as

a means for monetary gains for their jurisdictions, the Trump administration

claims that repealing this letter would impede “the long-standing abuse of

issuing rules by simply publishing a letter or posting a web page.”

397

Thus,

the Trump administration has justified not only the repeal of this

protectionary letter, but also the repeal of more than 24 “guidance

documents” from the Justice Department, some of which have been

followed since the 1990s.

398

One such document, crafted under the Obama administration, sought

to terminate debtors’ prisons (i.e., a place for those whose financial situation

prohibits their ability to pay fines that are overdue).

399

The Justice

Department had previously investigated and found that using the criminal

justice system as a for-profit enterprise which seeks to glean large sums of

money from poor individuals is both disadvantageous and

unconstitutional.

400

Policies have subsequently been instituted to reform the

justice system to ensure that it protects the civil rights of those of all

socioeconomic classes.

401

Nonetheless, former Attorney General Sessions

proceeded to eliminate the progress of these reforms via the rescinding of

guidance documents such as the one on debtor’s prisons, which both

protected civil rights and yielded positive impacts on communities with

some poor citizens.

402

Sessions inadequately justified his rescinding of

guidance documents by claiming that they “circumvent the executive

branch’s rule-making process and impose novel legal obligations by fiat.”

403

The Trump administration has also undermined efforts to reduce the

nation’s unprecedented prison population, much of which includes the

white poor and working class. Sessions instructed federal prosecutors to

seek the strongest possible charges and sentences against defendants.

404

These guidelines directly repeal former President Obama’s mission to

396

Id.

397

Id.

398

Id.

399

Chiraag Bains, Sessions Says to Courts: Go Ahead, Jail People Because They’re Poor, N.Y.

TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/sessions-says-to-courts-

go-ahead-jail-people-because-theyre-poor.html.

400

Id.

401

Id.

402

Id.

403

Id.

404

David Parkins, America’s Prisons are Failing. Here’s How to Make Them Work, ECONOMIST

(May 27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21722642-lot-known-about-how-

reform-prisoners-far-too-little-done-americas-prisons-are.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 245

curtail the harshest sentences for defendants with low-level drug offenses.

405

Former Obama administration Attorney General Eric Holder described the

new policy as an “ideologically motivated, cookie-cutter approach that has

only been proven to generate unfairly long sentences that are often applied

indiscriminately and do little to achieve long-term public safety.”

406

B. THE TRUMP VOTER

Despite the potential harm of these policies, nearly 63 million

Americans voted for Trump.

407

These voters are often portrayed as poorly

informed and highly influenced by the mass media. Based on demographic

breakdowns by gender, race, and age, the average Trump voter has been

described as “male, white, and poor.”

408

Further, four features of Trump’s

constituency are people who (1) did not go to college, (2) do not think they

have a political voice, (3) want to wage an interior war against outsiders,

and (4) live in parts of the country with racial resentment.

409

A survey in September and October of 2016 of American voters’

political feelings found that financially troubled white working-class voters

were more likely to prefer Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton over

Trump.

410

Nonetheless, three factors contributed to voters “defy[ing] post-

election tropes” and predictors of how the white working class would

vote.

411

The first factor was “anxiety about cultural change.”

412

Sixty-eight

percent of the white working-class voters said that “the American way of

life need[ed] to be protected from foreign influence,” while almost half of

these voters agreed that “things have changed so much that I often feel like

a stranger in my own country.”

413

79% of the white working class voters

405

Id.

406

Matt Ford, Jeff Sessions Reinvigorates the Drug War, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessions-sentencing-memo/526029/.

407

See Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22,

2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-

popular-vote-final-count/index.html.

408

Derek Thompson, Who Are Donald Trump’s Supporters, Really?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/who-are-donald-trumps-supporters-

really/471714/ [hereinafter Thompson, Who Are Donald Trump’s Supporters, Really?].

409

Id.

410

Id.

411

Emma Green, It Was Cultural Anxiety that Drove White, Working-Class Voters to Trump,

ATLANTIC (May 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/white-working-

class-trump-cultural-anxiety/525771/ [hereinafter Green, It Was Cultural Anxiety that Drove

White, Working-Class Voters to Trump].

412

Id.

413

Id.

246 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

who demonstrated these anxieties voted for Trump, while only 43% of

white working class voters “who did not share one or both of these fears

cast their vote the same way.”

414

These statistics demonstrate that these two

variables were strong indicators of support for Donald Trump.

415

The second factor was immigration.

