Crime data integrity
Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service
August 2014
© HMIC 2014
ISBN: 978-1-78246-478-5
www.hmic.gov.uk
2
Contents
Introduction 3
Methodology 4
The scope and structure of the report ........................................................ 4
Part A: Summary of inspection findings and recommendations 5
Leadership and governance ....................................................................... 5
Systems and processes ............................................................................. 6
People and skills ...................................................................................... 11
Recommendations ................................................................................... 12
Part B: Audit findings in numbers 15
Part C: Additional detailed inspection findings 16
Leadership and governance ..................................................................... 16
Systems and processes ........................................................................... 18
People and skills ...................................................................................... 24
3
Introduction
In its 2013/14 inspection programme
1
, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary (HMIC) committed to carry out an inspection into the way the 43
police forces in England and Wales record crime data. All 43 forces will be
inspected by mid August 2014, with a full thematic report published in autumn
2014. The central question of this inspection programme is:
“To what extent can police-recorded crime information be trusted?”
Accurate crime recording underlines the police service’s commitment to public
accountability, ensures that local policing bodies
2
can match resources to the
risks identified in communities and enables the police to provide a proper
service to victims of crime.
Recent HMIC inspections have revealed weaknesses in police crime recording,
particularly the under-recording of crimes. In our interim report of 1 May 2014
we said that “we are seriously concerned at the picture which is emerging”.
3
We strongly recommend our findings in this report are read alongside the
interim report, Crime recording: A matter of fact - An interim report of the
inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales,
available at www.hmic.gov.uk.
The interim report sets out the full context of this inspection programme
including the rules and standards governing crime data integrity: the National
Crime Recording Standard (NCRS)
4
and Home Office Counting Rules
(HOCR)
5
.
1
The 2013/14 inspection programme was approved by the Home Secretary under section 54 of
the Police Act 1996.
2
Police and crime commissioners for police areas outside London: the Mayor’s Office for
Policing and Crime for the Metropolitan Police Service; and the City of London Corporation for
the City of London Police.
3
Crime recording: A matter of fact – An interim report of the inspection of crime data integrity in
police forces in England and Wales, paragraph 1.20.
4
NCRS is a standard of crime-recording introduced in 2002 and published as part of the Home
Office Counting Rules; it has the twin objectives of ensuring the police focus more on victims of
crime and ensuring consistency in crime-recording in all police forces.
5
HOCR are rules in accordance with which crime data – required to be submitted to the Home
Secretary under sections 44 and 45 of the Police Act 1996 – must be collected. They set down
how the police service in England and Wales must record crime, how crimes must be classified
according to crime type and categories, whether and when to record crime, how many crimes to
record in respect of a single incident and the regime for the re-classification of crimes as no-
crimes.
4
Methodology
Each force inspection involves:
1. An examination of crime records for the period 1 November 2012 to 31
October 2013;
2. A dip-sample of out-of-court disposals (cautions, Penalty Notices for
Disorder (PND), cannabis warnings, community resolutions) and no-crime
decisions for rape, robbery and violence;
3. Visits to forces where inspectors assess local crime recording arrangements
under three headings: leadership and governance; systems and processes;
and people and skills; and
4. A peer review of audit findings by an NCRS expert from outside HMIC.
The audit examined for compliance a small sample of crime records from each
force. Taken together, these samples are sufficient to provide a reliable national
estimate, but are too small to produce a force estimate of compliance. Force
compliance rates typically result in a margin of error of around +/- 10 percent
and therefore a range of 20 percent. This range of uncertainty means that few, if
any, conclusions can be drawn from individual force compliance rates or
comparisons of rates between forces based on the data alone. (Samples large
enough to make more reliable force judgements, while desirable, were not
affordable.) Our conclusions and recommendations are, therefore, based upon
the evidence drawn from our inspection of the force’s crime-recording
arrangements.
The scope and structure of the report
This report is divided into the following sections:
1. Part A: A summary of our findings, and recommendations;
2. Part B: Our findings in numbers;
3. Part C: Additional detailed inspection findings.
This report, undertaken at a force level, allows a qualitative assessment of the
force’s crime recording arrangements and to make recommendations for
improvement.
5
Part A: Summary of inspection findings and
recommendations
Leadership and governance
Chief officers in the Metropolitan Police Service promote a message of no
compromise on crime data integrity. The assistant commissioner for territorial
policing is the named, responsible officer for crime data quality.
The force has an established governance structure for monitoring performance,
including crime data integrity, which is underpinned by statements of
expectation by all borough commanders. The force maintains policies and
procedures on crime reporting, management and criminal investigations which
are compliant with the NCRS and HOCR, but are not explicit or detailed about
taking a victim-centred approach.
Most officers and staff engaged in the crime recording process are aware of the
headline message to ensure integrity in crime recording however, junior staff
engaged in crime recording processes would benefit from increased clarity on
the subject.
Recommendation: As soon as reasonably practicable, chief officers
should clarify the roles and responsibilities for all staff in ensuring
compliance with NCRS. Accountability for compliance should be held
within the control room, at the point of closure, for incidents that are not
recorded as a crime, and within the crime recording and investigation
bureau and the specialist crime and operations (SC&O) crime
management unit for recorded crime and that referred to police by
partners.
The force has a confidential internal reporting route called ‘right line’, by which
officers can raise concerns in respect of unethical practices of whatever kind to
the professional standards department. The process has an emphasis on
identifying individual wrongdoing as opposed to identifying organisational
failings.
The force maintains a flexible audit regime with the focus being on the seven
priority crime types which are detailed in the force police and crime plan.
The results from audit are tracked at a senior level, actions are allocated and
monitored through local performance meetings, and individuals and their line
managers receive feedback where required. The force has an established
process in place to identify and share good practice or lessons learned from the
findings of these audits.
