EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 57
JEMEAA - FEATURE
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important
to Russian Security?
The Cases of Sevastopol and Tartus Compared
Tanvi Chauhan
Abstract
is article aims to examine why Russia’s warm- water ports are so important to
Russian security. First, the article denes what security encompasses in relation to
ports. Second, the article presents two case studies: the Crimean port of Sevasto-
pol and the Syrian port of Tartus. is article proves that warm- water ports are
important to Russian security because they enable Russia to control the sea, proj-
ect power, maintain good order, and observe a maritime consensus. Each of these
categorical reasons are then analyzed in the Crimean and Syrian context. e re-
sults are compared in regional perspective, followed by concluding remarks on
what the ndings suggest about Russian foreign policy in retrospect, as well as
Russian security in the future.
Introduction
General discourse attribute ports with a binary character: commercial or naval.
However, the importance of ports is not limited to those areas alone. Security in
the twenty- rst century has come to constitute multidimensional relationships, so
this article will approach the importance of warm- water ports for security by us-
ing the broad concept of maritime security, rather than naval security alone. Previ-
ously, the maritime context covered naval confrontations and absolute sea control,
but today, scholars have elaborated the maritime environment to include security
missions spanning from war and diplomacy to maritime resource preservation,
safe cargo transit, border protection from external threats, engagement in security
operations, and preventing misuse of global maritime commons.
1
us, maritime
security has crucial links to political, economic, military, and social elements. It is
therefore imperative that all such dimensions are considered for an overall and
overarching security picture.
Methodology and Research Background
To determine why warm- water ports are important to Russian security, the
reasons for why any port is generally important come under consideration rst.
58 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
Any naval port enables states to execute maritime security functions, and as dis-
cussed previously, maritime security is wide- ranging. Pioneers in naval studies,
like strategist Alfred ayer Mahan, emphasized signicance of naval supremacy,
while Julian Corbett stressed the necessity of joint warfare (navy and army).
2
Georey Till built on these ideas and described maritime security in today’s glo-
balizing world.
3
Till presents two competing models of maritime security—mod-
ern and postmodern navies—where the former’s missions reect ideological su-
premacy and competitive military power, while the latter’s are sea control, good
order, power projection, and maritime consensus. Till concludes that postmodern
navies embrace the globalized maritime order, while modern navies, whose gov-
ernments reject or despise globalism, have a narrow concept of maritime power
projection, focusing less on maritime consensus and more on deterrence.
4
Another
scholar, Sam J. Tangredi, also maintains that globalization is the dening charac-
teristic of global order. However, states hardly t into any two models perfectly, so
a port’s importance in acting out maritime security functions cannot be divided
strictly in terms of modern or post- modern missions.
5
Skeptics, like Colin S. Gray,
discuss how power dynamics—including rivalries, conicts, international organi-
zation memberships, and so forth—form the milieu in which maritime security
policies take place in the post–Cold War era much more than globalization.
6
So,
the two thoughts (globalization vs. presiding international power dynamics order)
are needed to evaluate why a warm- water port is important to a state’s security.
is article aims to blend explanations that t both the globalized maritime
world and the traditional realist one, so that the reader can get a comprehensive
understanding of the subject matter. I use Till’s maritime functions as the categor-
ical reasons for why warm- water ports are important to Russian security, analyz-
ing each one per the chosen case.
7
e reasons are listed below followed by de-
scriptions and indicators of each reason:
1. sea control;
2. power projection;
3. good order at sea; and
4. maritime consensus.
First, sea control means that the controlling power can use the sea to serve its
interests,
8
but in today’s world, sea control also means securing it for everyone
except the enemies of the system.
9
Second, maritime power projection is the “ability
of a state to inuence or coerce others at, or from, the sea.”
10
is denition is very
wide, allowing maritime power to translate into social, political, and/or military
projections. As Till suggests, power projection not only means “what they can do
at sea, but what they can do from it.”
11
is means that ports may permit states to
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 59
project power for historic or cultural reasons, meet geopolitical ends, and even
militaristic expeditionary operations away from their shorelines. ird, good order
at sea means using the port to protect anything that threatens the set benecial
order. Order is understood dierently by dierent states: good order involves deal-
ing with traditional threats (alliances, balancing, unipolarity, etc.), as well as new-
age globalization threats (weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal immigra-
tion, nonstate actors’ aggression, radicalism, environmental degradation, and so
on). Lastly, maritime consensus entails cooperation and integration of as many
countries’ maritime agencies as can be persuaded to cooperate to deal with com-
mon threats.
12
A naval port is required in order to command and share the global
commons peacefully and eectively.
Case Selection
is article focuses on Russia’s warm- water ports from two dierent regions
where it has a naval eet stationed: the Black Sea (Sevastopol in Crimea) and the
Mediterranean Sea (Tartus in Syria). ere are three reasons for selecting these
ports. First, because one is a home base and the other is an away one: to fully as-
sess the importance of a Russian port to its security, a home and abroad compari-
son is imperative. Second, because both give access to multiple regions of inu-
ence: the Black Sea gives access into the Mediterranean Sea, and the Mediterranean
Sea pours into the Arabian, so an expansive maritime security policy can be real-
ized, both from a globalization perspective as also the traditional realist one.
Lastly, because of Russia’s geographical limitations, the research de facto chooses
two of its only naturally occurring warm- water ports. Novorossiysk in the Black
Sea was excluded from the analysis because it is primarily an economic port hous-
ing only part of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), while Vladivostok in the Far East is
kept open using ice- breakers and is not a naturally occurring warm- water port.
I utilize Arend Lijphart’s interpretative- comparative case study method,
whereby the research uses a theoretical foundation to examine or interpret a case;
however, the focus is still mainly on the case.