416

Only 27% of white working

class voters, contrary to popular belief, said they “favor a policy of

identifying and deporting immigrants who are in the country illegally.”

417

Among those who did share this belief, however, widely supported Trump

with an 87% support in the 2016 election.

418

Lastly, 54% of the white

working class claim that “investing in a college education is a risky gamble,

including 61% of white working-class men.”

419

White working class voters

who held this opinion were nearly twice as likely as their peers to vote for

Trump.

420

This “sense of economic fatalism” is the third factor that created

support for Trump among the white working class voters.

421

“The enduring

narrative of the American dream is that if you study and get a college

education and work hard, you can get ahead,” said Robert P. Jones, the CEO

of the Public Religion Research Institute (“PRRI”).

422

However, “[t]he

survey shows that many white working-class Americans, especially men,

no longer see that path available to them. . . . It is this sense of economic

fatalism, more than just economic hardship, that was the decisive factor in

support for Trump among white working-class voters.”

423

The rise of Trump can be largely attributed to economic anxiety and

racial resentment.

424

In 2009, Samuel Huntington, a well-known political

scientist, anticipated this reaction among whites to the growth of

minorities.

425

He theorized that once a dominant ethnic-racial group feels

threatened by the rise of other groups, it could produce a racially intolerant

414

Id.

415

Id.

416

Id.

417

Id.

418

Id.

419

Id.

420

Id.

421

Id.

422

Id.

423

Id.

424

Derek Thompson, Donald Trump and the Twilight of White America, ATLANTIC (May 13,

2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/donald-trump-and-the-twilight-of-

white-america/482655/ [hereinafter Thompson, Donald Trump and the Twilight of White

America].

425

Samuel P. Huntington, The Threat of White Nativism?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 28, 2009),

https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/the-threat-of-white-nativism.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 247

country with increased intergroup conflict.

426

The Atlantic’s Derek

Thompson identifies three major turning points in United States history: the

1968 election of Richard Nixon, the 1979 peak in manufacturing

employment, and the 2008 election of Barack Obama.

427

With the election

of Nixon came the White South’s shift to the Republican Party—a

demographic that was critical to Trump’s success.

428

In 1980, when

employment in the manufacturing industry began to decline, rising

economic anxiety—particularly among white men without a college

degree—contributed to a simultaneous rise in racial/minority resentment.

429

Finally, according to researchers, the election of the first non-white

president signified the rise of the minority population, which was likely

perceived as a threat to the relative standing of whites.

430

The combination

of economic and racial anxiety can explain the electoral victory of President

Trump.

Journalist Alec MacGillis expands upon this feeling of resentment,

arguing that its roots stem from colonial times.

431

A strict class system

followed settlers from England, with distinctions dependent mostly on the

apportionment of land.

432

Landlessness became stigmatized across the

country, eventually becoming the “white trash” and “trailer trash” of

today’s society.

433

Moreover, dissatisfaction among the white working class

is not entirely racial: “The most painful comparison is not with supposedly

ascendant minorities—it’s with the fortunes of one’s parents or, by now,

grandparents.”

434

The lower classes have been neglected throughout the

United States’ history, yet detachment has grown more pronounced in

recent years.

435

Currently, out-of-wedlock births, male unemployment,

opium addiction, and the mortality rate (including suicide) have risen

among working class whites.

436

MacGillis concludes that, although racial

anxiety is still a factor, the experience of watching local economies decay

426

See id. (explaining that whites have already reacted negatively to minority groups’ interests

and will continue to do so).

427

Thompson, Donald Trump and the Twilight of White America, supra note 424.

428

Id.

429

Id.

430

Id.

431

Alec MacGillis & ProPublica, The Original Underclass, ATLANTIC (Sep. 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/492731/.

432

Id.

433

Id.

434

Id.

435

Id.

436

Id.

248 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

has produced bitterness among poor whites—of which President Trump

took advantage.

437

For many voters that chose President Trump on their

ballots as a result of (1) their bitterness regarding their economic situations

and (2) then-candidate Trump’s campaign promises to induce economic

reform, Trump’s moral shortcomings are excusable.

438

That is, as an article

in The Economist reveals, “there is no reason to conclude that all Trump

voters approve of his behavior. For some of them, his flaws are insignificant

next to the One Big Truth: that America needs fixing.”

439

Thus, Trump’s

deplorable actions, such as his mistreat of females or his shortcomings to

deliver desired reform, are pardoned because Trump, unlike Clinton, proved

to be a President who at least spoke as though he recognized and wished to

alter the plight of the lower-class American.