6
Systems and processes
Accuracy of crime recording
Of the 1428 incident records
6
examined, 1169 crimes should have been
recorded. Of the 1169 crimes that should have been recorded, 948 were. Of the
948, 24 were wrongly classified and 11 were recorded outside the 72-hour limit
allowed by the HOCR. This indicates a need for improvement in the accuracy of
crime recording decisions.
The data above include some wide variances
7
. Burglary (140 crimes correctly
recorded out of 162) and Robbery (321 crimes correctly recorded out of 379)
were found by inspection staff to be areas where crimes were more likely to be
recorded in line with the HOCR.
For other categories of crime the MPS were found not to comply with the HOCR
effectively. Of the 128 violent crimes that should have been recorded, 75 were.
Of the 106 sexual offences that should have been recorded, 65 were. Many
calls contain sufficient information for the force to record a crime at the time the
report was made; however, the force follows an ‘investigate-to-record’
8
approach for all reports of crime which can often result in some loss of
information between the first report and the finalisation of the incident
The crime recording investigation bureau also handles internet-based reports of
crime, which are called Holon reports. 110 Holon reports were examined,
identifying 95 crimes that should have been recorded. Of the 95 crimes that
should have been recorded, 75 were. Of these, 5 were wrongly classified and
two were recorded outside of the 72-hour limit allowed by HOCR.
Another standalone system used by the force is the Airspace system. This is
used by boroughs to support the case management of anti-social behaviour.
110 reports on the Airspace system were examined, identifying 12 crimes that
should have been recorded. Of these 12 crimes that should have been
6
An incident in this context is a report of events received by the police, recorded on the
electronic incident systems, that requires police attention. Whether or not an incident report
becomes a crime record is determined on the balance of probability that a notifiable offence has
occurred as set out in the Home Office Counting Rules. If an incident does not turn out to be a
crime, it must still be logged in an auditable form on the force’s incident-recording system or
some other accessible or auditable means.
7
The audit was designed to provide a nationally robust estimate of crime recording (via
incidents and crime desk) for all crime and selected crime types. It is possible that the sampling
process generates results that, for any individual force, are not representative of the actual level
of crime recording. Results for different crime types should not be compared but are provided as
supporting evidence to HMIC inspection findings.
8
This means that the police do not record the incident as a crime at first, but instead investigate
the matter in order to establish whether a crime has been committed.
7
recorded, 5 were. Of these 5, all were correctly classified and recorded within
the 72-hour limit allowed by HOCR.
There is evidence that a lack of training and knowledge of legislation, as well as
some workload pressures experienced by frontline staff, contribute to errors in
deciding whether or not to record a crime. Our audit revealed a number of
incidents with clear and obvious lines of enquiry that were not, according to the
incident record, adequately pursued and resulted by staff. This is particularly
prevalent where the report of the incident is via a third party.
Recommendation: Within six months, the force should undertake a
review of its systems and processes for the recording of crimes reported
through incidents, Holon and Airspace, and no later than 31 December
2014 ensure these systems and processes are sufficiently robust to
ensure the prompt recording and investigation of all reports of crime in
compliance with NCRS.
The supervision of incidents is variable; 212 of the 215 reports of dwelling
burglaries reviewed had been supervised. In the high-risk area of sexual
offences, evidence of supervisory oversight was only present in 88 of the 164
sexual offence incidents reviewed. The supervision of internet-based reports
(Holon) of crime, and of crime outcome decisions, presents a challenge for the
force. We found limited evidence of intrusive oversight on records and case files
Recommendation: The force should immediately introduce a consistent
and structured approach to call handling quality assurance processes,
ensuring that compliance with NCRS is at its core and that particular
attention is given to those offences which are of greater risk to public
safety.
Out-of-court disposals
Out-of-court disposals include cautions, Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs),
9
cannabis warnings
10
and community resolutions.
11
The HOCR (section H) state
that national guidelines must be followed
12
.
9
A form of immediate financial punishment used by police to deal with low-level offending such
as being drunk and disorderly, retail theft, and minor criminal damage.
10
A cannabis warning is a non-statutory disposal for cases of possession of cannabis for
personal use. It constitutes a warning to the offender and confiscation of the cannabis.
11
Resolution of a minor offence or anti-social behaviour incident through informal agreement
between the parties involved, for example often involving the offender making good the loss or
damage caused.
12
National guidance for the use of out-of-court disposals is detailed in a number of documents:
• Home Office Circular 016/2008: Simple Cautioning – Adult Offenders. Available from
www.xact.org.uk
• Simple Cautions for Adult Offenders, 14 November 2013. Available from
www.justice.gov.uk
8
Cautions – Of the 30 cautions dip-sampled, the offender’s previous history
made them suitable to receive a caution in 27 cases. In 26 cases the offender
was made aware of the nature and future implications of accepting the caution.
Out of the 21 cases where there was a victim to consult, 6 showed that the
victims’ views had been considered.
Penalty Notices for Disorder – Of the 30 PND disposals dip-sampled, the
offender was suitable to receive a penalty notice in 24 cases. In all cases the
offender had been made aware of the nature and future implications of
accepting the penalty notice. Out of the 15 cases, where there was a victim to
consult, 3 victims had their views considered when the police decided to issue a
penalty notice.
Cannabis warnings – Of the 30 cannabis warnings dip-sampled, the offender
was suitable to receive a warning in all cases. In all cases the offender had
been made aware of the nature and implications of accepting the warning.
Community resolutions - Of the 31 community resolutions dip-sampled, the
offender was suitable for community resolution in 27 cases. Out of the 31
resolutions where there was a victim, all 31 cases showed that the wishes and
personal circumstances of the victim had been properly considered. 27 cases
showed that the agreed outcome was meaningful and appropriate
13
.