13
is method is not only useful in
interpreting the cases involved, but the interpretations themselves lend better un-
derstanding of posited theory, i.e., whether theory is appropriate to explain a case
or if another one is better, or there is need to create one. In our situation, by
comparing the two regions for their port importance, newer insights or explana-
tions that conrm or debunk Russian actions in those places can be found. e
two ports share the similarity of being warm- water ports. So, by utilizing the
“most similar systems design” for my cases, this article attempts to examine the
reasons (independent variables) for why Russian warm- water ports in two dier-
ent regions are important for Russian maritime security (dependent variable).
60 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
Case Analysis: Sevastopol (Black Sea)
is section will analyze why the warm- water port of Sevastopol is important to
Russian security using the categorical reasons as stated and explained in the meth-
odology: sea control, power projection, good order at sea, and maritime consensus.
Sea Control
Sevastopol is important because it gives Russia the ability to control its open and
littoral waters. As previously mentioned, the vast denition of sea control entails
using the sea to serve a state’s political, economic, and military interests. First, Rus-
sia values Sevastopol because it can use the port to accomplish political ends. Before
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, Sevastopol’s port facilities were shared by Ukraine
and Russia—this joint basing “provided practical limitations on Ukraine’s maritime
power [while] the presence of Russian BSF in Sevastopol hampered Ukraine’s abil-
ity to control eectively its main port and its infrastructure.”
14
So it was in Russian
political interests to have a pro- Moscow government or ruler in Kiev who would
continue the longstanding lease on Sevastopol because the port limited Ukraine’s
freedoms as much as it did Russia’s, especially given Ukraine’s inclination to inte-
grate with the international organizations of the West. Now, after the annexation,
although maritime governance was, and remains, fraught with divergent views re-
garding Crimea, the absolute control over a strategic port like Sevastopol provides
Russia with the lead in any new geopolitical maneuvers it chooses to make—whether
they be power projections, expeditionary operations, participation in sea commerce,
or new multilateral arrangements, to name a few. In Tillian logic, military sea control
refers to preventing adversaries from eectively controlling the same region. By
controlling Sevastopol, Moscow obviously denies Ukraine the same space and si-
multaneously ensures that Russian forces are no longer constrained by Ukraine.
Before the annexation, the BSF was only permitted to replace old naval craft with
similar ones, so Russia could not advance the port with modern naval technology;
however, post annexation, such constrains were removed.
15
From Sevastopol, there-
fore, the BSF can reconnoiter the sea and also dominate the aerial space, creating a
formidable antiaccess/area- denial (A2/AD) situation for its enemies (including
NATO). We see examples of this during the Crimean annexation when BSF con-
trol of the sea executed a blockade on the Ukrainian army and eet. Roy Allison
informs that Russian eorts to control the sea go further to include reactivating its
submarine base at Sevastopol, upgrading naval weapons testing, and advancing early
warning radar stations that cover the Black Sea and Middle East.
16
us, such
physical modernization elevates the Sevastopol port as a platform from which Rus-
sia can control the sea for oensive reasons.
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 61
But let us not forget defensive sea control. BSF admiral Viktor Kravchenko
notes that “Russia’s military superiority in the Black Sea has to rely on its station-
ing arrangements in Crimea [because] the Black Sea has two components: Group
West based in Sevastopol, and Group East—on the Caucasian Coast.”
17
In other
words, security of one main port aects another. rough Sevastopol, Russia can
monitor conictual zones like Moldova- Transnistria (Giurgiulești port) or eort-
lessly access newly sieged bases like Abkhazia (Sukhumi).
Although Sevastopol is primarily a naval base housing the BSF, it also indi-
rectly aects and reinforces Russian economic security. If the Sevastopol lease had
not been ratied, then Russia would be left with only one warm- water port in the
Black Sea—Novorossiysk—chiey an economic port, which houses only part of
the BSF because its main purpose is to support the local economy with its ship
repairing, shing, cement manufacturing, food processing, machinery, and textile
industries and its export facilities of timber, coal, grains, and cement. In fact, Rus-
sia’s key Baku- Novorossiysk pipeline also passes through this commercial port.
Since a good portion of Russia’s wealth depends on Novorossiysk, an unfriendly
or uncontrollable Sevastopol directly compromises Novorossiysk, so the latter’s
protection depends upon the former’s ability to control the maritime space. is
in no way suggests that Russia controls the entire Black Sea economy, because
according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
all littoral Black Sea states have responsibilities and rights to their exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZ). us, Sevastopol does not aord any state (let alone Russia)
full economic control in the sea outside of their legal EEZ.
18
Nevertheless, Sevas-
topol does enable Russia to control littoral waters in general and problematic lit-
toral states, in particular. is section analysis conrms that Sevastopol is indeed
important to Russian security because it allows Russia to control the sea in and for
various political, economic, and military reasons.
Power Projection
As noted earlier, maritime power can be translated to achieve social, political,
and military eects, so it is worth understanding Sevastopol’s importance to Rus-
sian security in terms of the port being Russia’s gateway for regional and interna-
tional power projection. First, let us examine the use of maritime power projection
to achieve social eects. In a 2014 address to both houses of the Russian legisla-
ture, Pres. Vladimir Putin claimed that Crimea has always been an “inseparable
part of Russia” and that “there was no single armed confrontation in Crimea and
no casualties.”
19
e decision to annex Crimea and unilaterally control Sevastopol
must then be understood from a nuanced social power projection lens. e port is
the emblematic representation of Russia’s soft- power victory against the West.
62 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
Russia frames its soft power in geopolitical terms as a “counterforce to the West”
in an eort to defend Russian interests.
20
Although soft power has far- reaching
applications and denitions, Joseph Nye’s original idea translates for Russians,
like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as the “ability to inuence the world with the
attraction of one’s civilization and culture.”