440

The aforementioned bitterness (or anger), author Joan C. Williams

clarifies, is not rooted in individuals of the lower class wishing to become

upper class individuals.

441

In fact, members of the lower class, of whose

number has grown in the past ten years, mostly do not envy the differing

friendships and food tendencies of the wealthy.

442

Rather, they largely wish

to remain in their current, familiar socioeconomic class, but to nonetheless

obtain greater amounts of money and thus comfort.

443

This, in part, explains

why impoverished West Virginians, for example, dislike educated

professionals yet are willing to vote for a wealthy individual such as

President Trump.

444

That is, “the ideal is to own your own business, so you

no longer have to take orders from anyone, just like the president.”

445

infatuation with the economic comfort of the candidate.

446

Donald Trump

largely inspired the poor vote to choose today’s President.

447

Four days after Trump was elected to office in November 2016, Caleb

Crain wrote an article for The New Yorker discussing the population that

437

Id.

438

America’s New President: The Trump Era, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2016),

https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21709951-his-victory-threatens-old-certainties-about-

america-and-its-role-world-what-will-take.

439

Id.

440

Id.

441

America’s Urban-Rural Divides, ECONOMIST (Jul. 1, 2017),

https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21724129-mutual-incomprehension-between-

urban-and-rural-america-can-border-malice-americas.

442

Id.

443

Id.

444

Id.

445

Id.

446

Id.

447

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 249

elected Mr. Trump into power: working or lower class whites.

448

Trump

targeted these voters by appealing to their anger towards their economic

situation as well as their social fears of those who are different than them.

449

Crain believes that the Trump’s supporters will lose faith in him “soon

enough,” as Crain does not believe Trump will be able to follow through on

promises to improve the economic situation of the poor, white working

class.

450

However, Crain also suggests that Trump will be able to maintain

his voter base by continuing to cast blame for failures off of him and onto

groups of people that are “non-white[], non-Christian[], and non-

native[].”

451

Although Crain, like many Democrats, finds it hard to have

sympathy for the voters who elected Trump, he explores the reasons why

they decided to cast their votes the way they did.

452

The loss of factory jobs

hurt the working class, which led many to have to find income in other

ways.

453

Many middle-aged men began to accept social security to stay

afloat, and there is also a correlation between the population that was most

directly affected by the closing of factories and an increase in suicide and

drug and alcohol poisoning.

454

This population is not keen on receiving

welfare benefits, as they view them as handouts.

455

When a candidate like

Trump came along that stood out, this population got behind him. Crain

argues that Trump will not be able to solve the issues that plague the white

working class, but is unsure if their support will waver.

456

Trump’s presidency has far-reaching implications, even for local

government officials. A December 2016 article in the The New Yorker by

Jennifer Gonnerman profiles New York City Councilman Ritchie Torres of

the Bronx District.

457

Torres became the youngest person to be elected to

the New York City council and is the chair of the Committee of Public

Housing.

458

As a progressive, gay, Afro-Latino man attempting to protect

the welfare and public housing his constituents depend on, the election of

448

Caleb Crain, On Choosing Trump and Being Bad, NEW YORKER (June 19, 2017),

https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/on-choosing-trump-and-being-bad.

449

Id.

450

Id.

451

Id.

452

Id.

453

Id.

454

Id.

455

Id.

456

Id.

457

Jennifer Gonnerman, Fighting for the Poor Under Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 12, 2016),

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/12/fighting-for-the-poor-under-trump.

458

Id.

250 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

Trump created cause for concern.

459

In particular, Torres worries that the

New York City Housing Authority is vulnerable as its funding is directed

through Housing and Urban Development.

460

The housing developments in

Torres’s district could be under threat if President Trump’s Secretary of

Housing and Urban Development, Ben Carson, makes good on his promise

to decrease reliance on public housing.

461

C. TRUMP AND WHITE EVANGELICALS

Although many Christians are opposed to President Trump’s policies

and rhetoric, white evangelicals are among his strongest supporters.

462

Throughout polls during the election, Trump remained the top pick for

president among evangelical Christians.

463

In a 2016 survey, two-thirds of

white evangelicals indicated their excitement and satisfaction with the

election results, compared to less than half of white mainline Protestants

459

Id.

460

Id.

461

Id.