There was little evidence that the administration of out-of-court disposals was
adequately supervised at a local level, and force audits have yet routinely to
include this issue.
The force is currently reviewing its management of crime and those units whose
role it is to record, investigate, and manage crime. The crime recording and
investigation bureau has proved to be a great success in improving the quality
of crime classification decisions and the force could usefully pass responsibility
for the finalisation of all types of crime outcome to this unit.
• Code of Practice for Adult Conditional Cautions, 8 April 2000. Available from
www.justice.gov.uk
• Home Office Police Operational Guidance for Penalty Notices for Disorder, March 2005.
Available from www.justice.gov.uk
• ACPO Guidance on Cannabis Possession for Personal Use, 28 January 2009. Available
from www.acpo.police.uk
13
National guidance for community resolution directs that at the point the community resolution
is administered an officer will need to confirm the offender admits the offence and explain the
process to the offender – including how the offender will make good the harm caused. The
implications of receiving a community resolution need to be explained to the offender – it does
not form part of a criminal record but may be disclosed as part of an enhanced Disclosure and
Barring Service check. The community resolution is to be recorded appropriately, in accordance
with the NCRS and HOCR.
9
Recommendation: Within three months, the force should introduce a
structured regular audit plan for out-of-court disposals, ensuring as far as
is reasonably possible that the resources available to the Force Crime
Registrar are sufficient to ensure full compliance with national guidance,
HOCR and NCRS and the proper and timely operation of the audits,
which must be subject to scrutiny through local performance meetings.
No-crimes
No-crime refers to an incident that was initially recorded as a crime but has
subsequently been found not to be a crime on the basis of additional verifiable
information. 90 no-crime records were examined and 69 were found to be
compliant with HOCR and NCRS.
Most errors for no-crime relate to shortcomings in the attainment of additional
verifiable information, some of which were based on a single telephone
conversation without corroboration.
With the exception of rape, all no-crimes within the force are managed centrally
by the crime recording and investigation bureau and are subject to management
oversight within the unit. There is some concern amongst crime recording and
investigation bureau staff that they feel ill-equipped to make decisions due to
the complexity and responsibility of no-crime decisions; however guidance from
the force crime registrar can be obtained when required.
Recommendation: The force should immediately assess the knowledge
gaps of officers and staff within the crime recording information bureau in
respect of no-crime decision making, and without delay ensure guidance
is provided which enables them to make no-crime decisions with
confidence. In particular the guidance provided should clearly describe
the standard of additional verifiable information required in order to
authorise a no-crime in accordance with the NCRS.
Victim-centred approach
The force promotes a victim-centred approach to crime recording, crime
outcomes and no-crime decisions. The force’s crime recording policy and
procedure highlight a requirement to consider the special needs of vulnerable
groups and detailed procedures exist for crimes committed against children.
Victim First care cards are issued to victims of crime and the Victim’s Charter
and Code of Practice is applied by staff and monitored by supervisors. Subject
to the victim’s consent, all suitable crimes are referred to Victim Support
London.
The quality of call handling, professionalism and victim focus by operators is
excellent with the operators being polite, helpful and professional in 1,315 of
10
1,348 calls listened to from the public. There is increasing use made of
Language Line
14
for those callers who do not speak fluent English.
The force regularly conducts surveys of people who report incidents and crime,
and has a cohort of volunteers who, at weekends, make victim call-backs and
invite feedback on their perception of the service they have received. Results
are fed back to management, staff and their supervisors within the force control
room and the crime recording and investigation bureau.
Rape offences
The force has a clear and detailed procedure for dealing with reports of rape,
and most officers and staff have a clear understanding of the policy.
Dip-sampling of the computer systems used for partner agency reports of child
abuse found no reports of rape received from these agencies that have gone
unrecorded by the force. However, the audit did identify concerns with the
accurate recording of initial reports of other types of sexual offence, due to
misunderstanding of legislation and the HOCR (particularly with victims who
suffer from with mental illness), and poor primary investigations for crime
related incidents where clear lines of enquiry were not actively pursued (see
Recommendation 6).
Our audit revealed that 26 out of 30 rape no-crimes complied with HOCR.
Since January 2014 a new process for no-crimes has been implemented. In
cases where officers believe their investigation proves beyond doubt that no
crime took place, a panel is convened, chaired by the specialist crime
commander, who reviews the investigation. If the commander is satisfied that
no crime has taken place, the case is submitted to external academic
professors who meet on a quarterly basis for final approval of the no crime
decision. Both the Force Crime Registrar and the external professors are
independent from the force performance regime.
The force procedure gives clear guidance in respect of the handling of rape
offences that are reported to the force but which are committed in other force
areas. The processes are clearly understood by staff involved.
IT systems
The MPS has a computer system for recording each of its incidents (CAD) and
another system for recording crime (CRIS). The force also uses a system to
record telephone call data – the call handling system (CHS). The MPS
recognises the possibility of reports of crime being lost between the CHS and
CAD systems; however the quality assurance review team has done much to
14
Language Line is an interpreting service that is used to translate calls from members of the
public.
11
reduce this risk. The recordings for all calls received by the control room are
captured on digital audio files and are accessible for audit.
There remain other systems used for case management that may contain
reports of crime that have not been correctly transferred to CRIS for
investigation; these are called drop-off systems (such as Airspace). Our
examination of these systems found crimes that had not been recorded onto
CRIS.
Recommendation: The force should immediately undertake an audit to
identify what other ‘drop-off systems’ are in use by the force which may
contain reports of crime, and immediately thereafter include these in the
regular force crime audit regime.
The professional standards department use a standalone IT system called
Tribune for the recording of crimes disclosed from their disciplinary
investigations. This system is not subject to force crime registrar oversight and
crimes recorded therein are not included within the force’s annual data return to
the Home Office.