21
So, when the pro- Russian leader
Sergei Tsekov appealed to Russia for help in Crimea, this presented a cultural
obligation for the Russian Federation to extend the notion of Russkyi Mir—the
conceptualization of a greater Russian world beyond the current borders of the
federation—and an opportunity to reinstitute power based on the premise that
areas like Crimea were home to Russian culture and ethnicities. For why would
Russia risk huge economic losses and international derision when the BSF was
legally guaranteed Sevastopol port facilities until 2042? Annexing the peninsula
with a strategic and historic port meant that Russia got a symbolic trophy of hav-
ing protected and defended the Russian world from the Other. For as Anna Mat-
veeva puts it, had Russia not attended to Crimea or Donbas, the very society
moved by Russia’s soft power (Russian identity and ideology) would have felt
betrayed.
22
So, the port’s importance is not simply geographical as most scholars
believe; it stands as the symbolic triumph of soft power and the physical manifes-
tation of placated social surges.
Next, Sevastopol is obviously important to Russian security because it is the
outlet that Russia uses to reach certain geopolitical and military eects—both
domestic and international. Till states that oensive naval missions are dealing
with a disorder on land (normally political); so, what happens at sea is treating the
symptom, not the cause.
23
In this regard, Sevastopol’s importance to Russia goes
beyond the hackneyed imperialistic and re- Sovietizing theories abounding in
general discourse. Let us consider the port’s naval importance to home base rst.
Once Sevastopol was under Russia’s possession, there was no fear of an anti-
Moscow government in Kiev reverting the lease, so instead of using the port to
militarily project dominion over Ukraine, Moscow used the annexation of the
peninsula, and with it the port, as a medium of political warfare. By restricting
how much maritime power Ukraine could project, Russia added another pressure
point that it hoped would force Ukraine to adopt a federalizing scheme favorable
to the Russian polity.
24
Ukraine was not the only sore spot. Looking at the Black Sea map, the onlooker
notices at once how Russia is encircled by adversarial or ckle states: Turkey,
Romania, and Bulgaria are NATO members, while Ukraine, Moldova, and Geor-
gia are aspirants to membership in that organization. In this milieu, Russia’s pos-
session of an important port means that it can wield political sway over its adver-
saries using the maritime domain as one of its key pressure points, among other
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 63
things. For example, Russia threatened to stop energy exports to Moldova as
Chișinău vacillated between a European and Russian alliance, as well as Latvia
and Lithuania in 2006, but rewarded Ukraine with a price cut when a pro- Russian
candidate won the presidency.
25
Now, let us discuss the port’s naval importance for expeditionary operations.
Sevastopol renders Russia uninterrupted ability to conduct naval missions within
the Black Sea of course, but the readiness and tactical convenience of this facility
means that Russia can also extend its power beyond the Black Sea, for example,
through the Mediterranean Sea and into Syria. Sevastopol was valuable in allow-
ing Russia to conduct its rst “military intervention outside of Europe since the
Soviet collapse.”
26
From Sevastopol Russia can therefore send reinforcements and
supplies for its power projects outside of the Black Sea. So, this section analysis
also conrms that Sevastopol is undeniably important to Russian security because
it allows Russia to not only project power socially, militarily, and politically but
also maintain that same power in subtle ways.
Good Order at Sea
Sevastopol is important to Russian security because from this port, year- round,
Moscow can protect its region from any threat that upsets the established stability
or order—from social threats on culture and radicalism to economic and military
threats that tip regional stability o. Michael O. Slobodchiko maintains that
Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global one, but in-
creasingly, Western actions have isolated Russia, destroying the regional order
nested within the global one.
27
So, a dissatised Russia now looks to challenge the
Western hegemonic order.
28
Hence, good order at sea does not necessarily involve
protecting the region only from globalization threats as Till would have it
29
but
also protecting one’s state and companions from the presiding global order threats
that is West- favoring and anti- Russian. However, this does not mean Russia has
completely turned away from battling globalization threats; Moscow can, from its
strategic port, allow itself to treat threats in a way Russia wants and in the priority
that they appear—using or not using the nested global order framework. Take
terrorism for instance: Sevastopol’s year- long access means that when terrorists
use the sea to inuence social and political agendas, a strategic port can help with
policing and protection against that threat. Although this is crucial for any littoral
state’s security in the Black Sea, it is especially important for Russia, which has
been threatened with the instability and spillover eects of terrorism in Central
Asia and by Islamist separatism within the federation, i.e., Chechnya.
But larger than these threats are those that Russia faces from the West, which
wishes to challenge and interfere in Russia’s regional order. e West is an aggre-
64 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
gate term, so here we must separate it from the immediate west (Europe/EU), to
the combined west (NATO), and the hegemonic west (United States). Russia
attempted to nest regional treaties into global lodestone agreements, indicating
Russia’s inclination to pluralism in foreign policy,
30
but the EU’s “domestic plural-
ism is balanced by foreign policy monism.”
31
is means that the Russia–Europe
order is truly separate and divisive. Europe magnetizes those states, like Ukraine
and Georgia, that fall under Russia’s perceived order to join the EU’s monistic
vision, forbidding Russia from both participating in a comprehensive continental
order and sustaining her own regional order. is also explains Russia’s aversion to
NATO. President Putin had expressed strong opposition to NATO, stating that
“we are against having a military alliance making itself home right in our back-
yard or in our historic territory [and] I simply cannot imagine that we would
travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors.”
32
Russian security is not limited to maritime security obviously, but a force land-
ing at or around Sevastopol translates into a threat that tips security o in a
plethora of other areas. For Moscow, Eurasia is obviously a sphere of inuence,
but more so, a region that it bears the responsibility to stabilize. Most of the for-
mer Soviet states heavily rely on Russia in terms of debt, energy dependency, se-
curity guarantees, political support, labor migrations, and remissions.
33
e Sevas-
topol port assists Russia by upholding this good regional order, but the
Russia- averse Western global order threatens this stability. For instance, the
United States even resisted Russia’s eorts to utilize the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS)—a regional intergovernmental organization of nine post-
Soviet republics in Eurasia—as a way of integrating the region.