462

See generally JOHN FEA, BELIEVE ME: THE EVANGELICAL ROAD TO DONALD TRUMP (2018)

(describing the motivations behind the 81% of white evangelicals who voted for Trump); Emma

Green, Why White Evangelicals are Feeling Hopeful About Trump, ATLANTIC (DEC. 1, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/trump-white-evangelicals-

communities/509084/ [hereinafter Green, Why White Evangelicals are Feeling Hopeful About

Trump]. It is important to highlight the divide, here, between black and white evangelicals. In

recent decades, the evangelical churches have been working to better integrate African-Americans

into the historical white evangelical church. The results were increasingly positive, especially

from larger churches; however, that all changed with the 2016 presidential election. Campbell

Robertson, A Quiet Exodus: Why Black Worshipers Are Leaving White Evangelical Churches,

N.Y. Times, (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/us/blacks-evangelical-

churches.html. While black church goers had begun to feel uneasy after the pastors failed to

discuss the police shootings of blacks, it was the 2016 election that caused most black members

to disaffiliate with their churches. Id. Not only were the pastors, specifically Pastor Robert Morris,

preaching to the congregation to elect Mr. Trump, but more telling, “white evangelicals voted for

Mr. Trump by a larger margin than they had voted for any presidential candidate.” Id. Many white

evangelical church goers believed that Trump was “prophesied” to be the next president. Id.

Furthermore, Reverend Dwight Makisic attended Southern Baptist Convention in Phoenix and

proposed a resolution condemning alternative right (white supremacists/white nationalists). Id.

The convention would not even hear the resolution believing that “racism wasn’t a problem in

their church;” however, when this news got out to the public, the convention re-voted and passed

the resolution overwhelmingly. Id. Overall, the African-American members of the evangelical

church felt that they were not only not addressed, but when they were the church failed to discuss

the structural legacy of racism that President Trump facilitates. Id.

463

E.g., Trip Gabriel, Donald Trump, Despite Impieties, Wins Hearts of Evangelical Voters, N.Y.

TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/donald-trump-despite-

impieties-wins-hearts-of-evangelical-voters.html?r=0 (describing various polls across the country

demonstrating Trump’s lead among evangelical voters over presidential candidates such as Ted

Cruz and Marco Rubio).

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 251

and Catholics and less than one-third of the religiously unaffiliated.

464

Ironically, white evangelicals were more likely than any other group to

identify hunger, poverty, and concerns about drugs.

465

They also indicated

concerns that America is becoming weak, and, in a separate study, “too soft

and feminine.”

466

Finally, compared to white Americans affiliated with

other religious groups, white evangelicals were more likely to be among the

working class earning less than $50,000 annually, and less likely to have a

college degree.

467

While these findings do not refer directly to religious

views, they do suggest that white evangelicals comprise a distinct

demographic group with certain shared characteristics.

468

Since President Ronald Reagan’s era, evangelicals have mostly

supported presidential candidates who are socially conservative.

469

Much of

that has been driven by a desire to gain control of the United States Supreme

Court, especially where it comes to the possibility of overturning Roe v.

Wade.

470

In a 2015 poll, 64% of evangelicals indicated that a candidate’s

stance on abortion greatly impacted their presidential decision.

471

However,

their support of Trump has puzzled many individuals, as evangelical values

and beliefs do not align with the president.

472

For example, Trump’s

positions on abortion, same-sex marriage, and immigration before his

campaign were at odds with evangelical ideals.

473

In the past, Trump

claimed to be “very pro-choice”;

474

he went back on this position during his

presidential campaign. This similar “flip-flopping” on key positions was

seen in the 2004 election by Democratic nominee John Kerry, whom

evangelicals attacked for this exact reason.

475

Somehow, despite Trump’s

similar swayed beliefs, evangelicals continue to support him. Additionally,

President Trump now claims to oppose same-sex marriage, a stance that

464

Green, Why White Evangelicals are Feeling Hopeful About Trump, supra note 462.

465

Id.

466

Id.

467

Id.

468

Id.

469

Jonathan Merritt, Why Do Evangelicals Support Donald Trump?, ATLANTIC (Sep. 3, 2015),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/why-do-evangelicals-support-donald-

trump/403591/.

470

FEA, supra 462, at 29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) affirmed the constitutional right of

a pregnant person to choose abortion.

471

Merritt, supra note 469.

472

Id.

473

Id.

474

Id.

475

Id.

252 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

many evangelicals have.

476

However, Trump’s opposition to LGBT rights

has not always been the case. In the past, he had supported an amendment

to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that would outlaw discrimination based on

sexual orientation, a stance almost half of evangelicals oppose.

477

In fact,

his support of LGBT rights even motivated MSNBC to consider him

“2016’s most LGBT-friendly Republican.”