Recommendation: The force should immediately ensure that crimes
held on the Tribune IT system are added to the annual data return for the
Home Office.
Recommendation: Within three months, the force should introduce a
structured regular audit of the Tribune IT system to ensure crime reports
contained within this system are recorded as required in compliance with
HOCR and NCRS.
The MPS recognises its challenge in the modernisation of its core IT systems
as little data is currently shared across applications. Proposals under the force
Total Technology Programme are expected to address these issues.
People and skills
Training for staff that make HOCR and NCRS decisions is very limited in the
MPS. Some have completed computer based training packages and others
seek advice from the force crime registrar as required. Staff repeatedly told
inspectors that they did not feel properly trained or equipped to make decisions
under NCRS and the HOCR.
Recommendation: Within three months, the force should conduct a
NCRS and HOCR training needs analysis, and immediately thereafter
introduce a tiered, co-ordinated training programme on NCRS and
HOCR, prioritising personnel in roles which impact on quality, timeliness
and victim focus, and in particular ensure the training is always made
available to new personnel, including those taking on supervisory roles.
12
Most staff engaged in the crime recording process are generally aware of the
unambiguous chief officer headline message of integrity for crime recording.
This is more clearly understood amongst senior ranks and grades. Junior staff
engaged in crime recording processes would benefit from increased clarity on
the expected accountabilities, behaviours and main processes to support crime
data integrity.
Senior managers encourage staff to record crime accurately and we did not find
evidence of performance pressures affecting their approach to crime recording
decisions.
Force crime registrar
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The force crime registrar has extensive knowledge and experience in the
management of crime data and the application of the NCRS and HOCR.
The force crime registrar has unrestricted access to the assistant commissioner
for territorial policing who is the force lead for data integrity and is able to act
objectively and impartially to ensure that the MPS records crime correctly. In
practice, due to the volume of crime, the initial interface is between staff and
their crime management support units; and the force crime registrar, in effect,
only deals with disputes in his role as the final arbiter.
Recommendation: Within three months the force should assess the
audit requirements for the MPS to enable it to be satisfied, on an ongoing
basis, that it is applying NCRS and HOCR effectively and, as far as is
reasonably possible, ensure the audit capacity of the data accuracy team
adequately reflects this audit requirement.
The force crime registrar is consulted on the development of MPS crime
recording policy and all such policy is compliant with the NCRS and HOCR.
Recommendations
Immediately
1. Chief officers should clarify the roles and responsibilities for all staff in
ensuring compliance with NCRS. Accountability for compliance should
be held within the control room, at the point of closure, for incidents that
are not recorded as a crime, and within the crime recording and
investigation bureau and the specialist crime and operations (SC&O)
crime management unit for recorded crime and that referred to police by
partners.
15
The person in a police force who is responsible for ensuring compliance with crime-recording
rules. The HOCR provide that he is ultimately responsible for all decisions to record a crime or
to make a no-crime decision as the final arbiter. The force crime registrar’s responsibilities
include training staff in the crime-recording process and carrying out audits to check that the
force is complying with all applicable rules.
13
2. The force should immediately introduce a consistent and structured
approach to call handling quality assurance processes, ensuring that
compliance with NCRS is at its core and that particular attention is given
to those offences which are of greater risk to public safety.
3. The force should assess the knowledge gaps of officers and staff within
the crime recording information bureau in respect of no-crime decision
making, and without undue delay ensure guidance is provided which
enables them to make no-crime decisions with confidence. In particular
the guidance provided should clearly describe the standard of additional
verifiable information required in order to authorise a no-crime in
accordance with the NCRS.
4. The force should undertake an audit to identify what other ‘drop-off
systems’ are in use by the force which may contain reports of crime, and
immediately thereafter include these in the regular force crime audit
regime.
5. The force should ensure that crimes held on the Tribune IT system are
added to the annual data return for the Home Office.
Within three months
6. The force should introduce a structured regular audit plan for out-of-court
disposals, ensuring as far as is reasonably possible that the resources
available to the FCR are sufficient to ensure full compliance with national
guidance, HOCR and NCRS and the proper and timely operation of the
audits, which must be subject to scrutiny through local performance
meetings.
7. The force should introduce a structured regular audit of the Tribune IT
system to ensure crime reports contained within this system are recorded
as required in compliance with HOCR and NCRS.
8. The force should conduct a NCRS and HOCR training needs analysis,
and immediately thereafter introduce a tiered, co-ordinated training
programme on NCRS and HOCR, prioritising personnel in roles which
impact on quality, timeliness and victim focus, and in particular ensure
the training is always made available to new personnel, including those
taking on supervisory roles.
9. The force should assess the audit requirements for the MPS to enable it
to be satisfied, on an ongoing basis, that it is applying NCRS and HOCR
effectively and, as far as is reasonably possible, ensure the audit
capacity of the data accuracy team adequately reflects this audit
requirement.
14
Within six months
10. The force should undertake a review of its systems and processes for the
recording of crime reported through incidents, Holon and Airspace and
ensure these systems and processes are sufficiently robust to ensure the
prompt recording and investigation of all reports of crime in compliance
with NCRS.
15
Part B: Audit findings in numbers
Our audit of records will be used as part of a statistically robust national audit to
allow HMIC to report a figure for national crime recording accuracy across the
43 Home Office forces within our final report to be published in autumn 2014.
The audit undertaken at a force level is not of a sufficient size to be statistically
robust and is therefore used alongside our fieldwork interviews to form
qualitative judgments only.
Crimes reported as part of an incident record
Incidents reviewed Crimes identified Crimes recorded
HMIC reviewed the following
number of incident records in
MPS. These include reported
incidents of burglary, violence,
robbery, criminal damage and
sexual offences.
