within the boundary, the development of a centralized, complex government and administrative
structures, an incumbent regime, which controls, monitors, or otherwise regulates the economic,
military, political, and social affairs of that geographical area; and 3) an attitudinally, culturally, or
ethnically homogenous population within that boundary which is “legitimately” or effectively
governed by that incumbent regime.
-How does ethnic heterogeneity in a territorial-state get transformed into a conflictual, ethno-
political heterogeneity. First and foremost, it depends upon the answers to five basic questions
regarding the origin and composition of the territorial-state. First, did the development of its
constituent groups precede the establishment of the territorial-state and how long before the state’s
appearance did the groups appear? Second, how did its constituent groups come to be in the
territorial-state? Third, how many identifiable groups does the territorial-state contain? Fourth,
what proportion of the territorial-state’s population does each group constitute? Fifth, are group
members regionally concentrated in their traditional “homelands” or widely dispersed throughout the
territorial-state?
-A second major consideration is the formal structure of the territorial-state’s governmental and
political institutions. In other words, what is its “constitution”?
-A final consideration, related to institutional formation and operations, is the general behavior of
regime incumbents who occupy the key decision-making positions in those institutions.
-The first phase of ethno political activity is the appearance of leadership “cadres” or ethno-political
entrepreneurs, who engage in four major, overlapping, but analytically-separable activities: 1)
defining ethno-political goals; 2) articulating these goals for and to group followers; 3) presenting
these to regime incumbents; and 4) mobilizing and recruiting ethnic followers into organizations for
political action in pursuit of these goals; which overlaps with the next phase.
-The second phase can be labeled “normal” politics. In the “democratic” context, resulting from the
activities of ethno-political entrepreneurs, this phase includes, the appearance and development of
organizations and political parties, as well a differential patterns of ethno-electoral behavior.
-The third phases can be labeled “abnormal” politics (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically-based,
politically-motivated, and premeditated riots, assassinations, bombings, terrorism, coups, or civil
war.
-For a given territorial-state, progression through the phases, especially the latter three, and the
observed frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each depend upon five major factors.
First, is there or has there been an external threat to the formulation and/or continued existence of the
territorial-state and all of its inhabitants. Second, what is the nature of ethno-political goals? 1)
substantive, 2) procedural, 3) symbolic, 4) constitutional, 5) fundamental. Third, to what extent are
regime incumbents, especially key decision-makers, drawn from one ethnic group? Fourth, what are
or have been the policy responses of regime incumbents to fully articulated ethno-political goals or
demands? The fifth major factor, intergenerational dynamics, concerns repetitions of the phases.
-There are, or course significant differences between ethno-political terrorism and other forms such
as those based on quasi-ideological movements (e.g., Baader-Meinhof, Red Brigades). First, while
its proportion of the territorial-state’s population may be minuscule, the absolute size of the ethnic
group in which the terrorists originate is likely to be large. Second, as a consequence, the amount of
verbal and material support upon which the terrorists can rely is also likely to be greater. Third,
these two differences will make it easier for an embryonic organization to gain initial recruits and
later on, to obtain replacements for those captured, injured, disabled, or killed. Fourth, these first
three differences typically lead to a greater frequency and/or severity of terrorist attacks, at least in
the initial stages of the organization’s activities. Fifth, intergenerational dynamics give ethnically-
based terrorism a much greater potential for long-run persistence. Finally, underlying everything is
the hierarchy of values or goals alluded to earlier.
-Reviewing briefly, when faced with the potential or real prospect of ethno-political terrorism, an
incumbent regime encounters four principle problems: 1) preventing or resolving immediate (e.g.,
hostage) situations; 2) apprehending and dealing with perpetrators; 3) formulating, adopting, and
implementing preventive countermeasures; 4) formulating, adopting, and implementing policies
(e.g., economic) designated to reduce incentives in the host group for future organized violence.
-Depending of course, upon ethno-political goals, it may be that “democratic” regimes have a greater
potential for accommodation and eventual solution than “non-democratic” ones.
-The “strength” of the ethno-terrorist lies in the intensity with which he holds his perceived