478

Finally, Trump has

repeatedly stated his position on immigration and proposes mass

deportations and the construction of a separation wall along the southern

border.

479

This proposal does not perfectly align with evangelicals, as 62%

of them support solutions that will allow unauthorized immigrants to stay

in the United States.

480

Trump has also favored legalizing all drugs, a

position most white evangelicals strongly oppose.

481

Despite these

discrepancies between political values, white evangelicals continue to

support Trump.

482

Historically, evangelical voters sought to elect candidates who

presented themselves as people of character; however, the question then

arises as to why evangelicals support Trump in overwhelming numbers.

483

In past elections, candidates knew that in order to win the evangelical vote,

they had to present the country’s moral fabric as unraveling through the use

of political fear.

484

Trump did this well. Trump “rode this wave of fear all

the way to the White House.”

485

Trump’s approach dovetailed nicely with

traditional triggers among evangelicals. In times of change, such as an

election, fear is prominent. This fear conditioned evangelicals to vote for

Trump, in response to the cultural changes. For example, cases such as

Engel v. Vitale

486

and Roe v. Wade

487

began to threaten the way evangelicals

understood their educational and familial structures. As time progressed,

this cultural shift and “changes in demographics, and progressive policy

476

Id.

477

Id.

478

Id.

479

Id.; FEA, supra note 462, at 8.

480

Merritt, supra note 469.

481

Id.

482

FEA, supra note 462, at 8.

483

Id. at 12.

484

Id.

485

Id. at 13.

486

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a school policy establishing the recitation

of a prayer before class violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).

487

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (affirming the constitutional right of a pregnant person to

choose abortion).

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 253

shifts”

488

created great concern among evangelicals. In response to these

changes created Moral Majority, an organization which raises money for

conservative politicians with agendas similar to those of the evangelicals.

489

Their biggest goal is to gain control of the Supreme Court.

490

Soon enough

the playbook of the Christian Right was adopted by evangelicals in order to

vote for conservative policies and candidates.

491

Two ways Trump utilized

this playbook was to choose Mike Pence, a very religious man, and to

release names of potential very conservative Supreme Court judge options

for the vacant seat.

492

However, even in the face of his “locker-room talk”

or accusations of assault, his “character simply didn’t matter as much as the

opportunity to seize a seat on the supreme court.”

493

Their fear was so

prominent that voters still doubt Obama’s citizenship and religion,

regardless of documentation otherwise.

494

With Obama supporting

immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage, the “evangelicals felt

marginalized and even threatened by the social progressivism they

witnessed under Obama’s administration.”

495

Contrarily, Trump defended

traditional marriage, presented strong policies against immigration, and

voiced binging back American jobs.

496

Furthermore, along with having

support from multiple high-power evangelicals, Trump “presented himself

as an embattled outsider—as many evangelicals now saw themselves.”

497

This phenomenon is unsurprising, as it has deep American cultural

roots. Accordingly, Trump appeals directly to the deeply rooted fears and

beliefs that have guided white evangelicals throughout the United States’

history.

498

For example, during the American Revolution, the demand for

freedom from overpowering central government became inextricably linked

488

FEA, supra note 462, at 28.

489

Id. at 29.

490

Id.

491

Id.

492

Id. at 31.

493

Id.

494

Id. at 14.

495

Id. at 18; see also Amy Sullivan, Democrats are Christians, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/opinion/sunday/trump-evangelicals-christians-easter.html

(explaining that white evangelicals’ hostility to gay rights precludes many of them from voting

for Democrats, a party consistently seen as being champions of gay rights).

496

FEA, supra note 462, at 18.

497

Id. at 22.

498

Molly Worthen, A Match Made in Heaven: Why Conservative Evangelicals Have Lined Up

Behind Trump, ATLANTIC (May 2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/a-match-made-in-heaven/521409/.

254 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

to religious freedom.

499

Then, during the time of the Great Depression and

the New Deal, the migration of African Americans and the immigration of

Catholic, Jewish, and Eastern Europeans threatened evangelicals’ feeling of

control over the nation’s culture.

500

The New Deal itself also posed a major

threat “by redistributing wealth to the poor—including so many foreign-

born arrivals and blacks—the New Deal threatened to undermine that

authority even further. Opposition to Soviet Russia provided a perfect

rallying cry: the country represented the godless, totalitarian end toward

which the New Deal might lead.”

501

In the 1950s, Billy Graham, a prominent evangelical leader, combined

this fear of cultural change with anticommunist hysteria to create an

extremely powerful ideology: the Christian free-market.