From these incidents HMIC
identified the following
number of crimes
From these identified crimes
the MPS recorded the
following number of crimes
1428 1169 948
Crimes reported via Holon system
HMIC reviewed the following
number of reports that were
recorded onto the Holon
system.
From these reports HMIC
identified the following
number of crimes that the
MPS should have recorded.
From these identified crimes
the MPS recorded the
following number of crimes
110 95 75
Crimes reported via Airspace system
HMIC reviewed the following
number of reports that were
recorded onto the Airspace
system.
From these reports HMIC
identified the following
number of crimes that the
MPS should have recorded.
From these identified crimes
the MPS recorded the
following number of crimes
110 12 5
No-crimes
HMIC reviewed the following number of
recorded crimes of rape, violence and robbery
which the MPS had subsequently recorded as
no-crime.
From these HMIC assessed the following
number as being correct.
90 69
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Part C: Additional detailed inspection findings
Our detailed findings are set out against three headings: leadership and
governance, systems and processes, and people and skills.
Leadership and governance
1 Does the force have arrangements at a senior level to ensure there
is confidence in recorded crime figures and all aspects of the
HOCR?
1.1 How is the MPS ensuring that leadership responsibilities and
expectations for crime data integrity are clearly defined and
unambiguously communicated to staff?
Chief officer accountability for crime data integrity in the MPS is clear with the
assistant commissioner for territorial policing being ultimately accountable,
supported by a commander who has no direct accountability for the delivery of
external performance targets. The headline message is clear. There will be no
compromise on integrity in crime recording. This expectation has been
communicated to command teams across the force. It is underpinned by
statements of expectation for all borough commanders and reinforced through
monthly strategic performance management meetings.
In assessment of the reasons behind failure to record crime correctly at the
operational level. We found no evidence of performance pressures affecting
decision-making. Moreover, judgment errors against the HOCR and NCRS
were more a consequence of shortcomings in knowledge, compliance and, in
some cases, pressure of workload. Indeed, most errors could be eliminated by
sharper accountability for NCRS, targeted training and improvements in the
design of key crime recording processes.
The MPS has a professional standards policy that is supported by a procedure
for anonymously reporting integrity concerns of any kind. The policy and
procedure has an emphasis on individual wrongdoing as opposed to
organisational failings. There is awareness of the facility amongst staff but its
use for crime integrity matters is limited.
There are documented crime recording policies for the MPS and these are
supported by operating procedures and hyperlinks to the HOCR and National
Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR), all of which are accessible via the force
intranet. They emphasise the need for recording every crime correctly and in
accordance with NCRS but are not explicit or detailed about taking a victim-
centred approach. However, accountability and responsibility for NCRS
compliance in the finalisation of incidents and classification of crime are unclear
17
from our reading of the MPS policy documents, and staff are uncertain on the
matter.
Most staff engaged in the crime recording process are aware of the requirement
of integrity in crime recording, and this is currently being reinforced through a
new quarterly data quality and ethics board attended by borough commanders.
However, junior staff engaged in crime recording processes would nevertheless
benefit from increased clarity on the expected accountabilities, behaviours and
key processes to support crime data integrity. This is especially the case as the
MPS is currently undergoing significant organisational change.
The need for accurate crime data is succinctly and unambiguously detailed
within the MPS policing and crime plan. It recognises the importance of
accurate crime data in promoting public confidence and in the efficient
deployment of resources.
1.2 How does the MPS ensure it has a proportionate approach to
managing the strategic and organisational risk of recording crime
data?
The MPS analyses and considers most of its risks in relation to inaccurate crime
recording at an organisational level. It recognises the need to get it right first
time alongside the risk to vulnerable victims arising from poor identification of
crime at the time a report is first received. In the case of anti-social behaviour,
the MPS uses a software system that requires vulnerability to be assessed as
part of the case management process, and the quality assurance review team
systematically checks 50 randomly selected incidents a day, and initiates action
on a graduated basis to minimise any risks.
However, not all of the risks associated with crime data are identified, with our
audit identifying concerns in relation to the accurate recording of violent crime
and sexual offences. Other significant concerns related to the accurate
recording of no-crimes, and in the finalisation of cautions, Penalty Notices for
Disorder, and the application of restorative justice. The audit findings indicate
that the underlying issues go beyond that of simple compliance and principally
relate to system and process design, accountability for NCRS and knowledge
among responsible staff.
1.3 How does the MPS use HOCR, NCRS, and NSIR to ensure there is
confidence that crime is recorded accurately?
The work of the quality assurance review team is complemented by a focused
and proportionate monthly audit regime applied by the data accuracy team.
Force audits focus upon the seven priority crime types detailed within the MPS
police and crime plan, alongside the overall reduction of crime, sexual offences,
racial and domestic incidents. Action taken from audits is tracked and monitored
through a strategic performance meeting. The MPS uses the generic thresholds
for crime audits as recommended in the Home Office Data Quality Audit Manual
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and does not adopt a risk-based approach to their own audit plan. There
remains an opportunity for the force to improve the integration of audit results
on crime data integrity with core performance data.
Crimes are reported through a number of different routes. The majority are
routed through the call handling and incident system. Others are reported to the
crime recording and investigation bureau as internet-based reports, transferred
from other forces or reported to staff engaged on boroughs or in specialist units,
such as child abuse investigation teams, who will input reports of crime directly
onto crime system. This latter category is difficult to assess in terms of quantity,
quality and compliance with the HOCR due to the lack of an audit trail to
capture accurately the initial conversation or report from the victim, their
representative or a third party.