34
Under such
circumstances, Russia’s good regional maritime order is perpetually threatened,
and although the port at Sevastopol does not by and in itself protect Russia’s or-
chestrated regional order in any unconditional way, it does, however, serve as one
bulwark against any gross aggressive action taken by the West.
Of course, combating shared threats like WMD and terrorism will translate as
maintaining good order no matter which littoral state or Western power one asks,
but Russia’s actions are not limited to combating these threats alone. Since Russia
uses Sevastopol as a buer against any imminent threat from the Western system
along with dealing with other threats, the port’s importance for Russian security
order is quite particularistic. Whether this classies as good order or not depends
on perspective, but objectively speaking, Russia has used Sevastopol more for its
own interests than it has in solely combating globalization threats. is very well
may be because Russia is incessantly consumed with trying to protect its own
regional order from collapsing before it can wholly focus on altruistic global en-
deavors. In this respect, Sevastopol is important to Russian security because it
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 65
allows Moscow to preserve its own good order more than that of the globe, even
as it plays a small part in combatting globalization threats.
Maritime Consensus
Sevastopol is important to Russian security because it allows the Russian state
to eectively maintain cooperation with its region on trade, military support, non-
traditional threats, and so forth. Ports, therefore, enable maritime commitments
to actually be practiced and realized. Bilateral and multilateral consensus come
into consideration here. Take Moldova, for instance. Sevastopol allows Russia to
uphold its maritime consensus with Moldova in transporting Russian forces, con-
ducting joint military operations, exchanging military hardware, and codirecting
border security operations in Transnistria.
35
e port also comes handy for Rus-
sia’s multilateral commitments. e CIS and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),
as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, depend on Russian hege-
mony and control in guarding the maritime space.
Moscow also values Sevastopol because Russia can use it to advance joint
maritime security operations with other countries into a fully standing multina-
tional maritime task force. is includes Black Sea Naval Force (BLACKSEA-
FOR), a multinational security force established by Turkey that deals with mari-
time threats to and from the Black Sea with port visits to Romania, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey.
36
Another example is Operation Black Sea Harmony,
a Turkish- led maritime operation that aims to prevent risks and deter threats at
sea. One more consensual organization is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC); founded in 1992, BSEC fosters good relations and cooperation among
all the littoral states. In the case of BSEC, because it is a structured intergovern-
mental organization, rather than an interventionist one, it only facilitates coop-
eration instead of constraining member behavior,
37
so it is dicult to say that the
warm- water port is advancing Russia’s security simply because Russia is proactive
about joint maritime agreements. Nevertheless, Russia’s voluntary participation in
multinational maritime security operations (even with adversary states) implies
both the importance of the port for that end and Russia’s willingness to espouse
maritime consensus.
Case Analysis: Tartus (Mediterranean Sea)
is section will analyze why the warm- water Syrian port of Tartus is impor-
tant to Russian security, using the categorical reasons as explained in the method-
ology: sea control, power projection, good order at sea, and maritime consensus.
66 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
(Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Russia)
Figure 1. Russia in Syria. Syrian president Bashar al- Assad (second from left), Russian
president Vladimir Putin (center), Russian minister of defense Sergei Shoigu (second from
right), and chief of the general staff of the Russian Federation armed forces Valery Gera-
simov (right) meet 21 November 2017 in Sochi, Russia, to discuss Russian support for op-
erations in Syria.
Sea Control
For a geographically locked or restrained country like Russia whose access to
the Mediterranean is controlled by Turkey and other littoral Black Sea states, a
sole Russian port in the Mediterranean enables Russia to control a portion of the
sea away from home to further its military, geopolitical, and economic interests.
Tartus is rst and foremost important to Russian military interests in the world
beyond the Black Sea. If military maritime control means preventing an adversary
from eectively using the same region, then to some extent Russia was successful
in doing so during the 2015–2018 period; however, it has been unable to form a
complete A2/AD environment around Syria. Nonetheless, starting with and from
Tartus, Russia has been able to control half of Syria in its ght against the Islamic
States (ISIS) and to protect the Assad administration from collapse. Although it
has not stopped the United States and its allies from inserting themselves in the
Syrian Civil War, Russia’s presence in Syria (aorded by Tartus) has diluted NA-
TO’s unchallenged and/or America’s unilateral control in the Middle East. is
military presence at the port, therefore, serves Russia’s geopolitical interest too,
since it forces NATO and the West to include Russia in the decision- making
process. By controlling Syria’s littoral waters, Russia is inserting itself in a region
that is either strongly allied to the United States (Israel and Saudi Arabia) or
highly opposed to it (Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon). Russia has demonstrated
that by being able to work with both sides, it can certainly inuence decisions,
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 67
directly challenging the US monopoly in the region. So, by controlling the littoral
Mediterranean shores from Tartus, Russia uses its naval presence to leverage its
own political interests on the West’s favorite regional playground. Doing so, Rus-
sia hopes to leverage matters back home into the Black Sea and Eurasia.
Tartus also allows Moscow to control the sea for Russia’s economic interests. In
1971, when Hafez al- Assad permitted Moscow to use Tartus in return for Soviet
arms, the port was chiey used for materiel and technical maintenance of smaller
ships in Russia’s BSF.
38
It is worth noting that Russia wrote o Syria’s massive
arms sales debt in 2005 in return for free access to Tartus, because Russia was
aware of the approaching end of its lease on Sevastopol. At that time, Moscow
had not yet acquired its port in Abkhazia either, as the Russian invasion of Geor-
gia did not occur until 2008. So, purely as a way to control the sea for economic
pursuits, Tartus was and remains very valuable to Russian economic security
abroad. Syria would immediately turn down any contract that bypassed Russian
economic interest, like Qatar’s LNG natural gas pipeline that would run from
Iran through Tukey and Syria, because of the debts written o and the Tartus port
deal.