502

As a result,

Trump’s promises to ‘drain the swamp’ and restrict immigration appealed

directly to long-standing fears of tyrannical government and infringement

on the power of the Christian right.

503

Furthermore, Trump’s leadership

style is reminiscent of a “long evangelical tradition of pastor-overlords”

who bestow upon themselves absolute power and unfailingly receive

forgiveness from God for occasional moral lapses.

504

Having been raised

with the ideals of the “prosperity gospel,” Trump reflects this evangelical

philosophy that material wealth is a blessing from God, and is given or taken

away based on one’s righteousness and donations to one’s church.

505

Trump’s popularity among white evangelicals also points to a desire

to preserve their once prominent cultural and economic standing.

506

For this

reason, these voters may be seen as “nostalgia voters” rather than “value

voters.”

507

It is this nostalgia that enabled “Make America Great Again” to

resonate so deeply with white evangelicals.

508

In essence, white

evangelicals harbor feelings of disaffection, particularly due to anxiety

about the rise in minorities’ power. This is evinced by a survey indicating

that “two-thirds of white evangelicals say that immigrants are a burden to

499

Id.

500

Id.

501

Id.

502

Id.

503

Id.

504

Id.

505

Id.

506

Robert P. Jones, How ‘Value Voters’ Became ‘Nostalgia Voters’, ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-trump-revelation/470559/.

507

Id.

508

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 255

the country because they take American jobs, housing, and healthcare.”

509

Also, a significant portion of respondents indicated that they are bothered

by immigrants who speak little or no English, that the values of Islam

conflict with American ideals, and that discrimination against whites has

become a serious problem.

510

Additionally, white evangelicals have lost

recent political battles such as the legalization of same-sex marriage; this is

something that they are staunchly opposed to, and this judicial defeat is a

clear sign of their depreciating power in American politics.

511

Furthermore,

Trump’s appeal to nostalgia has galvanized consolidation among white

evangelical voters, the Tea Party, and voters influenced by the southern

strategy.

512

Moreover, evangelical voters have historically supported candidates

who share their same beliefs.

513

President Trump was aware of this

throughout his electoral campaign and greatly boosted his religious rhetoric

throughout the campaign trail. During the President Eisenhower and Nixon

eras, evangelicals often invoked the saying “One Nation Under God.”

514

Trump repeatedly employed this phrase during campaign rallies, on posters,

and on T-shirts.

515

During his time, Eisenhower attempted to use this

rhetoric to bring Americans together.

516

Nixon, instead, used the phrase as

a partisan club.

517

This same dynamic is what evangelicals see reflected in

Trump’s campaign. Rather than promoting unity, the phrase represents the

exclusion of those beyond the United States’ borders.

518

Not only do these evangelicals value religious beliefs, but they are also

firm traditionalists who feel as though their values are being diminished by

modern society. In a fashion reminiscent of calls to “return to the

fundamentals” during the early twentieth century, contemporary

evangelicals require another cultural reset framed on theological terms.

They feel as though they are not given a fair share in the media, so when a

candidate like Trump “stands up” to the media, evangelicals are drawn to

509

Id.

510

Id.

511

Id.

512

Id.

513

Merritt, supra note 469.

514

Emma Green, Why Donald Trump Appeals to Evangelicals, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/donald-trump-christian-

libertarianism/494843/ [hereinafter Green, Why Donald Trump Appeals to Evangelicals].

515

Id.

516

Id.

517

Id.

518

Id.

256 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

him. Evangelicals appreciate someone like Trump who does not apologize

for politically incorrect rhetoric because they believe society is intolerant of

many of their own beliefs.

519

Others have argued that evangelicals support

Trump simply because he is a businessman. Throughout history, there has

been an alliance between white, evangelical Protestants and wealthy elites.

After the Great Depression, big businesses joined forces with pastors and

ministers, “pushing back against the New Deal with a kind of ‘Christian

libertarianism.’”

520

Today, one of the prime examples of the paradoxical

alliance between evangelicals’ and Trump is the case of Franklin Graham.

During a recent interview, Graham repeatedly cited the Trump

Administration’s arguments about refugees.

521

He constantly enforced the

model of good guys versus bad guys.

522

In this framework, Graham

considered Christianity the “good guy,” and Islam, the “bad guy.”

523

continued to oppose organizations such as Boy Scouts, by saying they have

lost their foundation since they now welcome LBGT kids and allow gay

men to lead troops.