The MPS audit and quality assurance regime is fairly flexible and takes account
of most emerging issues. The quality assurance review team has recently
focused on examining the action taken by operators to deal with vulnerable
callers, and it is currently exploring what could be done to incorporate mental
health awareness. The data accuracy team has a small audit capability of 5
staff which is increased when exceptional MPS requirements arise. The results
from sampling and audits are tracked, addressed and closely monitored through
the performance management processes with individuals and their line
managers receiving feedback. Emerging themes are raised for discussion at
strategic performance meetings.
The quality assurance review team will inform line managers when it discovers
three or more errors made by any given member of staff. Issues raised from
data accuracy team audits will usually result in an action plan, the
implementation of which is overseen by the strategic crime and incident
recording group. The force closely monitors every single crime-related incident
of rape and tracks compliance with HOCR and the progress of investigations.
Systems and processes
2 Does the force have systems and processes in place to ensure that:
crime is correctly recorded in accordance with HOCR and NCRS;
standards of out-of-court disposals are maintained; and no-crime
decisions are correct?
2.1 How does the MPS effectively manage and supervise incidents,
other reporting routes and crime records in order to ensure that
crimes are correctly recorded?
Of the 1428 incident records examined, 1169 crimes should have been
recorded. Of the 1169 crimes that should have been recorded, 948 were. Of the
948, 24 were wrongly classified and 11 were recorded outside the 72-hour limit
allowed by the HOCR.
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The data above include some wide variances. Burglary (140 crimes correctly
recorded out of 162) and Robbery (321 crimes correctly recorded out of 379)
were found by inspection staff to be areas where crimes were more likely to be
recorded in line with the HOCR.
For other categories of crime, the MPS were found not to comply with the
HOCR effectively. Of the 128 violent crimes that should have been recorded, 75
were. Of the 106 sexual offences that should have been recorded, 65 were.
Many calls contain sufficient information for the force to record a crime at the
time the report was made, however the force follows an ‘investigate-to-record’
approach for all reports of crime which can often result in some degradation of
information between the first report and the finalisation of the incident. The
crime recording investigation bureau also handles internet-based reports of
crime, which are called Holon reports. 110 Holon reports were examined,
identifying 95 crimes that should have been recorded. Of the 95 crimes that
should have been recorded, 75 were. Of these, 5 were wrongly classified and
two were recorded outside of the 72-hour limit allowed by HOCR.
Another standalone system used by the force is the Airspace system. This is
used by boroughs to support the case management of anti-social behaviour.
110 reports on the Airspace system were examined, identifying 12 crimes that
should have been recorded. Of these 12 crimes that should have been
recorded, 5 were. Of these 5, all were correctly classified and recorded within
the 72-hour limit allowed by HOCR.
Many calls contain sufficient information for the MPS to record a crime at the
time and in accordance with NCRS. However the force follows an ‘investigate-
to-record’ approach for all reports of crime. This results in the decision to record
crime being deferred until an officer attends or a telephone investigation is
undertaken, which can often result in some degradation of information between
the first report and the finalisation of the incident, particularly for non-urgent
reports of crime. It also requires victims to repeat information that has invariably
been communicated during the first call for service.
There is evidence that a lack of training and knowledge of legislation, and some
workload pressures experienced by frontline staff contribute to errors in
deciding whether or not to record a crime. Officer action during scheduled
appointments for third party and non-urgent first party crime related incidents
requires tighter management. Our audit revealed a number of incidents with
clear and obvious lines of enquiry that were not, according to the incident
record, adequately pursued and resulted by staff. The creation of the crime
recording investigation bureau and its independent role in the assessment of
crime classifications has made a strong and positive impact on HOCR
compliance.
The force has trained its staff to input reports of crime directly onto its crime
system and a number of reports are made directly to staff by partner agencies,
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victims or their representatives. This latter category is difficult to assess in terms
of quantity, quality and compliance with the HOCR due to the lack of an audit
trail to capture accurately the initial conversation or report. The NCRS
requirement to record correctly crime from these direct reports needs to be
emphasised clearly within existing force crime recording policy.
The supervision of incidents is variable; 212 of the 215 reports of dwelling
burglaries reviewed had been supervised. In the high-risk area of sexual
offences, evidence of supervisory oversight was present in only 88 of the 164
sexual offence incidents reviewed. The supervision of internet-based reports
(Holon) of crime, and of crime outcome decisions, presents a challenge for the
force with limited evidence from audit of intrusive oversight on records and case
files. Opportunities for improvement will exist with the new command and
control system (MPS Command Point) which is due to be adopted from 2015
and from related applications under the new MPS Total Technology
Programme.
The force crime recording policy does not give specific instructions for how staff
should deal with reports of crime which have occurred in another force area; nor
does it include details for managing the transfer of relevant documentation to
the corresponding force. We found that such crime reports are handled centrally
by the transferred crime unit within the crime recording investigation bureau.
Staff on boroughs provided positive feedback indicating that the crime recording
investigation bureau processes for transferred crime worked well.
2.2 How does the MPS ensure that out-of-court disposals suit the
needs of victims, offenders and the criminal justice system?
Cautions – Of the 30 cautions dip-sampled, the offender’s previous history
made them suitable to receive a caution in 27 cases. In 26 cases the offender
was made aware of the nature and future implications of accepting the caution.
Out of the 21 cases where there was a victim to consult, 6 showed that the
victims’ views had been considered.
Penalty Notices for Disorder – Of the 30 PND disposals dip-sampled, the
offender was suitable to receive a penalty notice in 24 cases. In all cases the
offender had been made aware of the nature and future implications of
accepting the penalty notice. Out of the 15 cases, where there was a victim to
consult, 3 victims had their views considered when the police decided to issue a
penalty notice.
Cannabis warnings – Of the 30 cannabis warnings dip-sampled, the offender
was suitable to receive a warning in all cases. In all cases the offender had
been made aware of the nature and implications of accepting the warning.