39
is also means that Tartus will allow Russia to build more of its own
pipelines in the future, helping the Russian economy. Rosatom, for example,
opened a regional headquarters in 2017, constructing reactors in Iran, Egypt, Jor-
dan, and Turkey.
is section analysis shows Tartus’s importance to Russian security in that it
allows Russia to control the littoral Mediterranean waters around Syria to realize
foreign policy interests with the military and the economy, as well as geopolitical
interests that benet domestic policies. However, this control must be contextual-
ized. Russia does not want to control the Mediterranean Sea like it would like to
the Black Sea. Russia is by no means desiring full command of it, because to do
that, Moscow has to face another naval power—Turkey. Under the 1936 Montreux
Convention, Turkey has rights to close o Turkish straits that connect the Black
and Mediterranean Seas, which would thereby lock Russia to its shorelines, ef-
fectively bottling the BSF up in Sevastopol.
40
Russia also has to face NATO and
US regional allies who are jockeying for control of the Mediterranean as well. So,
Russia’s littoral control is simply to establish a small foothold in the region, so in
no way is it attempting to use Tartus to institute a complete command of the
Levant shorelines.
Power Projection
Earlier we ascertained that maritime power can be translated to achieve social,
political, and military eects, so the port at Tartus, very much like Sevastopol,
forms Russia’s gateway in regional and international power projection. First, let us
68 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
examine the use of maritime power projection to achieve social eects. e fa-
mous 2007 Munich charge- sheet, wherein Putin claims the West humiliated
Russia after the Soviet collapse, is vital in understanding the underlying reasons
why an away base in a crucial region like the Middle East is important for Russia.
Stripped o its superpower status, Russia has been conned as a regional power
who, as Pres. Barrack Obama once claimed, acts “not out of strength, but out of
weakness.”
41
Hence, gaining Tartus empowered Putin to use it as symbolic rebuke
of the label Russia was given internationally and domestically. A spot in the
Mediterranean Sea (Tartus) boosts ethnic Russian sentiments against the per-
ceived mistreatments of the West. e Middle East presence allows Russia to
challenge the unipolar worldview synonymous with anti- Americanism. Even
Anna Borshchevskaya states that, thanks to the foreign facility, Russia reached a
global prestige that served to distract from domestic problems and invoke patri-
otic feelings necessary to maintain Russian cultural security back at home.
42
Fur-
ther, Tartus was not annexed or conquered—it was a deal made by the Alawite
Syrians who have had historical connections to the Russians. us, the port en-
ables Russia to maintain a powerful relationship on a social level because Syrians
feel a “connection with Russians” and “do not look down on them as they did on
other nations in the region.”
43
An interesting extension of such social power pro-
jection includes the establishment of an Arabic RT news station to resonate sym-
bolic presence in the Middle East through the physical presence at the port. Next,
Tartus is important to Russian security since it is Russia’s gateway for projecting
actual military power with geopolitical interests at heart. As with the social power
projection, one can call Syria Russia’s testing ground for military eciency. e
Russian military understood after its 2008 Georgian war how antiquated its
weapons were, so Syria became what some say the Gulf War was to America—a
military litmus test.
44
Russian ships in Tartus played a major role in supporting
Moscow’s aerial bombing campaign.
45
Projecting such maritime power from this
port prompted Middle Eastern powers like Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and
Saudi Arabia to sign “agreements to purchase arms from Russia” in the second
half of 2015.
46
Russian inuence to permeate into the Middle East through a
permanent port presence at Tartus has also added geopolitical Russian interest to
assert itself where the United States has pulled back, thereby walking a step closer
to restoring the former’s superpower status. US Ambassador to NATO Ivo
Daalder reports that Moscow has deployed 30 combat ships and submarines to
the port, eectively “ending NATO’s uncontested control of the Eastern
Mediterranean.”
47
So, Tartus is not simply a display- case ornament; it is a real
medium of aggressive power projection for Russia—a key factor that in turn safe-
guards Russia’s own security. In as far as expeditionary operations go, we do not
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 69
(yet) see Russia using Tartus to project power beyond the Mediterranean into the
Red or Arabian seas. However, there is the possibility of an intervention into
Libya from Tartus. Even if Tartus is not used for expeditionary operations around
the Middle East and North Africa, there seems to be no doubt about the port’s
value in projecting power back into the Black Sea. at is, by means of Tartus,
Sevastopol’s existence and position is strengthened in the Black Sea, and vice-
versa. For instance, Tartus can become the device Russia uses to encircle its encir-
clers, e.g. a double presence in the Black and Mediterranean Sea weakens Turkey’s
fronts. us, analysis of this section also conrms Sevastopol’s importance to Rus-
sian security because it allows Russia to project power socially, militarily, and po-
litically and provides impacts that are felt back home.
Good Order at Sea
As in the previous analysis with Sevastopol, Tartus’s importance is twofold in
maintaining good order at sea: rst, in combating globalization threats like terror-
ism; and second, in countering threats emanating from the established Western
order system to Russian security. Good order depends entirely on one’s perspec-
tive, especially when the Middle East is concerned. Firstly, Tartus is key to dealing
with the globalized threat of terrorism, since the port aids in policing and pre-
cluding spill- over eects into the Eurasian neighborhood. Scholars who state that
Tartus is only important to Russia because it is a warm- water port valuable for
Russia’s economic and naval security miss the fact that Russia has lost thousands
of citizens to terrorist attacks and has more than 5,000 nationals ghting in Syr-
ia.
48
If Russia justied its Syrian involvement using the pretext of combating ter-
rorism simply to keep its warm- water port, then that was a precarious gamble.
Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta posit that over the long run ISIS could
percolate into Afghanistan and directly aect Russia’s Central Asian allies, even
encouraging North Caucasians to ght in Russia.