524

However, the most puzzling moment throughout the

interview was when Graham stated that Trump “has done everything wrong

politically,” and then went on to say there’s “no question that God is

supporting Trump.”

525

As for those who have been personally attacked by

Trump’s discriminatory and derogatory comments, Graham has advised

them to “talk to God about it. . . . I believe Donald Trump’s there because

God put him there.”

526

519

Merritt, supra note 469. In fact, evangelicals support Trump’s message in a hope that he will

return culture to reflect their “Judeo-Christian values.” This was especially illustrated in the

Values Voter Summit, where both Donald Trump and Roy Moore, Alabama Senate candidate,

were big hits. In the summit, Trump referenced how in recent times societies lack of using the

word “Creator” in government documents, such as used the Declaration of Independence, is

quickly reverting. This point aligned with Tony Perkins’s, president of Family Research Council,

belief that Trump allows individuals to stand up for traditional values disregarded in current

society. Evangelicals are “betting on a brash street bawler to win the culture battles they had been

losing for generations.” Tim Alberta, Donald Trump and the Dawn of the Evangelical Nationalist

Alliance, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/14/trump-

evangelical-nationalist-alliance-215713. The other hit of the summit, Roy Moore, addressed how

the government is turning back to God and how he will always place “Christianity above the

Constitution.” Id. Placing this focus on Christian values and immigration has united evangelicals

and nationalists in overwhelming support of Trump. Id.

520

Green, Why Donald Trump Appeals to Evangelicals, supra note 514.

521

Id.

522

Id.

523

Id.

524

Id.

525

Id.

526

Id.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 257

The intertwining of Christianity and Trump’s beliefs seem to cause

evangelicals to support the newly-elected president.

527

This contradiction is

further amplified by Trump’s ability to invoke some of the techniques of

“prosperity preachers” within his speeches.

528

He credits his success and the

promise of a “totally brilliant future” to “major help from God” with an

enthusiasm similar to that of renowned preachers such as Joel Osteen.

529

This use of prosperity preaching may have helped Trump’s message to

resonate with evangelicals as such believers tend to speak of their

confidence in God with such passion. Furthermore, the emphasis on

monetary prosperity in Trump’s message is of value to evangelicals that

follow prosperity gospel. The prosperity gospel is one that emphasizes

God’s desire for his followers to be “wealthy and healthy.”

530

Trump’s

financial success is seen as “the truest sign of God’s blessings” for

prosperity believers.

531

This may have allowed evangelical Trump

supporters to forgive his shortcomings that they would usually denounce.

Believers may see Trump’s policies as a way to achieve their prosperity.

Additionally, Trump has formed relationships with many influential

prosperity preachers who have spoken (and tweeted) highly of him and

opened his campaign rallies. One particularly influential preacher is

Jentezen Franklin, who spoke to his 3,000 worshippers in Georgia of the

prosperous future Trump would bring, saying “I prophesy that God will

open big doors for his people in 2017.”

532

In conclusion, Trump’s ability to exploit the long-standing fears and

anxieties of white evangelicals allowed him to secure a strong voter base.

“Make America Great Again” appealed to their desire to reclaim greater

cultural and economic power, and therefore was a powerful motivator to

stand behind Trump, rather than a candidate that embodied the evangelical

Christian faith. Their support of him raises an interesting question: why

would Christians support a presidential candidate whose policies are

527

Id.

528

Why Evangelicals Love Donald Trump, ECONOMIST (May 18, 2017),

https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21722172-secret-lies-prosperity-gospel-why-

evangelicals-love-donald-trump.

529

Id.

530

Elizabeth Dias, Donald Trump’s Prosperity Preachers, TIME (Apr. 14, 2016),

http://time.com/donald-trump-prosperity-preachers/.

531

Id.

532

The Political Beliefs of Evangelical Christians, THE ECONOMIST (July 1st, 2017),

https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21724130-personal-morality-politics-

negotiable-political-beliefs-evangelical.

258 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

anathema to their attitudes toward what Jesus refers to as “the least of

these”?

533

V. CONCLUSION

Evangelicals’ support of President Trump cannot be summed up as

cleanly as we might think. Evangelicals continue to be a more complex

group. A recent conversation with a prominent evangelical leader reveals a

great discontentment with blind support of President Trump exhibited by

other evangelicals.

534

Even still, evangelical theological ideology notes that

everyone has fallen and is subject to an abounding grace from God. Such

notions square with the blind support we find often among white

conservative Christians. Yet, a paradox reveals itself: evangelicals who live

according to a biblically-driven puritanical ethic or within a “Lordship

Salvation” framework must cautiously align with President Trump, given

his widely reported moral misdeeds.