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Community resolutions – Of the 31 community resolutions dip-sampled, in 27
of the cases the offender was suitable to receive the disposal. Out of the 31
resolutions where there was a victim, all 31 cases showed that the wishes and
personal circumstances of the victim had been properly considered. 27 cases
showed that the agreed outcome was meaningful and appropriate.
There was little evidence that the selection and administration of out-of-court
disposals was adequately supervised at a local level, and force audits by the
data accuracy team have yet to include routinely this issue. The role and remit
of the crime recording investigation bureau is currently being reviewed by the
force alongside that of borough crime management units and, taking account of
its success in the quality of classification decisions, it could usefully include
responsibility for the finalisation of all types of crime outcome against the new
HOCR outcome criteria.
Compliance with the Victims’ Charter and its Code of Practice is monitored and
all suitable crimes are routinely referred to Victim Support London.
2.3 Are no-crime decisions for high-risk crime categories correct and is
there is robust oversight and quality control in the MPS?
No-crime refers to an incident that was initially recorded as a crime but has
subsequently been found not to be a crime on the basis of additional verifiable
information.
HMIC found too many no-crime decisions did not comply with the HOCR. 90
records for violence, robbery and rape were reviewed, of which 69 no-crime
decisions were compliant with the HOCR. For violence, 21 of 30 no-crime
records were compliant; for rape, 26 of 30 no-crime records were compliant; for
robbery, 22 of 30 no-crime records were compliant. Most errors relate to
shortcomings in the attainment of additional verifiable information; some of
these were based on a single telephone conversation without corroboration.
With the exception of rape, all no-crimes within the force are managed centrally
by the crime recording investigation bureau which is subject to management
oversight within the unit. A decision from the force crime registrar, who acts as
the final arbiter in the case of disputes, is obtained when required. Staff involved
in the process felt ill-equipped to undertake the task due to the complexity of
decisions. The issue of no-crimes therefore remains a challenge for the force
that should be addressed through targeted training and support.
2.4 How does the MPS promote a victim-centred approach to crime
recording and associated outcomes?
The force’s crime recording policy and procedure highlights a requirement to
consider the special needs of vulnerable groups and detailed procedures exist
for crimes committed against children. ‘Victim First’ cards are issued to victims
of crime and the Victims’ Charter and Code of Practice is applied by staff and
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monitored by supervisors. Subject to the victim’s consent, all suitable crimes are
referred to Victim Support London by the force. All victims of crime are offered a
personal visit leading to an improvement to its customer satisfaction rates for
ease of contact. This will be enhanced further by the introduction of a system to
allow the public to track the investigative progress of their report of crime via the
internet. Enhanced vulnerability assessments are being explored potentially to
include mental health issues.
The quality of call handling, professionalism and victim focus by operators, as
judged by our inspection, is excellent with the operator being polite, helpful and
professional in 1,315 of the 1,348 calls we listened to from members of the
public. There is increasing use made of Language Line for those callers who do
not speak fluent English. This represents a radical improvement from the
service encountered by the HMIC inspection team in 2011, and is a reflection of
the improved selection, development and leadership of staff within the force’s
control room.
In addition to the British Crime Survey data, the force routinely commissions its
own survey of people who report incidents and crime. The force uses a cohort
of 20-30 volunteers at weekends to make approximately 300 victim call-backs
and invite feedback on their perception of service. Results are fed back to
management, staff and their supervisors within the force control room.
2.5 How does the MPS ensure systems for receiving, recording and
managing reported crimes of rape are robust?
The MPS has a clear and detailed procedure for dealing with reports of rape
that provides thorough guidance on investigative procedures and highlights the
need to take a victim-centred approach. There are separate and specific
instructions for dealing with reports received from the London Sexual Abuse
Referral Centre. Most officers and staff have a clear understanding of the policy
although a number of frontline staff reiterated that they have received no
training in NCRS/HOCR.
The force understands the various reporting routes for rape, although the exact
volume reported through each route is less clearly understood due to the
limitations of the data held within the force crime recording system. The force
maintains a tight grip on the progress of investigation, recording and
classification of third party reports of rape and other crime related incidents.
However, it is more difficult to maintain oversight of reports made directly to
police by the public at front counters or in the street, particularly if it is decided
that a crime has not occurred under NCRS by the officer who has initial contact
with the victim.
Crimes reported to rape and child abuse investigation teams by partner
agencies, such as health or social services, are entered directly onto the crime
system and there is no evidence of any standalone IT system being used. Dip-
sampling of the intelligence system (CrimInt Plus) and that used for partner
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reports of child abuse (Merlin) found no cases of reports of rape having been
missed by the force. However, concerns with the accurate recording of initial
reports of other types of sexual offence under NCRS were identified, arising
from misunderstanding of legislation and the HOCR (particularly with victims
who suffer from mental illness) and poor primary investigations for crime-related
incidents where clear lines of enquiry were not actively pursued.
The force procedure for dealing with reports of rape no-crimes was understood
by staff who investigate reports of rape. Our audit which included reports
between the period 1 November 2012 and 31 October 2013 revealed that 26
out of 30 rape no-crimes complied with HOCR.
Since January 2014, a new process for no-crimes has been implemented. In
cases where officers believe their investigation proves beyond doubt that no
crime took place, a panel is convened, chaired by the Specialist Crime
Commander, who reviews the investigation. If the Commander is satisfied that
no crime has taken place, the case is submitted to external academic
professors who meet on a quarterly basis, for final approval of the no crime
decision. Both the force crime registrar and the external professors are
independent from the force performance regime.
For rape offences that are reported to the force which are committed in other
force areas, the force procedure gives clear guidance. The processes are
clearly understood by staff whose role it is to deal with these incidents.
2.6 How do the MPS IT systems allow for efficient and effective
management of crime recording?