49
e Beslan town attack in the
North Caucasus was Russia’s wake- up call for terrorism long before Moscow ven-
tured into Syria. erefore, Tartus gives Russia the ability to deal with the terror-
ist threat right in its hotbed, so that good order can be maintained both in the
region and back at home.
rough Tartus, Russia can also tackle Western unipolar- order threats. at is,
by maintaining a maritime presence and policing the shorelines, Russia has chal-
lenged Western foreign policy actions and criteria, enacting a rather contrary, alter-
nate version in dealing with regional issues. Take for instance Moscow’s support
for the Western- condemned Assad government. Supporting that government was
Putin’s rationale for good order in Syria, whether maritime or whatever else, be-
cause Russia wanted to prevent Syria from the same fate as Iraq after the demise
70 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
of Saddam Hussein and Libya after Muammar Gadda. In Russia’s view, the Arab
Spring was not a region- wide success, so it was necessary to cultivate stability by
assessing the impact of the grassroots rebellion in each country. e decision to
support Assad rested on that very premise. Scholars like Borshchevskaya, who
claim Russia’s priority was protecting Assad instead of ghting terrorism, miss the
crucial point that without a political framework, nonstate threats like terrorism
cannot be eectively eliminated. One can presume that keeping Assad in power
meant the port stayed in Russia’s possession because the port is necessary for Rus-
sia’s power projection schemes, but if that was all Russia aimed for, Moscow would
not worry about negotiating peace between rival groups and regional powers.
Tartus is obviously important because it is the physical proclamation of Rus-
sian presence in the Middle East, but more than that, it is Russia’s demonstration
of good order. In Russia’s 2017 naval doctrine, Moscow objected to “the US and
its allies of dominance of the world’s oceans” and proclaimed it would combat
such unipolarity by “crushing the superiority of their naval forces.”
50
Russia is
driven by an alternate worldview that despises Western democratization- crusading
and distrusts grassroots rebellions,
51
so through Tartus, Russia demonstrates to
NATO a dierent way of conducting interventions against global threats like
terrorism, as also meeting the objective of maintaining good order in a region—
maritime order being only one such aspect. Now, one can argue that Russia is
using Tartus to in fact collapse the good order because of Syria’s ties to Hezbollah
and Iran, who are deemed as direct threats to the West and its allies in the Middle
East. However under Russian intervention through Tartus, states like Israel have
felt more secure because of Russia’s ability to cajole Assad, as well as to preoccupy
Hezbollah’s attention.
52
Israel’s downing of a Russian ghter jet still does not
change how crucial Russian presence at Tartus is to containing Israel’s enemies.
Russia’s ability to operate within reach of the Golan Heights—a contested terri-
tory in the ongoing Arab–Israeli conict—suggests that the port presence allows
for Russia to achieve friendship that conditioned good order in the region as the
Syrian Civil War raged and, in lieu of an Israel–Syria peace treaty, presented hope
for future peace around Golan.
Tartus has endowed Russia with a prestigious role not only in Israeli issues but
also in fostered renewed maritime accord with Turkey. Turkish president Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan was quoted as saying that “without Russia, it is impossible to nd
a solution to the problems in Syria.”
53
e two countries partnered in formulating
a political settlement in Syria that some may call a rapprochement of sorts.
54
Al-
though it very well may be Turkey’s way to bandwagon for prot, Russia’s inu-
ence in the Mediterranean order is not so lightweight. Whatever one’s perspective
of good order, the warm- water port at Tartus is crucial to Russian security because
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 71
it is Russia’s mechanism for enacting its own version of good order in a region that
is also the epicenter to the gravest global threat this decade—terrorism.
Maritime Consensus
If maritime consensus is to be analyzed in the Middle East, it is crucial to factor
in NATO. Despite their antagonisms and supporting opposite factions, both sides
have not used this region as a way to turn their new “cold war” into a proxy hot one.
erefore, Tartus is helpful to Russian security because it gives Russia the leverage
and the sensitivity to make judicious decisions by factoring in NATO, which is
using the same sea to tackle the common terrorist threat. Other than NATO,
Tartus’s basing allows Russia to be proactive about its commitments in and to the
Mediterranean region. ere are countless examples of this—whether it is legally
responding to the summoning of its ally Syria for help through the UN mandate,
or the once active Iran Nuclear Deal, or even the Syrian peace process. Under this
legal consensus, Tartus facilitates Russian foreign policy dealings.
Take Iran–Russia consensus for instance: Moscow could engage in a coopera-
tive relationship with Tehran like pipeline projects and arms deal and utilize the
latter’s Hamadan Airbase, all the while containing Iran from mischievous behav-
ior in the locality in the early years through the nuclear deal. Getting an estranged
state to commit to cooperative arrangements shows how the local presence af-
forded by Tartus allowed Russia to understand the region from the ground up and
produce consensual relationships.
Another example is the Syrian peace process, which brought key regional play-
ers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran to negotiations in Astana and Geneva IV. Just a
simple basing in Tartus meant Moscow played a role in regional consensus, which
in turn aected domestic Russian relations and policies. For instance, working
closely with Turkey, a littoral Black Sea state, means the furtherance of the two
nations’ relationship beyond the Mediterranean, while working with Iran means
direct economic relationships and extended inuence on Hezbollah in Lebanon.
is in turn also impacts the Russo–Israeli relationship, given the huge Russian
Jewish diaspora resident in Israel. With the Syrian peace talks in 2017, de-
escalation zones were established to initiate a political process on the ground.
Consensus was achieved, albeit with problems, but it was achieved without the
Western giants. As Dmitri Trenin conrms, Moscow was able to build common
ground between the region’s contending factions.
55
Russia has used its presence in Syria through Tartus to work with other con-
nected navies and armies in dealing with day- to- day issues, rather than simply
shielding Assad. So, it is clear, at least from this analysis, that Russia values its
Middle Eastern asset to foster consensual agreements with key regional players
72 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
who have a lasting impact on Russian security in other areas. erefore, the port
is more than a physical placement of navies. It is the gateway, literally, for Russia’s
insertion into the Middle East power- consensus and security system.