Further complication is the evangelical ideology regarding poverty and

the extent to which the evangelicals need to be involved in the work to

eradicate it. Many evangelicals are unwavering in their position that Jesus

Christ’s sole instruction to the believer was to satisfy the Great

Commission; the instruction given by the resurrected Jesus Christ to his

disciples to spread his teachings. It is therefore not surprising to find some

tension within the evangelical community regarding issues such as social

justice and institutional or systematic racism. Understood as a cultural

phenomenon, evangelicalism produces noteworthy ambiguities. For

example, some evangelicals align with conservative political positions like

smaller government or decreasing perceived overreach of state and federal

government. Conversely, some evangelicals are calling for their faith

communities to critically examine the insider-outsider mentality that

evangelical Christianity perpetuates.

In an era of heightened political tension, evangelicals are making their

voices heard. As the midterm elections of the Trump’s first presidential term

approached, evangelicals expressed opinions that are not always in

agreement with one another. For instance, many evangelicals agreed with

senate Republicans that the hearings to confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the

Supreme Court dragged on too long, even in the face of allegations of sexual

533

See infra Part V.

534

See supra notes 521–526 and accompanying text.

2019] “HOW MUCH A DOLLAR COST?” 259

misconduct against him.

535

Rather than decry to potential immorality of

now-Justice Kavanaugh’s alleged actions, this group of evangelicals turned

their attention to questioning the morality of the confirmation process and

the timing of the allegations.

536

In short, they saw Kavanaugh as politically

victimized. Ironically, Kavanaugh being seen by evangelicals as a victim

neutralizes his possible moral flaws. Accordingly, evangelicals emphasize

what they consider the meaning of grace in the Gospel. One cannot help but

also see that, for evangelicals, this grace gives space for the extension of

their desired social conservatism as well. Ultimately, the lifetime

appointment of Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court secures a long-term

proponent, perhaps even an advocate, of their social concerns.

While this political saga follows what many would consider a standard

evangelical script, we should be cautious lest we assume all evangelicals

toe the same social conservative lines. The most fascinating element of

America’s current political saga is that it comes at a time when evangelicals

are also expressing diverging views on formerly deemphasized issues.

Some evangelicals are pushing for a broadened ideological perspective to

care for the least, othered, and outsider in more public ways. Therefore, to

reduce the debate about evangelicals and social justice issues to a

preoccupation with personal salvation misses the fact that evangelicals are

increasingly saying more to address issues of systemic racism or justice for

the poor. We grapple with this reality in light of the fact that Trump inspired

a significant number of the poor to vote for him. Among this voting bloc,

few would believe that systemic racism still exists or that eradicating

poverty requires federal government involvement. But if Christianity

carries with it a theo-ethical space to care for and serve the poor, how do we

square the challenge of an evangelical electorate that seems to deemphasize

that message in matters of policy? The crux of this article found space in

much of the contradictions.

In the end, the seeming theological and cultural contradictions

highlighted throughout this analysis are less related to evangelical support

of President Trump. With respect to political party line issues, conservative-

leaning evangelicals were likely to support a Trump administration given

the high stakes. The larger challenge, then, is associated with the ways in

which evangelicals’ political ideology fails in robust ways to address

poverty policy on the societal level. Kendrick Lamar’s words and message

over and against a Trump presidency colors this narrative in interesting

535

Ken Thomas, Evangelicals Push Senate Republicans to Confirm Kavanaugh, AP (Sept. 21,

2018), https://apnews.com/73d6bf49463045e0a4dce215b1b020c7.

536

Id.

260 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 28:2

ways. To utilize Lamar’s ideas about the image of the poor was all the more

challenging while wrestling with the complex religio-political ideology of

evangelicals. We tried to consider the possibility of white evangelicals

finding the value of poor people beyond evangelizing them. Ultimately, the

cause of the “least of these” must be taken up by the entirety of the Christian

faith and its members, regardless of political allegiance. Evangelicals are a

shifting community with a significant voice in this cultural and political

struggle. Perhaps messages like those found in Kendrick Lamar’s “How

Much A Dollar Cost” can compel some evangelicals to action, or at least

toward a reconsideration of the Imago Dei.

537

Imago Dei (“image of God”), PBS, https://www.pbs.org/faithandreason/theogloss/imago-

body.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). (explaining that Imago Dei or “image of God” is “a

theological term, applied uniquely to humans, which denotes the symbolical relation between God

and humanity.”).