The MPS has a computer system for recording each of its incidents (CAD) and
another system for recording crime (CRIS). The force also uses a system to
record telephone call data the call handling system (CHS). The MPS recognises
the possibility of reports of crime being lost between the CHS and CAD
systems; however the quality assurance review team has done much to reduce
this risk. The recordings for all calls received by the control room are captured
on digital audio files and are accessible for audit.
There remain other precursor systems that may contain reports of crime that
have not been correctly transferred to crime recording system for investigation –
these are called drop-off systems. One such system is Airspace which is used
by boroughs to support the case management of anti-social behaviour not
otherwise recorded on the crime recording system. The system is highly
regarded by staff and has usefully met a requirement for the MPS pending
introduction of new applications under its Total Technology Programme. Its use
for incidents that concern mental health is currently being considered by the
force. Notwithstanding its value as a case management tool, there is evidence
that some entries on Airspace include less serious crimes that were not
recorded on the crime recording system.
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Another drop-off system is the intelligence system, CrimInt Plus, which
contained 10 reports of less serious crime from 30 records sampled. These
were not recorded on the crime recording system.
The professional standards department uses a standalone IT system called
Tribune for the recording of crimes disclosed from its disciplinary investigations.
This system is not subject to force crime registrar oversight and crimes
recorded therein are not included within the force’s annual data return to the
Home Office. Such records should either be added to the annual data return
derived from the crime recording system or placed within the confidential
element of the crime recording system from the outset.
The MPS recognises its challenge in the modernisation of its core IT systems
as few data are currently shared across applications. The proposals under the
force Total Technology Programme are expected to address these issues.
The majority of IT systems that could contain reports of crime are capable of
being audited. All force IT systems that contain reports of crime in the MPS
have an identified owner but their management in terms of weeding, control and
review is constrained by their design. The MPS carries out monthly audits of its
core systems for the reporting and recording of crime to assess compliance with
NCRS and HOCR.
People and skills
3 Does the force have staff whose conduct and skills ensure accurate
crime recording?
3.1 What arrangements does the MPS have in place to ensure that staff
have the necessary skills to ensure accurate crime recording?
The MPS has adequate staff within the force control room to handle the initial
reports of crime, and aside from some scheduling issues for appointments,
there was little evidence to indicate that excessive workload was a factor to
affect crime recording decision-making for staff on boroughs or in specialist
units.
The crime recording investigation bureau uses productivity indicators for
performance monitoring alongside qualitative measures derived from its review
of crime reports against minimum standards. The productivity measure for
telephone investigation is set at one and a half crimes per individual/per hour
which indicates some scope to increase responsibility and potential expansion
of the crime recording investigation bureau role and remit.
Training for staff who make key decisions against the HOCR, NCRS and related
guidance is very limited in the MPS with some having completed computer
based training packages and others taking advice on an ‘as required’ basis.
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Staff repeatedly told our inspectors that they did not feel properly trained or
equipped to make decisions under NCRS and the HOCR. Clarity on
accountability for NCRS and properly targeted training for those responsible
would therefore help to address this issue. Such training should equally reflect
the MPS process for the reporting and recording of crime through its various
routes and any changes to process design.
Most staff interviewed were aware of the HOCR and knew that advice could be
obtained either from the data accuracy team or from its intranet website. New
staff received a presentation on crime recording and the HOCR but there
remained some concerns regarding the adequacy of this training and the
availability of refresher training for existing staff on the subject. Intrusive
supervision of out-of-court disposal decisions was not evident from most of the
case files sampled and our inspectors found shortcomings in staff knowledge of
the HOCR and related guidance as it applies to these decisions. Once again,
training was cited as being minimal with any knowledge being acquired from
advice and experience in the role.
3.2 How do the behaviours of the MPS staff reflect a culture of integrity
for crime recording practice and decision-making?
Most staff engaged in the crime recording process are generally aware of the
unambiguous headline message of integrity for crime recording. This is more
clearly understood amongst senior ranks and grades. Junior staff engaged in
crime recording processes would benefit from increased clarity on the expected
accountabilities, behaviours and main processes to support crime data integrity.
Senior managers encourage staff to record crime accurately and there was no
evidence of performance pressures unduly affecting their approach to decision-
making for crime recording. Most staff receive support from their supervisors
and managers to record crimes accurately and we did not find any evidence of
performance pressures having a bearing on their decision-making. Moreover,
judgment errors against the HOCR and related guidance were a consequence
of shortcomings in knowledge, compliance and, in some cases, pressure of
workload.
3.3 How is the accuracy of crime recording in the MPS actively
overseen and governed by the force crime registrar (FCR)?
The MPS has a dedicated force crime registrar role, with a small team to
support him with his specific responsibility for ensuring NCRS and HOCR are
consistently and accurately applied. The force crime registrar is able to act
objectively and impartially to ensure that the MPS records crime correctly. In
practice due to the volume of crime, the initial interface is between staff and
their crime management support units; the force crime registrar, in effect, only
deals with disputes. The force crime registrar is supported by a dedicated force
incident registrar and they both have the capacity to lead, provide oversight and
audit of HOCR and NCRS compliance.
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The force crime registrar and force incident registrar coordinate a programme of
audits that focus upon force priorities with proportionate sampling. Both are
consulted on the development of MPS crime recording policy with advice given
being heeded. All such policy is compliant with NCRS/HOCR having been
endorsed by them. The MPS may wish to consider whether the audit capacity of
the data accuracy team adequately reflects its demand.
Crime recording disputes are suitably referred to the force crime registrar who is
the final arbiter for crime recording decisions and interpretation of HOCR for the
MPS. The MPS will need to ensure that its Tribune system used by professional
standards department is also subject to transparent oversight.
The force crime registrar has direct access to, and the support of, the chief
officer lead with whom he has quarterly meetings on crime recording.