Results in Comparative Perspective
As the analysis indicated, there was stronger support for some reasons versus
others in explaining the importance of the respective ports to Russian security.
e table below categorizes the overall intensity and validation of each reason
when analyzed in their separate contexts:
Strong = overwhelming supporting evidence or action
Weak = nonexistent, limited, and/or ambiguous evidence or action
Reason for Importance Sevastopol Tartus
Sea Control Strong Weak
Power Projection Strong Strong
Good Order at Sea Weak Strong
Maritime Consensus Strong Strong
e results above illustrate Sevastopol’s importance to Russian security for vari-
ous reasons—letting Russia control the Black Sea, project power, and generate
maritime consensus. Sevastopol is not as important to Russian security in dealing
with globalized threats like terrorism as much as it is in dealing with threats ema-
nating from the Western- style order (e.g., NATO expansion). On the other hand,
the analysis also shows Tartus’s striking importance to Russian security even
though it is an away base. Tartus enables Russia to continue power projection be-
yond its regional waters and actually contain globalized threats by attaining a re-
gional maritime consensus, including with adversaries like NATO. At present,
being stationed on the Syrian shorelines, controlling the Mediterranean Sea is not
as important to Russian security as much as all the other maritime functions are.
Since both ports only dier in one reason of importance to Russian security, we can
conclude they are equally important to Russian security. e main dierence lies in
prioritizing any of the dierent maritime functions in the context of those regions.
Discussion
Russia’s ports in the Far East, Caspian, and Baltic freeze for some time during
the year, thereby obstructing, compromising, and/or limiting Russia’s maritime
security. is article has incessantly stressed that maritime security guarantees and
reinforces security in other areas, so Russia’s warm- water ports at home and away
are constantly working toward this end—protecting and furthering Russian inter-
ests at home and abroad. It is not redundant to state the obvious fact that Russia’s
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 73
warm- water ports are important to Russian security because they are, indeed,
warm. ey are naturally available, replete with strategic advantages, and opera-
tional year- round. However, these ports in and by themselves do not uncondition-
ally guarantee Russian security in any way. To quote Nicholas Spykman, “geogra-
phy does not argue, it simply is.”
56
So in addition to, and outside of, a geographic
reason, this study aimed to nd out why and to what extent warm- water ports are
important to Russian security when distinct regions are compared. From this
analysis, it is clear that Russian warm- water ports are important to Russian secu-
rity because they genuinely enable Russia to control the waters, project power,
maintain good order at sea, and observe maritime consensus. By comparing a
home base (Sevastopol) to an away base (Tartus), the aim was to juxtapose two
warm- water Russian ports in separate regions to assess why each one is important
to Russian security when contrasted using the same reasons. is gives us perspec-
tive about Russia’s regional as well as foreign maritime policy conduct. Future
studies can apply the same analysis to other Russian ports as well. For instance, a
home base like Sevastopol can be compared to an away one like Cam Ranh Bay
(Vietnam) to check if the reasons discussed herein still resonate equally in another
region like the Indo- Pacic.
In as far as this research, it is not surprising from the results to see how impor-
tant a home warm- water port is as compared to an away one because of its obvi-
ous proximity and inuence to the immediate region. Sevastopol gives Russia a
monopolizing sea control second only to Turkey, a clear domain to project regional
power of varying social and military dimensions, a medium of deterring threats
from the Western order, and a vestibule that further leads to consensual bilateral
and multilateral relationships, for example the CIS, EEU, and so forth. So, the
port’s importance goes beyond being the site where the BSF is located. Once we
understand that, Russian actions in Crimea, Abkhazia, and Syria can be compre-
hended in their entirety, thus debunking the much in vogue imperialistic- only
and militaristic- only theories about Russian behavior. Even with Tartus, its im-
portance lies not only as a show of Russian power abroad but also as a genuine
eort to reshape the region with Russia’s version of order and to attain harmony
with regional players.
Conclusion
So, what does the future hold? Russia has no outlets to inuence a world be-
yond its region. In the North, it is impeded by harsh winters; in the East by a
dominant China; in the Black Sea by uncooperative actors; and in the Mediter-
ranean by unreliable participants. Given the antagonistic Russia–West tensions,
the maritime domain will eectively remain an important contest medium be-
74 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
tween the two sides. However, from its warm- water ports, the BSF is guaranteed
to take on additional missions beyond the Black Sea at any time in the year, espe-
cially sealift operations and amphibious landings in the Mediterranean. Even the
Libyan intervention from Tartus appears to be a likely possibility. e strategic
warm- water ports will remain instrumental in Russia’s ability to ward o NATO
threats, challenge Western maritime dominion, and compel the United States to
rethink geopolitical maritime strategy in those regions. Further, Russian economic
interests and security appear to prot from these ports; so, more pipeline projects
are likely to be implemented. In a subtle yet critical way, the strong Russian pres-
ence year- long in home and foreign waters also means that Russian cultural values
(soft power) will continue to impact communities disillusioned by globalization
and the Western system, aording such communities the opportunity to per-
chance appreciate the alternate stability proposed by Russia. ough this analysis
is nowhere suggesting that the ports are part of the new cold war between Russia
and the West, they are denitely strategic tools—weapons or shields, depending
on one’s perspective—in this poisoned bilateral relationship.
is simple study to identify reasons why warm- water ports are important to
Russian security has actually revealed the need for scholars to transcend super-
cial naval philosophies and plunge into underlying political, economic, and social
importance of such facilities for a comprehensive maritime security understand-
ing. Only then can we make any meaningful conclusions and predictions about
overall state security in the case of Russia.
Ms. Tanvi Chauhan
Miss Chauhan holds a master of science in international relations (with honors) from Troy University, AL. Her re-
search interests include regional and international foreign policy, geostrategy, cultural ideology, and ethnic studies.
Her graduate focus centered on global affairs as a whole, with special attention given to US, Eurasian, Middle East-
ern, and African studies. Her works have been published by International Affairs Forum, International Policy Digest,
Modern Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy News. Currently, she is working on a research paper about the Caspian Basin
for the Asia- Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). This paper will be published under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific branch by summer 2020.
Chauhan is a young professional with a strong third- culture upbringing, including living and travel experiences in
Africa and Asia. She enjoys traveling and interacting with diverse cultures and wishes in earnest to positively impact
the world. In this light, she has worked on refugee acculturation missions in Clarkston, Georgia, and hosted inter-
national cultural events at Brewton- Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia.
Notes
1. Deborah Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea (Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2014); Basil
Germond, “e Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54 (April 2015): 137–
42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.013; Christian Bueger, “Piracy Studies: Academic Re-
sponses to the Return of an Ancient Menace,” Cooperation and Conict 49, no. 3 (2014), 406; Georey
Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” Orbis 51, no. 4 (2007): 569–75; and Sam J. Tangredi,
Globalization and Maritime Power (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacic), 2004).
Why Are Warm- Water Ports Important to Russian Security?
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 75
2. Alfred ayer Mahan, e Inuence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783 (1890, repr., New
York: Dover Publishing, 1988); and Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London:
Longmans, Green & Co.,1911)
3. Georey Till, “New Directions in Maritime Strategy?,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 4
(2007): 29–43.
4. Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea.
5. Tangredi, Globalization and Maritime Power.
6. Colin S. Gray, e Navy in the Post- Cold War World (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State Press,
2004)
7. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World.”
8. Till, “New Directions in Maritime Strategy”; and Mahan, e Inuence of Seapower upon
History.
9. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World.”
10. Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea, 17.
11. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” 32.
12. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World.”
13. Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study
Method in Political Psychology,” Political Psychology 20, no. 2 (1999), 369.
14. Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea, 20.
15. Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the
Rules,” International Aairs 90, no. 6 (2014), 1278.
16. Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine,” 1280.
17. Oleksandr Pavli︠u︡k and Ivanna Klympush- Tsintsadze, e Black Sea Region: Cooperation and
Security Building (London: Routledge, 2015), 199.
18. Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea.
19. Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation” (speech, Moscow, 18
March 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/.
20. Yulia Kiseleva, “Russia’s Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status and the Attraction of Power,”
Politics 35, no. 3–4 (2015), 325.
21. Kiseleva, “Russia’s Soft Power Discourse,” 321.
22. Anna Matveeva, rough Times of Trouble: Conict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from
Within (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018).
23. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World.”
24. Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva,
and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/.
25. Owen Matthews, Jack Moore, and Damien Sharkov, “How Russia Became the Middle
East’s New Power Broker,” Newsweek, 9 February 2017, https://www.newsweek.com/.
26. Mary Dejevsky, “Putin’s Rationale for Syria,” World Today74, no. 1 (2018), 44, https://
www.chathamhouse.org/.
27. Michael O. Slobodchiko, Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way: Order, Stability, and
Predictability in the Post- Soviet Space (London: Lexington Books, 2014).
28. Michael O. Slobodchiko, “Challenging US Hegemony: e Ukrainian Crisis and Rus-
sian Regional Order,” Soviet and Post- Soviet Review 44, no. 1 (2017): 76–95.
29. Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World.”
76 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Chauhan
30. Slobodchiko, Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way.
31. Richard Sakwa, “e Ukraine Syndrome and Europe: Between Norms and Space,”Soviet
and Post- Soviet Review44, no. 1 (2017), 14.
32. Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation.”
33. Dmitri Trenin and R. Craig Nation, Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian
Perspectives; U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia (Carlisle Barracks PA: US Army War College, 2007).
34. Trenin and Nation, Russian Security Strategy under Putin.
35. Slobodchiko, Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way, 114.
36. Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea.
37. Slobodchiko, Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way.
38. Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta, “Why Putin Wants Syria,” Middle East Quarterly
(Spring 2016): 1–17, https://www.meforum.org/.
39. Valenta and Valenta, “Why Putin Wants Syria”; and Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals
Go beyond Damascus,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2018): 1–13, https://www.meforum.org/.
40. Daniel Treisman, “Why Putin Took Crimea: e Gambler in the Kremlin,” Foreign Aairs
(May–June 2016), https://www.foreignaairs.com/.
41. Dejevsky, “Putin’s Rationale for Syria,” 44.
42. Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus.”
43. Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus,” 3.
44. Dejevsky, “Putin’s Rationale for Syria.”
45. Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus.”
46. Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention,”
Foreign Aairs ( January–February 2016), https://www.foreignaairs.com/.
47. Ivo H. Daalder, “Responding to Russia’s Resurgence: Not Quiet on the Eastern Front,”
Foreign Aairs (November–December 2017), https://www.foreignaairs.com/.
48. Dejevsky, “Putin’s Rationale for Syria.”
49. Valenta and Valenta, “Why Putin Wants Syria.”
50. Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus.”
51. Grigory Melamedov, “Russia’s Entrenchment in Syria: Moscow’s Middle East Resur-
gence,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2018): 1–9, https://www.meforum.org/.
52. Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria.”
53. Matthews, Moore, and Sharkov, “How Russia Became the Middle East’s New Power Broker.”
54. Ajdin Đidić and Hasan Kösebalaban, “Turkey’s Rapprochement with Russia: Assertive
Bandwagoning,”International Spectator54, no. 3 (2019), 123.
55. Dmitri Trenin, “Putin’s Plan for Syria: How Russia Wants to End the War,” Foreign Aairs
(13 December 2017), https://www.foreignaairs.com/.
56. Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy, II,” American Political Science Review
32, no. 2 (1938), 236.
Disclaimer
e views and opinions expressed or implied in JEMEAA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying
the ocial sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or
other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
